European Railway Comparisons: Final Report by Preston, J.M. et al.
This is a repository copy of European Railway Comparisons: Final Report.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/2160/
Monograph:
Preston, J.M., Shires, J., Garlick, M. et al. (2 more authors) (1994) European Railway 
Comparisons: Final Report. Working Paper. Institute of Transport Studies, University of 
Leeds , Leeds, UK. 
Working Paper 418
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
See Attached 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
   
 
 
 
White Rose Research Online 
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
 
 
 
 
Institute of Transport Studies
University of Leeds 
 
 
This is an ITS Working Paper produced and published by the University of 
Leeds. ITS Working Papers are intended to provide information and encourage 
discussion on a topic in advance of formal publication. They represent only the 
views of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views or approval of the 
sponsors.  
 
 
White Rose Repository URL for this paper: 
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/2160/ 
 
 
 
Published paper 
Preston, J.M., Shires, J., Garlick, M., Hodgson, F.C. (1994) European Railway 
Comparisons: Final Report. Institute of Transport Studies, University of Leeds. 
Working Paper 418
 
 
 
 
 
White Rose Consortium ePrints Repository 
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk 
 
UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS 
Institute for Transport Studies 
ITS Working Paper 418 
March 1994 
EUROPEAN RAILWAY COMPARISONS 
FINAL REPORT 
J.M. Preston 
J. Shires 
M. Garlick 
F.C. Hodgson 
C.A. Nash 
This work was financed by the British Railways Board 
ITS Working Papers are intended to provide information and encourage discusswn on n topic 
in advance of formal publication They represent only the views of the authors, and do not 
necessarily reflect the views or approval of the sponsors. 
GLOSSARY 
BR 
BV 
CFF 
CIE 
CP 
DB 
DSB 
ECMT 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
RENFE 
SNCB 
SNCF 
SJ 
UIC 
British Rail 
Banverket (Swedish Rail Track Authority) 
Chemins de Fer Federaux suisses (Swiss Federal Railways) 
Coras Iompair Eirann (Irish State Railways) 
Caminhos de Ferro Portuguesas 
Deutsche Bundesbahn (West German State Railways) 
Danske Statsbaner (Danish State Railways) 
European Conference of Ministers of Transport 
Ente Ferrovie dello Stato (Italian State Railways) 
Nederlandse Spoorwegen (Dutch Railways) 
Norges Statsbaner (Norwegian State Railways) 
Osterreichische Bundesbahn (Austrian State Railways) 
Red Nacional de 10s Ferrocarriles Espanoles (Spanish State Railways) 
Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Belges (Belgian State Railways) 
Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Francais (French State Railways) 
Statens Jarnvager (Swedish State Railways) 
Union Internationale des Chemins de fer (International Union of Railways) 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
In undertaking this work we would like to acknowledge the assistance of the following: 
Austria: 
Belgium: 
Britain: 
Denmark: 
Eire: 
France: 
Italy: 
Netherlands: 
Norway: 
Spain: 
Sweden: 
Switzerland: 
West Germany: 
Gerhard Ettlinger (OBB) 
Mr J. De Greef (SNCB) 
Chris Gore, Ron Williams, Martin Hwnphreys and Jackie Rowe (BRB) 
Torben Anderson (DSB) 
Harry McGeehan (CIE) 
Guy Dupre (SNCF) 
Wanda Specioso (FS) 
Dr T. Tieleman (NS) 
Egil Strand (NSB) 
Rafael Trueba (RENFE) 
Roberto Bauducco (BV) and Alf Eckstrom (SJ) 
Ernst Widmer and Walter Ellenberger (CFF) 
Roland Heinisch @B) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Institute for Transport Studies (ITS), University of Leeds and the British Railways 
Board (BRB) carried out a major comparative study of Western European railways in 
the late 1970s (BRB and University of Leeds, 1979). Follow-up work was carried out 
by ITS financed by the Social Science Research Council and reported by Nash (1985). 
It was deaded to revive this work at ITS for a number of reasons: 
(i) It is over ten years since the last set of comparisons (for 1981) were made at 
ITS and therefore a review of the changes in costs and productivity may be 
timely. 
(ii) There has been a number of technical developments that make the use of 
statistical cost analysis more promising. These developments include the use 
of more flexible functional forms such as the translog, and the development 
of comprehensive total factor productivity indices (see, for example, Dodgson, 
1985 and, more recently, Hensher and Waters, 1993). 
(iii) There is increasing interest in the organisational structure of railway industries 
as a result of the 1988 Transport Act in Sweden, the EC directive 91/4-40 and 
the publication of proposals for privatising British Rail in July 1992 (see, for 
example, ECMT, 1993). 
(iv) Given the explosion in information technology, there were some hopes that 
data availability would have improved. 
1.2 The aim of this project was not simply to repeat the 1979 study but rather to: 
(i) Compare the current efficiency of European railway operators and examine 
recent trends at both aggregate and disaggregate levels. 
(ii) Make an exploratory assessment of the potential for further disaggregation by 
market type in order to make detailed comparisons of market share etc. 
(iii) Assess the extent of economies of density and scale on European rail 
operations. 
1.3 The third aim was achieved through the development of a translog cost function 
using data published by the Union Internationale des Chemins de fer (UIC) and is 
reported elsewhere (Aldridge and Preston, 1992, Preston and Nash, 1993, Preston 
1994). The key findings are presented in ITS Working Paper 375. 
1.4 This study involved the following methodological approaches: 
(i) A review of the expanding literature on railway cost and productivity analysis 
to identify state-of-the art techniques and empirical findiigs (Nash and 
Preston, 19924, B, 
(ii) Published data was collected from the UIC, rail companies' Annual Reports 
and Accounts and, where available, from central Government statistics, for the 
following operators and countries: 
BR (Great Britain)* NS (Netherlands)" 
CFF (Switzerland) NSB (Norway)" 
CIE (Eire) OBB (Austria) 
DB (West Germany)" RENFE (Spain) 
DSB (Denmark)* SJ/BV (Sweden)+ 
FS (Italy)* SNCB (Belgium)* 
SNCF (France)* CP (Portugal) 
* Studied also in 1979. 
Of the 14 operators studied, 9 were also studied in the 1979 project. Only one 
company (VR - the Finnish operator), was included in the 1979 study but not 
in our current study. Annual Reports and Accounts for 1990 (BR 1990/91) 
have been obtained for all operators. National transport statistics for 1990 
have been obtained for Great Britain, Switzerland, Italy, Norway and Erance. 
In the summer of 1993, an MSc student undertook a study of railways in 
Portugal (Tao, 1993), and as a result the state railway operator in that country 
(CP) has been added to our study. 
(iii) Each operator was approached on a Chairman to Chairman basis. All 
operators agreed to co-operate with the study. Detailed questionnaires (a 
copy is included as Appendix one) were sent to all companies. All operators 
have returned the questionnaire, or provided additional data although in some 
cases not all the information reauested has been provided. The auestiomaires 
have been supplemented byLface to face inierviews with 73 of the 14 
operators. These face to face interviews were varticularlv useful in obtaininz 
kormation on the institutional, managerial A d  financ'ial structures of thi 
different rail operators and the degree of regulation that they face in the 
passenger and freight markets. This work is reported in detail elsewhere 
(Preston and Nash, 1992) 
(iv) The data collected has been entered into Works spreadsheets and preliminary 
analysis of performance and trends in operating, commercial and financial 
performance has been undertaken. This work was seen as being. the first of 
&o phases. A second phase would involve disaggregating resuGs by output 
and analysing market shares. The scope for such analysis has been examined 
in this first phase. Those operators that have the information required for this 
second phase will be identified and a prospectus for further research will be 
outlined. 
(v) An initial interim report was produced in March 1993 and circulated with an 
accompanying letter requesting comment to all co-operating railways. 
Comments were received from 10 of the 13 co-operating railways, and have 
been incorporated into this interim report, and the appropriate data bases 
updated. 
(vi) Following the revision of the Interim Report in June 1993, a time series data 
base was developed using UIC International Railway Statistics, covering the 
years 1971-91. From this data base a series of partial productivity indices (see 
1.8) were developed, along with other tabulations such as utilisation of freight 
stock. Graphing the resultant indices allows us to examine the long term 
performance trends of all 14 operators. This gives us a different perspective 
on European Railway Comparisons to that afforded by the Interim Report, 
which is a short-term, snapshot view. This work is reported in detail 
elsewhere (Shires, 1993). 
1.5 Most of the literature that has been reviewed relates to North American railways, 
with Caves et al. providing papers on total factor productivity measurement (1982) 
and the application of the translog cost function (1985). The translog is a flexible 
functional form that has usually been used to relate costs to output and input prices 
in order to determine economies of scale and density. Recent applications of this 
technique in Europe include studies carried out in Britain, using historical data 
between 1900 and 1912 (Dodgson, 1993), in Eire using time-series data (McGeehan, 
1993) and in Switzerland using pooled cross-sectional and time-series data for 48 
'private' railways (Filippini and Maggi, 1992). Other recent quantitative work has 
included comparisons of Australia's railways, based on total factor productivity 
indices (Hensher et al, 1992), and the passenger railways of Europe with those of 
Japan, Korea, North America and Australia, using a linear programming technique 
known as data envelopment analysis (Oum and Yu, 1991). 
1.6 There are a number of reasons why relatively little work has been done on comparing 
European railways. In particular: 
(i) European railways have a &verse range of outputs. North American and 
Australian railways are dominated by long haul freight. European railways, 
to different degrees are involved in inter-city, urban and rural passenger 
transport, as well as different mixes of freight traffic. Derivation of a 
comparable composite traffic unit measure is extremely difficult. Despite 
obvious problems, in the rest of this paper traffic units are defined as 
combinations of passenger kilometres and freight tonne kilometres. 
(ii) Although there have been recent improvements, instigated by the UIC, there 
is still a lack of comparability of accounts. Particular problems surround the 
measurement of depreciation and capital stock, interest charges and pension 
and social security liabilities. 
(iii) Government policy greatly affects fares, services operated and the degree of 
competition. This suggests that demand related output measures (such as 
passenger kilometres) may be poor measures of management performance. 
More meaningful comparisons may be obtained from supply related output 
measures (such as train kilometres). 
(iv) The variety of geographical circumstances, in terms of area, population 
density, industrial structure, strategic location, climate and terrain (including 
the need for ferry crossings) may make comparisons difficult. 
(v) European railways have a diverse range of inputs, for example with respect 
to traction power, and there are difficulties in measuring factor prices, due to 
different currencies, differing standards of living and taxation systems. 
1.7 We were aware of these, and other problems, at the start of our study and this 
awareness was reflected in the approach adopted, with its emphasis on gathering 
unpublished data on variables such as product mix, investment and capital stock. 
The outline of this report will be as follows. In section two, we present some 
background information on the role of European railways. In section three, we assess 
operating performance, whilst in sections four and five we assess commercial and 
financial performance respectively. In section six, we measure some aspects of quality 
of service, namely safety, reliability and punctuality. Lastly, in section seven we 
draw some tentative conclusions and make some recommendations for further work. 
1.8 Following our earlier work, we concentrate on the development of a series of partial 
productivity indices as follows: 
Receipts . Traffic Units . Train Km . Staff Nos . Staff Costs 
Traffic Units Train Kms Staff Nos Staff Costs Total Cost 
- Receipts 
Total Costs 
1.9 Of these indices we would classify Train Km/Staff Nos as being the key measure of 
operating performance, Receipts/Traffic Units and Traffic Units/Train Kms as 
measures of commercial performance and Receipts/Total Costs as a measure of 
financial performance. Staff Nos/Staff Costs and Staff Costs/Total Costs are best 
regarded as largely determined by factor prices. 
2. THE ROLE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN RAILWAYS 
2.1 Railways in western Europe are a minor mode, for both passenger and freight traffic. 
Table 2.1 shows that rail accounted for 7.2% of passenger kilometres made in 1990 by 
land based mechanised modes in our sample. This is a reduction compared to rail's 
8.4% share in 1980, despite a growth in absolute volume from 226 billion passenger 
kms to 256 billion. The reason for rail's relative decline is the continuing rapid 
growth of car use, which has increased market share from 80.3% to 83.3%. Only two 
countries in our sample (Ireland and Switzerland) have seen rail's market share 
increase between 1980 and 1990. Similarly, only two countries (Switzerland and Spain) 
have seen bus increase its market share. These two countries are also the only 
countries to have seen car lose market share, despite absolute growth. 
2.2 In 1990, the UK had the third lowest rail market share for passenger traffic at 5.4%. 
Only Norway (5.1%) and Eire (3.6%) had lower. Similarly, the UK had the third 
lowest bus market share (7.2%) with only France (6.0%) and Switzerland (4.8%) lower. 
The UK has the highest car market share (86.5%) in 1990, whereas in 1980 it had the 
fifth highest share, below Switzerland, France, the Netherlands and Sweden. At first 
this finding would appear to be difficult to explain given the UK's relatively low 
levels of car ownership. However the high levels of fares (illustrated in Table 3.5) 
reduce the attractiveness and competitiveness of rail in comparison to other transport 
modes. It should be noted that Table 2.1 does not take into account air travel which 
may be particularly important in certain countries (e.g. Norway, Sweden). 
2.3 Table 2.2 shows that rail accounted for 17.1% of freight tonne-kilometres moved in 
1990 by inland modes for the countries in our sample. This is a reduction compared 
to rail's 21.9% share in 1980. Unlike passenger traffic, there has also been an absolute 
decrease in rail freight movements, down from 229 billion tome-km in 1980 to 219 
billion tome-km in 1990. Rail's relative share has declined in all countries in our 
sample, although there has been some volume growth in four countries (Sweden, 
Italy, Spain and Denmark). Road freight is increasing its market share, up from 59.1% 
to 68.5%, at the expense of not only rail but also inland waterways and pipelines. 
2.4 In 1990, the UK had the third lowest rail market share for freight traffic, at 9.9%, with 
only Spain (7.0%) and the Netherlands (4.6%) having lower shares. There is much 
more variation in rail's share of the freight market than the passenger market. The 
highest market shares were achieved in Sweden (42.5%), Switzerland (41.6%), France 
(26.7%) and West Germany (20.6%), although the last three had suffered large losses 
in market shares since 1980. There are also definitional problems due to the fact that 
Table 2.2 does not include coastal shipping. For example, if coastal shipping is 
included as a mode, rail's share of the freight market in Sweden is reported to reduce 
to 29% (Hylen, 1993). 
2.5 Table 2.3 brings together what evidence we have available on traffic mix. It can be 
seen that BR has a greater dependence on commuter traffic and a lower dependence 
on inter city traffic than many of the other railways for which we have evidence. The 
main exceptions to this are CP and OBB. This may explain the relatively short mean 
passenger joumey lengths (only DSB and CP have shorter mean joumey lengths) and 
low loads (only SNCB and NSB have lower) exhibited by BR (see Table 2.4). 
2.6 By contrast, Table 2.3 shows that the freight mix is more favourable to BR, with there 
being a much greater dependence than any other country, with the exception of 
Belgium, on bulk commodities. Thus Table 2.4 shows that although BR has the 
disadvantage of short length of haul (only SNCB and NSB, due to the relatively short 
haul to Narvik, have shorter), it has the advantage of relatively large freight train 
loads (only SJ and NS have higher loads, albeit by a considerable margin). 
2.7 We have converted financial data to pounds sterling using the purchasing power 
parity (PPP) exchange rates given in Table 2.5. These are shadow exchange rates that 
take into account differences in the cost of living between countries (see, for example, 
Kravis et al, 1978). The shadow exchange rate, expressed in pound sterling, is greater 
than the market exchange rate for all countries other than Spain and Portugal, and 
is over 40% higher in Scandimvia and Switzerland due to the much higher cost of 
living in those countries compared to Britain. 
2.8 A further important difference between BR and continental European railways is 
highlighted by Table 2.6 and is the much higher mean actual hours worked per 
member of staff. BR staff work longer than the staff of any of the other twelve 
railway companies for which we have data. This differential has persisted despite the 
introduction of flexible rostering. The reasons must lie in the way that overtime is 
much more prevalent on BR due to the way that Sunday working has been 
traditionally rostered and due to the relatively low basic wage levels. Table 2.6 also 
shows annual salary costs per person and hourly wage rates. However, comparisons 
are notoriously difficult. Domestic labour markets may differ from country to 
country. Earnings in rail transport in each country may be broadly similar in relation 
to earnings in all industries across all our sample. Gross salary costs involve different 
levels of provision of state welfare benefits which need to be investigated further. 
Composition of the labour force may also be important. It may be that some railways 
have a higher proportion of high skill/high wage workers or more flexible working 
practices rewarded by higher wages. Nonetheless, Table 2.6 gives some broad 
indications that, although the annual earnings of BR employees are similar to many 
of their European colleagues, the hourly rates are some of the lowest (only CIE and 
CP have lower). 
2.9 Table 2.7 gives some indications of the role of geography on rail operations. It can 
be seen that the United Kingdom has a medium-high population density compared 
to the rest of our sample, but BR has a low amount of rail route per million 
population and a medium-high traffic density. Particularly noticeable, is the large 
variation in population density ranging from the sparsely populated Nordic countries 
(Norway and Sweden) to the densely populated Low Countries (the Netherlands and 
Belgium). It should be noted that the 300 route kilometres network of Northern 
Ireland Railways is not included in our data set. From Table 2.7 onwards all Tables 
refer solely to the activity of the dominant state owned rail operator in each of the 14 
countries studied, with the minor exception of Sweden where the figure are based on 
the dominant rail operator and the state owned infrastructure authority. 
2.10 Table 2.8 gives a brief comparison of the different car taxes operating within several 
of the countries whose rail operators are participating in this study. The first column 
aggregates taxes stemming from the ownership of a car and its use per annum i.e. 
road tax and fuel tax. Such costs accrue annually unlike acquisition taxes (second 
column) that are a one-off cost, associated with the purchase of a car. In terms of 
ownership and useage taxation, Britain is neither a low nor a high taxing country. 
Its annual charges of £530 p.a. is the mid-point of the range of charges shown in 
column 1, of Table 2.8, with France and the Netherlands having substantially higher 
annual charges whilst Sweden and Germany have significantly lower charges. From 
column 2 a wide range of acquisition taxes can be identified, ranging from VAT to 
Registration Taxes. Not only do the types of taxes vary from country to country but 
so do the rates these taxes are levied at, making comparisons of overall tax levels 
&fficult. This is illustrated by Britain, which levies one of the lowest VAT rates of 
the countries being compared, but on top of this levies a 10% Car Tax. If the various 
taxes are aggregated for every country the overall tax rate ranges from 20% to 30%. 
2.11 The total length of route (lans) BR operates is 16,584 kms, a figure exceeded only by 
the German and French operators, 26,949 kms and 34,070 kms respectively (see Table 
2.9). However over 50% of the German and French routes are single track only, 
whilst BR has double track on 70% of its route. The increasing returns to operating 
capacity and utilisation afforded by a double track mean that BR's overall operating 
capacity will be extremely high. Only the Netherlands and Belgium have comparable 
percentage levels of double track The other operators, with the exception of 
Switzerland, have less than 50% double track route with the Norwegians having the 
least (2.4%). 
2.12 Examination of Table 2.10, shows that 29.6% of BR's route is electrified. This figure 
is well below those returned by the majority of the other operators and is 
considerably less than the mean of 47%. These figures are tempered somewhat by 
looking at the total length of route electrified, which show BR to be both above the 
mean and many of the other operators. Another point worth noting is that BR has 
tended to prioritise electrification of its double-track route rather than its single track 
route. Other large operators have followed a similar strategy. However there is a 
lack of standardisation of electrification systems between European operators and in 
some cases within each operator themselves, with at least seven systems in use (AC 
11 KV, 15 KV, 25 KV, DC 750V, 1200V, 1500V, 3000V). 
2.13 The ratio of "track/routeU is illustrated by Table 2.11. Portugal, Norway and Ireland 
have the lowest ratios, with 1.26, 1.3 and 1.45, reflecting their high percentages of 
single track route (see table 2.9). BR has a high ratio of 2.28, which given its high 
percentage of double track is not surprising, but does not surpass Belgium which has 
a ratio of 2.76. 
2.14 The most noticeable difference between the operators in Table 2.12 occurs in the 
"average distance between freight stations" column. The mean distance is 10.4 kms 
whilst the figure for BR is 132.67 kms. The majority of the other operators range from 
6.8 kms to 11 kms. BR's figure reflects two elements, firstly the minor role played 
by rail in the UK freight transport market (it presently only has 9.9%) and secondly 
BR's policy of rationalising freight teminak and concentrating on sidings to sidings 
flows. 
2.15 Table 2.13 gives some indication on how geography may effect rail operations, as, for 
example, FS has the highest number of bridges per route km, whilst NSB has both the 
greatest length of tunnel and the greatest number of level crossings per route km. As 
a rule, densely populated countries, including Great Britain, tend to have large 
numbers of bridges; mountainous countries, such as Norway and Italy, have large 
numbers of tunnels. It is noticeable that Britain has the lowest number of level 
crossings per route kilometre in Europe. 
2.16 Table 2.14 shows that in 1990 only two railways out of the nine for which we have 
data (BR and SNCF) had a significant percentage of track capable of carrying trains 
at speeds in excess of 160 km/hour. However, a number of railways (most notably 
DSB and NS) had significant percentages of track capable of accommodating speeds 
in excess of 120 km/hr. 
2.17 Examining Table 2.15 shows that Britain's real GNP per capita belongs firmly in the 
middle category of those countries that are represented. Not surprisingly 
Switzerland has the highest real per capita GNP and Portugal the lowest. The second 
column shows the level of car ownership per thousand population, revealing a 
possible correlation between high levels of car ownership and high levels of real GNP. 
The level of car ownership in Britain is comparable to those experienced by Norway, 
the Netherlands and Austria, who also have similar per capita real GNP's. The 
figures in column three refer to rail passenger km per thousand population, and show 
that BR's provision of passenger kms is one of the lowest in comparison to the other 
rail operators. This comes as no surprise given the earlier table 2.1 that showed the 
UK to have the second lowest rail market share for passenger traffic (5.4%). 
Table 2.1: Passenger Transport ("l'housand Million Passenger Km) 
Source: ECMT 
Table 2.2: Freight Transport (Thousand million tonne-km) 
* Includes transport for hire and reward only. " Excludes own account operations 
Source: ECMT 
Austria 
Belgium 
1980 
1990 
1980 
1990 
Rail 
% 
11.00 
12.68 
8.04 
8.35 
39.9 
46.1 
23.6 
17.8 
Roads 
% 
2.88 
6.75 
18.31 
32.05 
28.7 
24.6 
53.9 
68.4 
Inland 
Waterways% 
1.56 
1.66 
5.85 
5.45 
TOTAL 
22.50 
27.46 
34.00 
46.88 
5.7 
6.0 
17.2 
11.6 
Pipelines 
YO 
7.06 
6.37 
1.80 
1.02 
25.6 
23.2 
5.3 
2.2 
Table 2.3: Distribution of Traffic by Market Sector (%) 
Source: Study Data N/A=Not available 
(I) Consists of Solid Fuels, Petroleum, Ores, Metals and Building Materials 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
CP 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ 
SNCB 
SNCF 
Table 2.4: Traffic Characteristics 
Source: Study Data. 
Passenger km 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
CP 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ 
SNCB 
SNCF 
Commuter 
45 
25 
18 
62 
27 
N/A 
N/A 
N/ A 
43 
30 
N/A 
N/A 
14 
Freight tomes kms 
Bulk (') 
76 
61 
60 
50 
N/ A 
39 
46 
34 
34 
34 
22 
70 
38 
Passenger Mean 
Journey Length 
(km) 
41.0 
42.0 
49.0 
25.0 
41.8 
33.4 
106.0 
43.3 
61.1 
50.8 
56.4 
78.5 
46.0 
76.4 
Inter-City 
38 
75 
82 
38 
73 
N/A 
N/A 
N/ A 
35 
54 
N/A 
N/A 
75 
Other 
24 
39 
40 
50 
N/A 
61 
54 
66 
66 
66 
68 
30 
62 
Other 
17 
0 
0 
0 
0 
N/ A 
N/A 
N/A 
22 
16 
N/ A 
N/ A 
11 
Mean Train 
Load (pax) 
89.0 
116.7 
124.2 
206.5 
107.8 
100.1 
193.1 
104.6 
83.2 
113.7 
128.8 
103.4 
56.7 
200.2 
Freight Mean 
Shipment Length 
(km) 
128.3 
161.4 
179.7 
246.2 
221.8 
215.4 
324.6 
166.9 
120.1 
202.3 
385.7 
349.5 
124.5 
358.7 
Mean Train 
Load 
(tomes) 
343.2 
299.4 
134.8 
235.6 
305.9 
245.1 
318.0 
365.5 
224.3 
314.6 
285.8 
471.0 
217.5 
303.7 
Table 2.5: Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) Rates 
Source: OECD. (1992) "National Accounts. Main Aggregates. Volume One. 1960-1990" 
Department of Economics and Statistics. 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
CP 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ 
SNCB 
SNCF 
Table 2.6: Mean Actual Hours of Work per Annum per Member of Staff and Annual Salary 
Costs (a 
Market Exchange Rate 
1.000 
2.467 
1.075 
253.206 
2.870 
10.993 
2128.100 
3.234 
11.119 
20.195 
181.055 
10.513 
59.357 
9.671 
Source: Study Data, converted to sterling at purchasing power parity exchange rates (see Table 
2.5). 
N/A=Not available 
Shadow Exchange Rate 
1.000 
3.596 
1.130 
169.786 
3.415 
15.452 
2323.500 
3.547 
16.108 
22.989 
178.98 
15.353 
64.532 
10.821 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
CP 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ/BV 
SNCB 
SNCF 
Hours Worked 
2472.34 
1643.74 
2383.65 
1911.81 
1505.69 
1569.30 
1656.00 
1567.15 
1603.18 
1621.55 
N/A 
1457.69 
1585.96 
1644.89 
Annual Salary Costs per 
person (E) 
15054.47 
21197.22 
14467.96 
8483.19 
26296.02 
13360.35 
22899.49 
18711.70 
13595.61 
14935.19 
19473.35 
14844.14 
24591.58 
18729.41 
Salary Costs per Hour 
Worked (E) 
6.09 
12.90 
6.07 
4.44 
17.46 
8.51 
13.83 
11.94 
8.48 
9.21 
N/A 
10.18 
15.50 
11.39 
Table 2.7: Population, Route and Traffic Density 
Sources: Population, Area: Times Atlas of the World (1990) 
Other Information: Study Data 
Table 2.8: Taxation of Private Cars - 1988 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
CP 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
RENFE 
SNCB 
SNCF 
SJ 
Source: International Road Federation World Road Statistics 1984-88 Geneva 1989 
Population 
per km2 
233.151 
159.860 
51.382 
110.3 
246.597 
119.071 
190.675 
433.559 
12.967 
90.633 
77.414 
327.934 
102.679 
18.898 
Ownership and use of Taxation1 (p.a) 
Britain 530 
Germany 380 
Denmark 573 
Netherlands 715 
Norway - 
Sweden 3942 
Belgium 447 
France 825 
':The exact definition is as fol1ows:annual taxes paid by a 1500cc private car travelling 
15000kms and consuming 1500 litres of petrol p.a.. All figures in E Sterling. 
Acquisition Taxes 
15% Vat & 10% Car tax,(wholesale price) 
14% Vat 
22% Vat & 1st Registr. Tax(83%-158%) 
Purchase Tax 16.4% - 24.6% 
5.3% Vat, Import Tax based on Value & 
Weight 42.5% - 105% 
19% Purchase Tax, 2% - 10% Import Tax 
25% Vat & Small Registration Fee 
28% Vat & Small Registr. Fee on HP basis 
':Includes special taxes on1y;not import tax and purchase tax. 
Rail route km per 
mil.population 
290.62 
440.00 
549.15 
333.68 
439.38 
457.01 
279.70 
190.15 
962.86 
693.29 
320.86 
350.71 
606.44 
1477.65 
Train km per 
route km 
26055 
41099 
7324 
13033 
22405 
23522 
19560 
41927 
9076 
20827 
13695 
44206 
14313 
9225 
Table 2.9: Percentage of Single And Double-Track Route 
Source: Study Data S-Tk=Single Track, D-Tk=Double Track 
Table 2.10: Percentage of Route Electrified 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
CP 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ/BV 
SNCB 
SNCF 
Mean 
Source: Study Data Elect.=Electrified N/A=Not available 
14 
Total Length 
of Route(km) 
16584 
2978 
1944 
26949 
2344 
16066 
2798 
4044 
3126 
5624 
12560 
10801 
3479 
34070 
10240.5 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
CP 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ/BV 
SNCB 
SNCF 
Mean 
Total Length 
of S-Tk 
Route(lan) 
4952 
1460 
1424 
14569 
1417 
10295 
1006 
3945 
2732 
3964 
9856 
9610 
895 
18283 
6029.1 
S-Tk 
Route % 
29.9 
49.0 
73.3 
54.1 
60.5 
64.1 
36.0 
97.6 
87.4 
70.5 
78.5 
89.0 
25.7 
53.7 
58.9 
% of 
Elect. 
Route 
29.6 
99.7 
1.9 
43.4 
9.8 
59.2 
69.9 
60.0 
14.7 
57.7 
51.1 
64.8 
65.9 
37.0 
47.5 
Total 
Length 
of 
Route(lan) 
16584 
2978 
1944 
26949 
2344 
16066 
2798 
4044 
3126 
5624 
12560 
10801 
3479 
34070 
10240.5 
Total Length 
of D-Tk 
Route(km) 
11632 
1518 
520 
12380 
927 
5771 
1792 
99 
419 
1660 
2704 
1191 
2584 
15787 
4213.1 
Total Length 
of Elect. 
Route(km) 
4912 
2968 
37 
11693 
230 
9512 
1957 
2426 
458 
3246 
6416 
6995 
2294 
12609 
4697 
Elect. 
S-Trk.(lan) 
235 
1450 
N/A 
2187 
1 
3833 
241 
2327 
55 
1586 
3805 
5804 
162 
1787 
1676.6 
D-Tk 
Route "/o 
70.1 
51.0 
26.7 
45.9 
39.5 
35.9 
64.0 
2.4 
13.4 
29.5 
21.5 
11.0 
74.3 
46.3 
41.1 
% of 
Elect. 
S-Trk 
1.42 
48.69 
N/ A 
8.12 
0.04 
23.86 
8.61 
57.54 
1.76 
28.20 
30.29 
53.74 
4.66 
5.25 
19.44 
Elect. 
D-Trk. 
(km) 
4677 
1518 
37 
9506 
229 
5679 
1716 
99 
403 
1660 
2611 
1191 
2132 
10822 
3020 
% of 
Elect 
D-Trk 
28.20 
50.97 
1.90 
35.27 
9.77 
35.35 
61.33 
2.45 
12.89 
29.52 
20.79 
11.03 
61.28 
31.76 
28.04 
Table 2.11: Length of Route and Length of Track (1990) 
Source: Study Data N/A=Not available 
Table 2.12: Passenger and Freight Stations 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
CP 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ/BV 
SNCB 
SNCF 
Mean 
Source: Study Data. For CP, information contained in Wagonload OD-DO Matrices MS 20550 (1990) was 
used. N/A=Not available 
15 
Total Length 
of Route(km) 
16584 
2978 
1944 
26949 
2344 
16066 
2798 
4044 
3126 
5624 
12560 
10801 
3479 
34070 
10240.5 
Total Length 
of Track@) 
37810 
7517 
2810 
60549 
5068 
31187 
6680 
5276 
3940 
10698 
18706 
17056 
9615 
70046 
20635 
- 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
CP 
OBI3 
ENFE 
SJ/BV 
SNCB 
SNCF 
Mean 
No of Pass. 
Stations 
(total) 
2490 
799 
N/A 
4430 
284 
2763 
389 
589 
760 
1456 
1624 
546 
563 
4952 
1665 
% of Elect. 
Trk/ 
All Trk 
Length 
33.2 
93.7 
1.3 
52.5 
4.5 
70.0 
N/A 
59.9 
26.4 
65.8 
N/ A 
64.9 
57.6 
46.0 
48.0 
Ratio 
Trk/Rt 
2.3 
2.5 
1.4 
2.2 
2.2 
1.9 
2.4 
1.3 
1.3 
1.9 
1.5 
1.6 
2.8 
2.1 
1.8 
No of 
Stations 
Total 
2615 
816 
121 
4809 
284 
2843 
460 
589 
772 
1563 
2257 
1055 
678 
5766 
1759 
Total Length 
of Elect. 
Track (lan) 
1%67 
7047 
37 
21771 
230 
21841 
N/A 
3161 
1040 
7036 
N/A 
11067 
5543 
32239 
11132 
Average Dist 
Between 
Pass. Stns 
(Km) 
6.7 
3.7 
N/ A 
6.1 
8.3 
5.8 
7.2 
6.9 
4.1 
3.9 
7.7 
19.8 
6.2 
6.9 
6.5 
Avge Dist 
Between 
Stations 
(Kms) 
6.3 
3.6 
16.1 
5.6 
8.3 
5.7 
6.1 
6.9 
4.0 
3.6 
5.6 
10.2 
5.1 
5.9 
5.7 
No of 
Stations 
With 
Freight Serv. 
125 
598 
N/A 
2776 
284 
2061 
71 
589 
201 
794 
1207 
827 
416 
3980 
N/ A 
Average Dist 
Between 
Freight Stns 
(Km) 
132.7 
5.0 
N/ A 
9.7 
8.3 
7.8 
39.4 
6.9 
15.6 
7.1 
10.4 
13.1 
8.4 
8.6 
10.4 
Table 2.13: Bridges, Tunnels and Level Crosssings 
Source: Study Data. N/A=Not available 
Table 2.14: Percentage of Track, following Maximum Admissible Speeds. 
Source: Study Data 
No of Bridges 
per Rte-km 
1.57 
1.38 
1.42 
1.17 
0.94 
3.81 
1.61 
0.67 
0.64 
0.96 
0.27 
1.13 
0.83 
Number of 
Tunnels 
283 
241 
16 
686 
N/A 
1955 
3 
725 
117 
226 
90 
115 
1409 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
CP 
OBB 
SJ/BV 
SNCB 
SNCF 
Number of 
Bridges 
26101 
4114 
2752 
31426 
2200 
61279 
4500 
2700 
2000 
5422 
2957 
3934 
28280 
No of Tunnels 
per Rte-km 
0.0171 
0.0809 
0.0082 
0.0255 
N/A 
0.1217 
0.0011 
0.1793 
0.0374 
0.0402 
0.0083 
0.0331 
0.0414 
BR 
CIE 
DSB 
NS 
NSB 
CP 
OBB 
SJ/BV 
SNCB 
SNCF 
Total 
Track 
37810 
2810 
5068 
6680 
5276 
3940 
10698 
17056 
9615 
70046 
Less th. 120 Km/h 120-160 Km/h 
Number of 
Level 
X-ings 
9338 
2126 
2564 
20267 
1786 
9993 
3303 
6805 
4361 
7154 
16083 
2720 
24338 
Total 
23835 
2305 
2515 
3636 
4940 
2940 
8101 
14290 
5961 
44561 
160 Km/h&M. 
Total 
8753 
505 
2553 
3048 
336 
1000 
2219 
2520 
3654 
14756 
L-X's/ 
Rte-km 
0.56 
0.71 
1.32 
0.75 
0.76 
0.62 
1.18 
1.68 
1.40 
1.27 
1.49 
0.78 
0.71 
YO 
63.04 
82.04 
49.62 
54.37 
93.63 
74.62 
75.73 
83.79 
62.00 
63.62 
Total 
5222 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
378 
246 
0 
10729 
% 
23.15 
17.96 
50.38 
45.63 
6.37 
25.38 
20.74 
14.77 
38.00 
21.07 
% 
13.81 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3.53 
1.44 
0 
15.31 
Table 2.15: GNP, Car Ownership and Rail Use - 1990 
Source: British Railways Board, Policy Office 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ 
SNCB 
SNCF 
CP 
3figures includes the former GDR 
Real GNP 
per Capita 
(PPP)i E 
5826 
7835 
3957 
6840 
6220 
5932 
5860 
5893 
6085 
4370 
6257 
6166 
6466 
2898 
Car 
Ownership 
per Capita 
376 
443 
228 
43P 
312 
433 
370 
380 
384 
308 
421 
393 
417 
242 
Rail Pass 
KM 
Per Capita 
595 
1882 
350 
709 
945 
788 
743 
495 
1101 
431 
712 
665 
1130 
538 
3. OPERATING PERFORMANCE 
3.1 In Table 3.1 we present our key measure of operating performance, train kilometres 
per member of staff. From the unadjusted figures (kilometres per staff) we can see 
that in 1990 the performance of BR appears to be reasonable, with only DSB, NS, SJ 
and SNCB bettering it. All the operators have experienced improvements in 
operating performance since 1977, in some cases quite s iwcant ly  e.g. BR saw a 32% 
improvement. S ice  some of the operators were not included in the original study 
of 1979 (BRB and University of Leeds, 1979) figures are not available for the year 
1977. 
3.2 Because we believe that freight traffic is more labour intensive than passenger traffic 
(Nash, 1985) passenger train kms have been weighted to take this into account. In 
the first comparative study carried out by BRB and University of Leeds, passenger 
train km were given a weighting of 0.45. This obviously makes a large difference to 
the absolute values but in the majority of cases only leads to modest changes in 
relative perfonnance. The major exception is NS whose performance is brought back 
into line with the other operators. However we now believe that the data we have 
for NS is probably the most reliable in this respect suggesting that freight services 
require 35% more staff than passenger services and that passenger train km should 
be weighted by 0.74. This weighting too has little affect on relative performance. 
3.3 Table 3.2 presents Train kms per Staff (1990) at the disagregate level. In the case of 
BR and SNCF, freight and parcel staff appear more productive than passenger staff 
in contradiction to earlier findings (Nash, 1985) that freight traffic was more labour 
intensive than passenger traffic. 
3.4 Table 3.3 shows another measure of operating performance, train kilometres per 
traction unit. Table 3.3 excludes shunt operations and locomotives with less than 750 
kw power. The utilisation of diesel locomotives is highly variable. However, the low 
figures for CFF, NS and SJ may reflect the role of diesel locomotives as back-ups for 
predominantly electrified systems and may also reflect the inclusion of small shunters 
despite our request for these to be excluded. More difficult to explain are the high 
utilisation figures for both CP and DSB. At this stage we are treating them as 
outliers, due to either missing or misinterpreted data. The utilisation of electric 
locomotives is less variable and generally much higher than diesel locomotives, with 
BR locomotive utilisation tending towards the upper end of the observations. 
3.5 The utilisation of diesel multiple units (DMUs) shows less variability than diesel 
locomotives. The utilisation of electric multiple units (EMUS) is more variable than 
DMUs and tends to be lower (CFF, NSB and RENFE are exceptions). BR utilisation 
of DMU's is good, but for EMU'S in common with France, Germany and Denmark 
the utilisation is poor, presumably reflecting the peaked nature of these operators' 
services. As expected both BR and SNCF utilise their fixed formation High Speed 
Trains very heavily at 378,884 km and 355,660 km (respectively) per m u m  per train 
set. What is significant is the similar levels of utilisation given the different 
geographical and operational characteristics facing the two operators. 
3.6 Table 3.4 presents further utilisation data, in the form of Vehicle Gross Tome km. 
BR utilises both diesel and electric locomotives very heavily, in the case of diesel this 
is especially so when compared to the other operators. Only the Portugese operator 
is especially so when compared to the other operators. Only the Portugese operator 
CP has a similar level of diesel locomotive utilisation, whilst the majority of the 
operators have utilisation levels of under 10 million gross tome kms. Levels of 
electric locomotive utilisation are more constant across the operators, with the 
majority of operators having utilisation levels greater than 50 million gross tome kms. 
The figures for utilisation of D.M.U.'s and E.M.U.'s refer to passenger vehicles only 
and show wide ranges of values. DB has the lowest level of utilisation for D.M.U.'s, 
260,000 gross tonne kms and DSB the highest 19.9 million gross tome kms. The DB 
figure is probably so low because D.M.U.'s are either being phased out or operating 
as a backup to E.M.U.'s. This is a policy also followed by CFF. The utilisation levels 
for E.M.U.'s ranges from 4.5 million gross tome kms for NSB to 20.3 miUion gross 
tome kms for RENFE. 
3.7 Table 3.5 attempts to provide a more detailed breakdown of capacity utilisation of 
passenger services. The first column shows that BR is a relatively high fare railway, 
charging 6.2 pence per passenger km, with SJ the company with the next highest fare 
(5.2 pence - adjusted using the PPP rate). This goes some way to explaining the low 
loads for BR passenger services (Table 2.4). BR's relatively low total vehicle 
kilometres per Lain kilometre reflects a greater policy of using shorter trains and/or 
multiple units than other countries. Given definitional problems, any discussion of 
the passenger km/vehicle ktn figure must be drcumspe~t but it doessuggest that if 
this measure is used as the basis for loads, than BR's loadings may not be out of line 
with the average in our sample. 
3.8 Table 3.6 provides a more detailed breakdown of the utilisation of freight services. 
In terms of freight rates per tome km, BR at 4.2 pence per tome km has the second 
highest rate of the eight railways for which we have data. DSB's higher rate (at 5.3 
pence per tome km) probably reflects a commodity structure that has a higher 
proportion of high value goods than BR's freight operations. There is a high 
variability in the wagon km per train km figures with those for OBB and SJ being 
particularly high. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 highlight the problems we face when attempting 
detailed disaggregate analysis with our current data set. In particular, we continue 
to possess little information from DB, FS and SNCF, the three railways which in terms 
of size, at least, are most similar to BR. 
3.9 Large differences in Freight Mean Shipment Length are illustrated by Table 3.6. The 
French, Spanish, Swedish and Italian operators have the highest mean length (all 
greater than 300 kms), whilst the Norwegian and Belgium operators have the lowest 
mean length (all around 125 kms). Similarly there are large differences in wagon 
turnaround figures, ranging from 3.2 days for the Irish operator, CIE, to 14.9 days for 
the Italian operator, FS. For the majority of the operators the figures are centred 
around 5 days. The fastest freight shippers are the Swedish (69.9 kms/day), the 
Danish (65.28 kms/day) and the Irish operators (56.2 lans/day), whilst the Belgium 
and Italian operators are the slowest, at around 21 kms/day. 
3.10 The age of rolling stock is examined in Table 3.8 for the Locomotive Fleet, Railcar 
Fleet and the Coach and Wagon Stock. BR has one of the youngest rolling stocks of 
all the operators, for example its electric loco fleet is 17 yrs old whilst the Norwegian 
fleet is 24.5 yrs old. Other operators with similarly aged fleet include the Dutch, the 
Italians and the Belgiums. 
3.11 Table 3.9 shows the level of productivity amongst the operators' train crew, terminal 
staff, maintenance staff and administration staff. The figures for BR refer to passenger 
traffic only (with the exception of maintenance staff) and so comparison with the 
other operators is not possible. A wide range of values are given by Train 
Kms/Terminal Staff, ranging from 13,889 kms per staff member for the Dutch 
operator, NS, to 1,307 kms for the Danish operator, DSB. On the whole the majority 
of the operators are centred around 12,000 kms. The Train Crew and Administration 
Staff Indicators show less variation with values being centred around 2,000 kms. 
More variation is displayed by the Train Krns/Maintenance Staff Indicator. The 
figures range from 4,464 kms for the Italian operator, FS, to 55,556 kms for the 
Spanish operator RENFE. British Raiis figure of 29,412 kms out performs the 
majority of the other operators but is still a long way short of matching the 
performance of the Spanish operator RENFE. However doubt can be cast on the 
RENFE figure given its widespread use of contract labour. In the questionnaire 
response we received, no use of contract labour was indicated, when in practice we 
know that large amounts of contract labour are used by RENFE. If such labour was 
included then the performance would in all probability be well down on the present 
figure. 
3.12 In this section we also present several of our time series measures, generated from the 
UIC data base (see 1.4). We have split the 14 operators into small, medium and large 
railways. Small railways were classified as producing less than 90 million train kms 
per annum, large railways producing over 170 million train kms per annum and 
medium railways producing between 90 and 170 million train kms per annum. 
Despite being classified as a large railway, BR appears alongside small and medium 
railways to facilitate comparison with all the operators involved in the study. The 
key measure of operating performance, train kms per member of staff, is illustrated 
by Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. Figure 3.1 shows a general trend of improvement in 
operating performance throughout the period for all the small operators. BR itself 
experienced little improvement until 1982, a year that marked a signhcant upsurge 
in its performance until 1989 when it started to decline. CIE has been left out of 
Figure 3.1 because of the difficulty in disaggregating rail staff from the total staff 
employed in all of CIE's operations. 
3.13 Figure 3.2 shows a similar trend of improvement in operating performance 
throughout the period. For most of the period BR's performance is well below that 
of CFF and SJ, only matching them in the late eighties. Throughout the period NS 
consistently outperforms not only the medium sized operators but, as Figure 3.3 
shows, the large operators as well. 
3.14 In Figure 3.3 all the large firms, with the exception of FS, follow the same pattern of 
little improvement in operating performance until 1982-83, after which large 
improvements take place. In particular both BR and RENFE show very sharp, large 
improvements in operating performance during this period. Whether such 
improvement is attributable to exogenous or endogenous factors is a question beyond 
the scope of this report. However the reorganisation of BR during the eighties and 
the upturn in the economy during the same period would appear to explain the large 
improvement experienced by BR during the eighties, especially considering the fall 
in operating performance from 1989 onwards, which coincides with a downturn in 
the British economy. Spain has experienced a similar set of conditions, a growth in 
the economy and a large expansion in the amount of train kms provided (Commuter 
Networks) for a small expansion in staff numbers. Unlike BR, the Spanish operators 
have continued to improve their operating performance through the early nineties, 
suggesting that it is mainly endogenous factors that have fuelled the improvement in 
operating performance. 
3.15 The finding of strong productivity growth for BR in the 1980's confirms the work of 
other studies, most notably Molyneux and Thompson (1987) who found output per 
head increased by only 0.8% per annum between 1968 and 1978 but by 3.9% per 
annum between 1978 and 1985. 
3.16 Also included in this section are two new indices, dealing solely with freight, Vehicle 
Size (Freight Tome Capacity/Total Freight Stock) and Freight Wagon Utilisation 
(Freight Tonne Kms/Total Freight Stock). In Figure 3.4 all the operators have 
increased their vehicle size throughout the period. In BR's case, the reduction of its 
freight market and its resulting specialisation in bulk commodities may provide some 
of the explanation. 
3.17 For medium sized operators, (Figure 3.5), the long term trend is similarly one of 
increasing vehicle size. In Figure 3.6 the picture is repeated, with all the operators 
moving towards larger vehicles throughout the period in question. By 1991 BR had 
reversed its early position and was operating some of the largest vehicles among the 
fourteen operators, with vehicle size increasing by 90.4%. This is again indicative of 
the fact that BR has rationalised its freight business to a greater extent than many 
other European railways. 
3.18 Freight wagon utilisation has increased significantly for all the small operators during 
the period, with the exception of NSB, whose growth has been less pronounced, 
(Figure 3.7). The majority of medium operators (Figure 3.8) have seen little growth 
over the period, even taking into account the distortion caused by the scale. The two 
operators who have significantly improved their utilisation are BR and NS, the 
former increasing utilisation by 993% over the period in question and the latter 
making exceptional improvements (but this may be distorted by increasing 
international traffic). What both these operators have in common is the sharp 
increase in utiliiation that occurred during the 1980's. 
3.18 The trend for large sized finns shown by Figure 3.9 is one of low growth throughout 
the period in question. The exception to this rule is BR, whose relative position, in 
comparison with the other operators, is one of high utilisation. 
Table 3.1: Unadjusted and Adjusted Train Kilometres per Staff 
Source: Study Data. N/S=Not in the original 1979 study 
Table 3.2 Passenger and Freight Train Kilometres per Staff (1990) 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
CP 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ/BV 
SNCB 
SNCF 
Passenger Freight 
5139 ' 
SNCB 20309 11536 
SNCF 3803 4599 
Source: Study Data 
Total Unadjusted Adjusted 
By 0.45 
1990 
1673 
1728 
1667 
1134 
1607 
1944 
861 
2261 
1555 
1101 
2065 
2328 
1998 
1518 
1977 
2417 
N/S 
N/S 
N/S 
1750 
2242 
1411 
3909 
2267 
N/S 
N/S 
2830 
1800 
2096 
Adjusted 
By 0.74 
1990 
2475 
2408 
2208 
1496 
2103 
2986 
1202 
3433 
2055 
1428 
2766 
2927 
2738 
1976 
1990 
3193 
3033 
2693 
1857 
2559 
3920 
1568 
4484 
2504 
1750 
3459 
3501 
3402 
2413 
Table 3.3: Utilisation of Traction Units Kilometres per annum (Excludes Shunt) 
N-A Not Applicable N/A=Not available 
Source: Study Data 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
CP 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ 
SNCB 
SNCF 
Table 3.4: Vehicle Gross Tonne Km By Motive Power (000,000's) 
Source: Study Data N/A=Not available N-A=Not Applicable 
Diesel loco 
km/ 
Diesel loco 
69571 
2904 
97373 
125000 
30230 
131244 
17814 
6987 
32910 
22796 
61378 
9819 
74119 
18075 
Operator 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
CP 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ 
SNCB 
SNCF 
EMU vehicle 
km/ 
EMU vehicle 
21863 
92415 
24600 
61638 
23152 
21572 
42999 
48049 
50057 
28079 
101652 
31701 
59570 
21113 
Electric 
loco km/ 
Electric loco 
164483 
79294 
N-A 
140527 
165010 
189000 
109288 
170089 
123705 
105703 
115452 
121952 
108160 
120608 
Fixed 
formation 
HSTs 
378884 
N-A 
N- A 
N-A 
N/ A 
N-A 
N/A 
N- A 
N-A 
N- A 
N/ A 
N/ A 
N-A 
355660 
DMU Vehicle lan/ 
DMU vehicle 
63624 
N-A 
N-A 
61736 
43309 
65242 
43631 
51783 
45136 
61649 
65608 
69630 
68417 
40509 
Diesel 
Locom 
Total 
50.00 
0.46 
24.02 
55.11 
8.70 
33.81 
5.33 
3.48 
7.40 
4.67 
22.69 
5.00 
32.71 
8.81 
D.M.U.'s 
Passen. 
10.93 
N-A 
N-A 
6.91 
0.26 
19.90 
3.71 
6.09 
4.20 
3.68 
13.79 
4.10 
4.13 
3.18 
Electic 
Locom. 
Total 
72.93 
16.38 
N-A 
51.87 
85.82 
16.30 
53.06 
74.79 
59.87 
53.70 
56.92 
69.56 
50.83 
76.53 
E.M.U.'s 
Passen. 
4.71 
15.09 
N/ A 
14.34 
4.97 
8.86 
7.70 
9.41 
4.49 
6.29 
20.32 
5.14 
7.93 
8.51 
Table 3.5: Capacity Utilisation on Passenger Services 
Source: Study Data N/A=Not available 
Table 3.6: Capacity Utilisation on Freight Sewices (Includes parcels) 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
CP 
DB 
DSB 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ 
SNCB 
Source: Study Data N/A=Not available 
Total vehicle 
km/ 
Train km 
2.92 
7.78 
6.36 
N/ A 
3.26 
2.54 
4.31 
5.06 
6.05 
6.26 
5.41 
2.42 
Passenger rev 
(pence)/ 
Passenger km 
6.21 
3.74 
4.05 
1.92 
3.95 
3.97 
3.52 
3.78 
2.92 
2.79 
5.17 
2.88 
Passenger 
km/ 
Vehicle km 
30.45 
15.00 
19.51 
N/A 
30.67 
26.07 
23.92 
16.44 
18.78 
20.56 
19.12 
23.45 
Wagon km/ 
Train km 
N/A 
21.97 
10.98 
N/A 
N/A 
15.29 
18.01 
29.66 
15.15 
33.64 
11.18 
Tome km/ 
Wagon km 
N/ A 
13.62 
12.27 
N/ A 
N/ A 
17.28 
12.45 
10.61 
18.83 
14.00 
19.45 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
CP 
DSB 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ 
SNCB 
Wagon km/ 
Wagon 
N/ A 
22012 
25265 
N/ A 
N/ A 
27248 
33437 
34003 
17780 
52480 
13690 
Freight revenue/ 
Freight tonne km 
(pence) 
4.15 
N/A 
4.20 
2.58 
5.29 
2.08 
2.75 
3.70 
2.93 
1.23 
2.52 
Table 3.7: Freight Wagon Turnaround 
a) Wagon Turnaround Data not Available, since a significant number of Freight Trains 
are of the "Merry-go-Round" Type, with negligible stopping time and absence of 
shunting operations. 
b) Mean Freight Shipment Length Unknown. 
Source: Study Data N/A=Not available 
Table 3.8: Age of Rolling Stock 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
CP 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ 
SNCB 
SNCF 
- 
Freight Mean 
Shipment Length 
(km) 
128.27 
161.39 
179.68 
221.78 
215.41 
324.59 
166.86 
120.12 
246.20 
202.31 
385.70 
349.48 
124.45 
358.73 
Speed 
Km/day 
a) 
33.6229 
56.15 
29.1816 
65.2758 
21.7846 
40.6976 
29.2976 
35.6812 
38.9058 
b) 
69.896 
21.0932 
29.165 
Wagon Turnaround 
Number of Days 
N/ A 
4.8 
3.2 
7.6 
3.3 
14.9 
4.1 
4.1 
6.9 
5.2 
12.1 
5.0 
5.9 
12.3 
BR 
CFF 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
CP 
Notes 
(1987) 
(1985) 
(1985) 
(1988) 
OBB 21.51 24.41 15.39 21.09 16.77 18.96 
RENFE 18.71 19.80 11.61 9.83 16.11 22.11 
SJlBV 23.33 23.46 13.61 7.95 27.14 18.77 
SNCB 19.67 25.26 18.64 35.00 20.44 16.63 
SNCF 22.78 23.14 12.84 19.46 16.24 19.07 
Loco Fleet 
Age (Years) 
Electric 
17.07. 
25.00 
22.99 
3.50 
22.25 
24.08 
24.51 
21.81 
Diesel 
23.94 
23.59 
23.49 
22.57 
17.30 
31.02 
23.39 
22.84 
Railcar Fleet 
Age Weam) 
Electric 
18.98 
19.78 
15.08 
17.84 
21.63 
17.65 
20.46 
19.47 
Stock Age 
(Years) 
Diesel 
16.30 
N-A 
16.45 
9.83 
18.68 
19.79 
18.53 
22.89 
Coach 
15.47 
21.76 
18.65 
17.68 
16.67 
7.80 
19.49 
22.17 
Wagon 
17.53 
22.08 
19.69 
19.63 
20.83 
20.56 
18.55 
23.08 
Table 3.9: Labour Productivity (kms per  staff^ 
Source: Study Data N/A=Not available 
* Figures just for passenger traffic only 
Operator 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
CP 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ 
SNCB 
SNCF 
Train Kms 
/Terminal Staff 
18868* 
7194 
12500 
N/A 
7937 
1307 
5128 
13889 
13699 
5435 
12500 
11111 
11364 
7519 
Train Kms 
/Admin. 
staff 
83333' 
32258 
22222 
N/A 
20833 
15385 
15625 
24390 
23256 
24390 
25641 
35714 
34483 
14493 
Train Krns 
/Mainte.Staff 
29412 
14706 
N/ A 
N/ A 
6849 
35714 
4464 
16949 
12048 
5102 
55556 
24390 
11628 
7692 
Train Kms 
/Train Staff 
16393' 
15152 
N/ A 
N/A 
26316 
27027 
11905 
32258 
25000 
21277 
17241 
35714 
20000 
24390 
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COMMERCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present our two main indicators of commercial performance. In 
Table 4.1 we present traffic units per train kilometre. This Table illustrates that the 
use of total traffic units can be misleading because many railways exhibit different 
results in their passenger and freight businesses and have different balances between 
passenger and freight traffic. For example, BR has relatively low loads in its passenger 
business, but high loads in its freight business leading to low loads overall, because 
passenger traffic dominates BR's overall business. Similarly, SJ has relatively low 
loads in its passenger business and high loads in its freight business but in this case 
has high loads overall, because freight traffic dominates SJ's overall business. The 
final column of Table 4.1 shows that BR has a relatively high dependence on 
passenger traffic. This column also illustrates the heterogeneity of our sample, 
ranging from dominantly passenger railways (NS, DSB) to dominantly freight 
railways (SJ). 
In Table 4.2 we present receipts per traffic unit. However, the total traffic unit figure 
is again misleading. In total SJ has the lowest charges in our sample, but if these 
charges are disaggregated it can be seen that SJ has the second highest fares per 
passenger kilometres but by far the lowest rate per freight tonne. This low rate is 
likely to be due to a combination of a dominance of low value commodities 
(especially iron ore) and long haul lengths. 
We now present trends for our two main indicators of commercial performance, 
traffic units per train kms and total receipts per traffic units. Ideally these measures 
would be diiggregated to the passenger and freight level, as in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 
but the UIC data-base has only facilitated an aggregate measure. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates that, despite yearly fluctuations, no real increase in loads has 
taken place over the period considered for the smaller railways. The exception to this 
is the Portuguese operator, CP, whose overall loads increased significantly throughout 
the seventies, due to new bulk freight flows. BR's loads have been constantly low 
throughout and have placed it well below those for other small operators. 
In Figure 4.2 a similar picture emerges for medium-sized railways, with no growth 
in loads between 1971 and 1991. Again BR performs unfavourably in comparison to 
other operators, who this time are medium operators. 
For the large firms, illustrated by Figure 4.3, there is again little long term variation 
in loads. Unfortunately for BR its performance compares very unfavourably with the 
other large operators, as it does with medium and small operators. However BR 
operates shorter trains than the other operators, so its percentage occupancy rate may 
not be as bad as suggested here. 
The measure of receipts per traffic unit is in pence. The total receipts measure is 
comprised of traffic receipts only, in an attempt to overcome any possible inclusion 
of operating subsidy. In so doing, we may have excluded some legitimate revenue 
e.g. from real estate, catering etc .... In Figure 4.4, the largest reduction in charges 
(another interpretation of receipts per traffic unit) over the period has been that 
experienced by the Portuguese operator CP. The reduction has been quite dramatic, 
plummeting from eighteen pence in 1971 to just over two pence by 1991. However 
this may be due to accounting conventions. The other operators have seen little long 
term variation in their charges throughout the period, with BR being consistently high 
in comparison with the other small railway operators. The gap in DSB's curve is 
caused by missing data for traffic units. 
4.8 In Figure 4.5 several operators have periods of short term variation, but over the long 
term the pattern is one of no or little growth in charges throughout the period. The 
exception here is with the Swiss operator, CFF, who experienced a strong rise in 
charges until the mid-eighties after which a steep fall occurred. BR again had the 
highest charges throughout the whole of the period. 
4.9 In Figure 4.6 the long term trend for RENFE has been a downward one, with charges 
falling from six and a half pence in 1971 to three pence in 1991. DB has experienced 
a long term rise in charges, from two pence in 1971 to four and a half pence by 1991. 
FS has experienced a long term fall in charges from six and a half pence to two and 
half pence. BR had the highest charges of all the large firms, a position also reflected 
in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. 
Table 4.1: Traffic UniWTrain Km 
Source: Study data 
Table 4.2: Receiptd'raffic Units (pence) 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
CP 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ 
SNCB 
SNCF 
Source: Study data N/A=Not available 
Total 
113.97 
158.11 
127.48 
175.21 
173.76 
119.27 
212.34 
120.45 
127.29 
181.48 
170.64 
249.23 
96.94 
234.66 
% of Traffic Units 
Passenger Kms 
67.5 
57.1 
67.6 
78.1 
41.5 
73.8 
68.2 
78.3 
45.0 
40.3 
52.7 
24.5 
43.9 
55.7 
Passenger 
88.97 
116.72 
124.24 
206.5 
107.75 
100.05 
193.14 
104.59 
83.18 
113.72 
128.80 
103.42 
56.68 
200.25 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
CP 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ 
SNCB 
SNCF 
Freight and 
Parcels 
343.17 
299.35 
134.81 
235.6 
305.89 
245.08 
317.97 
265.30 
224.30 
314.59 
285.37 
471.01 
217.46 
303.68 
Total 
5.77 
3.89 
3.63 
2.10 
4.28 
4.32 
2.37 
3.20 
3.45 
3.36 
2.60 
2.24 
2.96 
3.38 
Parcels 
N/A 
N/ A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/ A 
N/ A 
N/ A 
~ N/A 
127.10 
340.70 
N/A 
196.40 
N/ A 
N/A 
Passenger 
6.21 
N/A 
3.58 
1.92 
N/ A 
3.97 
N/ A 
3.52 
3.78 
2.85 
N/ A 
5.17 
2.88 
N/ A 
Freight 
4.15 
N/A 
3.72 
2.58 
N/ A 
5.29 
N/A 
2.07 
2.75 
3.70 
N/A 
1.23 
2.52 
N/ A 
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5. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
5.1 Table 5.1 shows the breakdown of total costs for the 14 railways in our sample. It 
should be noted that in most cases there are some residual, unallocated costs so that 
figures in the rows do not sum to 100. The problem seems to be due to the cost 
figure for supplies and services, other than fuel and power. Given such comparability 
problems, Table 5.1 must be interpreted carefully. Staff costs account for between 
43% (DSB) and 68% (SNCB) of costs, with BR being in the middle of this range. Fuel 
costs vary from 1% (FS) to 14% (CP) of costs, with BR again being in the middle of 
the range (5%). Other supplies and services vary from 5% (NSB) to 34% of costs 
(OBB). The high figures for SJ, OBB and (potentially) BR are probably due to 
accountancy conventions including certain forms of capital expenditure. Capital costs 
(historic cost depreciation and interest charges) vary from 29% (DSB) to 6% (BR). 
5.2 Table 5.2 attemvts to break down staff costs into more detail. However, this is onlv 
possible for eigh railways in our sample. Train operations staff account for betwe& 
23% (NSB) to 47% (NS) of staff costs (although azain there are definitional uroblems). 
BR is' ag& in the kddle of the range (at 32%)- Terminal staff account fir between 
15% (BR) to 42% (NSB) of staff costs (but figures are only available for six railways). 
Vehicle maintenance staff cost vary from 4% (NSB) to 22% (SJ) of staff costs, whilst 
infrastructure maintenance and operations staff account for between 8% (CIE) and 
30% (NSB) of staff costs. Administration staff account for between 9% (CFF) and 18% 
(BR) of staff costs. These figures may be affected by the contracting out of services. 
However, only two railways in our sample reported using contract labour, which 
accounted for 0.4% of BR's workforce and 1.2% of SNCB's, even though a number of 
other railways are known to use contract labour, particularly with respect to track 
maintenance. We have attempted to gain additional information here but have been 
unsuccessful 
5.3 In Table 5.3 we present the three financial measures. Staff numbers divided by staff 
costs is the reciprocal of the second column in Table 2.5, whilst staff costs divided by 
total costs has already been presented in Table 5.1. Hence, the key index is receipts 
divided by total costs, in other words, the cost recovery ratio. This index varies from 
0.16 (FS) to 0.82 (BR). However, many railways have important non rail business 
receipts and other (unspecified) income sources. For only three railways (BR, CIE 
and NSB) do these income sources account for less than 5% of total costs. If these 
income sources are included as receipts, the index varies from 0.27 (FS) to 0.89 (CFF), 
whilst the mean ratio increases from 0.46 to 0.63. 
5.4 Table 5.4 presents similar measures as Table 5.3, however in this case 
depreciation and interest have been taken out to give operating cost rather than total 
cost. Such a measure eradicates the differences in interest payments and treatment 
of historic based depreciation that exist between the fourteen operators. The overall 
effect is to increase all the ratios, most noticeably for CFF and DSB who have cost 
recovery ratios greater than one for their rail and non-rail business. 
5.4 In Table 5.5, we assess the direct govemment support per capita for our sample. 
Great Britain has the second lowest subsidy per head at £13 per annum, with Portugal 
having a slightly lower subsidy level (£11 per head) and Eire a slightly higher level 
(£16 per head). There is then a gap to Switzerland and Spain at £25 (and indirect 
support to CFF and RENFE may be important here). The highest subsidy per head 
is Italy at £95 per annum, followed by Belgium (£86) and Austria (£80). However, we 
are aware that the figures presented here are not always consistent with other sources 
and further work is required in reconciling these differences. A further point is that 
this figures have been presented as pounds sterling after adjustment using PPP rates. 
This is also the case for the figures presented in Table 5.6. 
5.5 In Table 5.6, we present estimates of future investment in the fourteen railways based 
on earlier work undertaken for the Department of Trade and Industry. This shows 
that projected investment in BR up to the turn of the century may be equivalent to 
over £17 per person per annum, with only CIE (with currently a near zero investment 
policy, although a major investment scheme, with EC funding, is being planned) 
lower, although the figure for Sweden (at £19) is not too dissimilar. High figures are 
apparent for Switzerland (£67 per head per annum), the Netherlands (£48), Austria 
(£42) and Denmark (EM), all countries with major capital projects planned and/or 
underway (see Preston and Nash, 1992). 
5.6 In the rest of this section we present trends in the three financial measures, staff 
numbers/staff costs, staff costs/operating costs and the key index of total 
receipts/operating cost (cost recovery ratio), based on UIC time series data. 
Operating cost has been used instead of total cost to overcome potential differences 
in operators interest payments and historic cost basis depreciation. The financial 
figures have been converted to 1991 prices and to pounds sterling (using PPP). 
5.7 The Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 refer to the staff numbers/staff cost index. To prevent 
misinterpretation some clarification is required at this stage. The index relates the 
number of staff per year that can be employed for a million pounds e.g. BR could 
employ 95 staff for a million pounds in 1971. 
5.8 The majority of operators illustrated in Figure 5.1 have experienced a long term trend 
of increasing staff costs in real terms. For example, by 1991 BR was employing 56 
staff for a million pounds. The exception to this has been the Portuguese operator 
CP, who have seen a signiEicant reduction in staff costs over the period. However, 
CP's initial figure of forty staff per million pounds in 1971 is quite surprising given 
that labour costs in Portugal are one of the lowest in Europe. It suggests that staff 
costs may have included other items such as supplies and services. As such we are 
treating CP's figures as spurious and ignoring them. BR has experienced long term 
increases in its labour cost, despite quite marked reductions in its overall staff 
numbers. The final position is one of near parity for BR and the other small rail 
operators. CIE is missing from this figure because we were unable to disaggregate 
the staff costs relating to railway operations from the staff costs relating to the whole 
of CIE's operations. 
5.9 A similar picture emerges in Figure 5.2, where the long term trend facing medium 
operators is one of increasing staff costs. At the beginning of the period BR has the 
second highest staff costs, a position that is reversed by the end of the period. The 
first three years are missing for OBB because of a change in accounting convention 
that removed part of the pension from staff costs in accordance with the regulations 
(paragraph 17) of the Federal Railways. 
5.10 From Figure 5.3 we can see that two firms, RENFE and FS, have experienced either 
no or little real term growth in staff costs. The other firms have experienced long 
term increases in staff costs, with DB's increase being quite marked. Despite quite 
large disparities in staff costs in 1971, by 1991 all the large operators are experiencing 
very similar staff costs, a characteristic of medium and small operators too. 
5.11 Fimre 5.4 illustrates the staff cost/ouerating: cost index for small railwavs. A slieht 
trend can be identified towards a redkction & the ratio throughout the p&iod, but &e 
only maior fall is that of the Danish overator DSB. BR emerienced a 1arg:e fall in the 
eariy seventies, but remained stable ihroughout the rest of the period.c' A possible 
outlier appears in 1981 (DSB), but until the accounts can be examined for that year 
we are treating it as a correct observation. CIE is also absent from this figure because 
of the problem of disaggregating staff costs. 
5.12 In Figures 5.5 and 5.6, despite yearly fluctuations the majority of the operators 
experienced little significant changes in the staff cost/operating cost ratio over the 
period. The exceptions to this general rule are SJ, OBB and RENFE. In comparison 
to the other operators, BR's ratio was consistently average throughout the period. 
5.13 The figures obtained for the key index of total receipts &vided by operating cost and 
presented by Figures 5.7 to 5.9 differ to those reported in the Interim Report, March 
1993 and replicated in table 5.3. This occurs because we have restricted the definition 
of total receipts to include receipts received from the passenger and freight rail 
business, only (as explaiied in 4.7). 
5.14 An examination of Figure 5.7 shows quite substantial differences between the cost 
recovery rates of the small operators throughout the period in question. Yearly 
fluctuations are also quite pronounced throughout the period in question. Again 
there is a possible outlier in 1981 (DSB). A general comment can be made regarding 
the overall picture these figures reflect. Many railway operators have important non 
rail business receipts and other (unspecified) income sources, which if included in the 
equation would significantly enhance their cost recovery ratio. This should be taken 
into account when viewing these figures. 
5.15 Figure 5.8 shows a similar picture as that of Figure 5.7, with the exception of SNCB 
and CFF who exhibit large declines in their cost recovery ratio over the period. The 
steep fall experienced by SNCB, from 1976 to 1977 is questionable and would suggest 
a change in accounting procedure which cut out an operating subsidy. In OBB's case 
the change in pension regulations explains the jump from 1973 to 1974. BR's 
performance is one of pronounced fluctuations in its recovery ratio throughout the 
period, peaking at the height of the eighties boom, 1988. 
5.16 The majority of the large operators, (Figure 5.9), have experienced falling cost 
recovery ratios' throughout the period, with the more pronounced falls being 
experienced by RENFE and SNCF. The overall picture for BR in comparison to the 
other fourteen operators is one of strength. BR outperforms all the other operators 
when only passenger and freight receipts are taken into account. 
Table 5.1: Breakdown of Total Costs (%) 
Source: Study data 
Percentages do not add to 100 due to other costs/unaUocated costs 
N/A = Not Available 
Table 5.2: Breakdown of Staff Costs (%) 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
CP 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ 
SNCB 
SNCF 
Staff 
59.1 
57.4 
47.7 
51.9 
60.7 
43.2 
44.1 
49.5 
60.0 
48.8 
53.6 
45.1 
67.9 
48.9 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
FS 
NS 
N/A NSB 23.3 42.2 4.3 30.1 N/A 
SJ/BV 25.9 20.0 7.4 21.9 12.6 12.2 
SNCB 27.2 23.6 N/ A 10.2 24.5 14.5 
Marshal. 
0.8 
6.3 
-- 
12.6 
N/ A 
Supplies and 
Services 
Train 
Opera. 
33.6 
26.2 
- 
27.6 
46.8 
Depreciation 
Historic cost 
4.5 
11.1 
0.2 
4.3 
6.3 
11.4 
4.5 
8.2 
5.9 
10.0 
12.6 
14.7 
5.9 
7.4 
Fuel 
5.0 
3.3 
5.0 
14.3 
5.1 
4.6 
0.7 
5.9 
3.8 
2.7 
8.8 
4.7 
3.1 
2.7 
Tenn. 
15.1 
35.4 
50.4 
21.8 
N/A 
Veh. 
Maint 
10.0 
8.4 
20.2 
12.0 
13.2 
Interest 
1.1 
8.6 
11.9 
14.5 
9.8 
17.7 
14.9 
7.1 
3.9 
1.1 
N/ A 
2.8 
8.1 
14.8 
Other 
N/ A 
15.5 
35.2 
11.3 
12.7 
18.3 
19.9 
16.9 
4.5 
34.4 
16.1 
32.6 
9.9 
20.3 
Infra. 
Maint. 
& 
Oper. 
22.2 
7.9 
19.4 
13.4 
27.6 
- 
Admin. 
18.1 
9.1 
10.0 
12.60 
12.3 
Table 5.3: Financial Indices 
Source: Study Data 
Table 5.4: Financial Indices 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
CP 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ/BV 
SNCB 
SNCF 
Mean: 
Source: Study Data N/A=Not available 
39 
Staff Nos/ 
Staff Costs 
(Ern) 
66.4 
47.2 
47.2 
96.5 
38.0 
74.8 
46.9 
53.4 
73.6 
67.0 
51.4 
67.4 
40.7 
53.4 
Staff Costs/ 
Total Costs 
0.59 
0.57 
0.77 
0.60 
0.61 
0.43 
0.44 
0.50 
0.60 
0.49 
0.54 
0.45 
0.68 
0.49 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
CP 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
RENFE 
SJ/BV 
SNCB 
SNCF 
Receipts/ 
Total Costs 
Staff Costs/ 
Operating Costs 
(Ern) 
0.63 
0.71 
0.55 
0.74 
0.73 
0.61 
0.55 
0.59 
0.67 
0.55 
N/ A 
0.55 
0.79 
0.63 
Receipts/ 
Operating Costs 
Rail business 
only 
0.82 
0.51 
0.46 
0.34 
0.44 
0.45 
0.16 
0.46 
0.49 
0.35 
0.42 
0.59 
0.27 
0.50 
0.46 
Rail Business 
only 
0.87 
0.64 
0.51 
0.42 
0.52 
0.63 
0.20 
0.54 
0.54 
0.39 
N/ A 
0.72 
0.31 
0.64 
Rail and Non- 
Rail business 
0.85 
0.89 
0.46 
0.73 
0.58 
0.78 
0.27 
0.58 
0.51 
0.72 
0.60 
0.73 
0.49 
0.68 
0.63 
Rail and Non- 
Rail business 
0.90 
1.11 
0.63 
0.90 
0.69 
1.10 
0.33 
0.68 
0.57 
0.81 
N/ A 
0.88 
0.57 
0.87 
Table 5.5: Direct Govenunent Support per Annum (1990) 
Source: Study Data 
BR Great Britain 
CFF Switzerland 
CIE Eire 
CP Portugal 
DB West Germany 
DSB Denmark 
FS Italy 
NS Netherlands 
NSB Norway 
OBB Austria 
RENFE Spain 
SJ/BV Sweden 
SNCB Belgium 
SNCF France 
Table 5.6: Estimates of Future Investment 1993-2000 (1990 prices) 
Adapted from: Department of Trade and Industry (1990) "West European Railway 
Component Study - Volume II". 
N/A=Not available 
Subsidy per capita 
(E) 
- 
12.9 
24.9 
15.8 
11.3 
46.8 
27.1 
95.0 
28.0 
38.7 
80.0 
25.3 
33.0 
86.0 
36.1 
Support (&I) 
736.70 
164.62 
55.74 
116.49 
2866.74 
139.01 
5454.20 
412.68 
162.74 
608.13 
989.12 
280.61 
852.78 
2015.37 
BR Great Britain 
CFF Switzerland 
CIE Eire 
CP Portugal 
DB West Germany 
DSB Denmark 
FS Italy 
NS Netherlands 
NSB Norway 
OBB Austria 
RENFESpain 
SJ/BV Sweden 
SNCB Belgium 
SNCF France 
Receipts (Em) 
2843.19 
753.33 
67.73 
149.81 
4486.65 
283.90 
1580.38 
452.80 
161.40 
713.19 
763.33 
555.78 
440.80 
3867.27 
Per capita 
investment 
per annum ( E )  
17.5 
67.4 
1.4 
22.0 
28.7 
40.5 
37.5 
47.8 
25.3 
42.3 
36.8 
19.1 
21.8 
27.7 
Investment (Em) 
Track & Signalliig 
4240 
2150 
N/ A 
1484 
10400 
1030 
15500 
4050 
500 
2040 
N/A 
990 
1280 
9600 
Rolling 
Stock 
3760 
1420 
N/ A 
326 
3660 
630 
1720 
1580 
350 
530 
N/ A 
310 
450 
2770 
Total 
8000 
3560 
40 
1810 
14060 
1660 
17220 
5630 
850 
2570 
11520 
1300 
1730 
12370 
UIC: Staff NumbersIStaff Costs 
Small Railways1 97 1 -9 1 
IICI 
FIGURE 5.1 
Medium Railways:I 9 7 1 -9 1 
FIGURE 5.2 Large Railways: 1 9 7 1 -9 1 
FIGURE 5.3 
UIC: Staff CostdOperating Costs 
Small Railways:l971-9 1 
0.9 
FIGURE 5.4 
Medium Railways:19 7 1 -9 1 
FIGURE 5.5 Large Railwaw197 1 -9  1 
FIGURE 5.6 
UIC: Total Receiptdoperating Costs 
Small Railways1 971 -9 1 
- 0 
1971 1973 19751977 1979 1981 19851985 1887 1989 1991 
Ymm 
FIGURE 5.7 
Medium Railwavs:197 1 -9 1 
FIGURE 5.8 
Large Railways:197 1 -9  1 
0.9 
FIGURE 5.9 
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6. SERVICE QUALITY 
6.1 In this section we present a series of tables containing qualitv of service measures. 
- .  
In Table 6.1 we examine accident rates, classifying accidents into 6 categories. From 
the number of total accidents column, we can see that with 1,230 and 1.178 accidents 
per year British Rail and the German operator, DB have significantly more accidents 
than other operators. Given the large size of both these operators this is expected, 
but seen in comparison with similar sized operators, such as FS and SNCF (556 and 
616) such figures stii appear to be high, possibly reflecting different reporting 
conventions. A more balanced picture is presented from the figures showing 
accidents per billion traffic units. These figures show that SNCF, CFF and FS enjoy 
the best safety records, with each of these operators experiencing less than 10 
accidents per billion traffic units. BR, despite having a high accident rate of 24.9 
accidents per billion traffic units, still falls short of OBB and DB's rates of 57.9 and 
68.4 accidents per billion traffic units. 
6.2 Table 6.2 shows data for the related measure of injuries and casualties per billion 
traffic units. Examination of the injuries per billion traffic units reconfirms the poorer 
safety records of CP and BR They once again have two of the worst safety records, 
with 27.8 and 11.6 injuries per billion traffic units respectively. SNCF enjoys the 
lowest injury rate, whilst nine other operators have injury rates under 7.7. A different 
picture emerges when examining the casualty rates. As one would expect Portugal 
has the highest rate, with 18 casualties per b i ion traffic units, however BR has one 
of the lowest rates with 1.7. CFF, NS and NSB have figures around the 3.0 mark, 
whilst Ireland has a figure of 7.4. 
6.3 Table 6.3 exhibits punctuality data for some of the operators being studied. Different 
geography, climate and operating practices all act to reduce the degree of 
comparability between the operators. Differences also occur in the definition of 
punctuation and in the level of disaggregation, which once again distorts 
comparability. On a general basis the Dutch operator, NS, appears to have the best 
record with 96.5% of its trains arriving within 5 mins of booked time and 97.1% of its 
long distance trains arriving within 5 mins. BR has 5 disaggregate measures, the 
worst performance is by Inter-city, who had 84.1% of their trains arriving within 10 
mins of booked time in 1991, a figure down on previous years. 91% of Network 
South East trains arrived within 5 mins of booked time as did 90% of Regional short 
trains. SNCF had 78.3% of its long distance trains arriving within 3 mins of booked 
time and 92.5% of all its regional trains arriving within 5 mins of booked time. The 
poorest punctuality figures belong to Norway's NSB and Swedens' SJ. SJ has only 
80.7% of its trains arriving within 5 mins of booked time, while NSB has only 78% of 
its long distance and 82% of its sburban trains arriving within 5 mins of booked time. 
This is partly a reflection of the extreme climatic conditions these two countries 
seasonally face, but also reflects the high proportions of single track working. 
Table 6.1: Accidents per Thousand Million Unit-Kilometre (billion traffic units) 
Source: Study Data Collis=Collisions Derailm=Derailment Acc=Accident Invol=Involving 
Th-M U-Km=Thousand Million Unit-Km 
Table 6.2: Injuries and Casualties per Thousand Million Unit-Km (billion traffic units) 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
CP 
OBB 
SJ/BV 
SNCB 
SNCF 
Source: Study Data 
Collis 
289 
19 
2 
421 
156 
151 
52 
33 
83 
42 
82 
70 
56 
Derailm. 
177 
22 
8 
170 
282 
189 
51 
20 
44 
72 
148 
119 
52 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
CP 
OBB 
SJ/BV 
SNCB 
SNCF 
Others 
306 
31 
14 
48 
1 
38 
23 
11 
223 
19 
6 
11 
55 
Injuries 
Acc.at Level X 
36 
40 
1 
228 
16 
32 
115 
24 
48 
55 
60 
19 
212 
Total 
570 
54 
8 
328 
51 
111 
82 
21 
200 
214 
49 
86 
140 
Pass. 
244 
15 
0 
113 
9 
60 
15 
14 
84 
50 
42 
54 
63 
Casual. 
Invol. Moving 
Stock 
422 
46 
3 
311 
0 
146 
50 
0 
22 
212 
16 
65 
241 
Injuries 
/ 
Th.M. 
U-Km 
11.6 
2.8 
4.3 
3.1 
7.7 
1.6 
5.8 
5.2 
27.6 
10.1 
1.9 
5.8 
1.3 
Pass. 
39 
8 
1 
45 
1 
9 
2 
4 
22 
6 
3 
0 
30 
Casual/ 
Th-M. 
U-Km 
1.7 
3.0 
7.4 
1.9 
0.9 
1.2 
3.0 
3.2 
18.0 
2.6 
0.7 
1.3 
1.6 
Agent 
306 
13 
7 
101 
10 
21 
15 
3 
58 
82 
6 
11 
10 
Tot. 
Accd. 
1230 
158 
28 
1178 
455 
556 
291 
88 
420 
400 
312 
284 
616 
Third-P 
20 
26 
1 
114 
32 
30 
52 
4 
58 
82 
1 
21 
67 
Agent 
22 
12 
2 
21 
2 
4 
1 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
14 
TotalAcc. / 
Th-M U-Km 
24.9 
8.2 
14.9 
11.2 
68.4 
8.2 
20.6 
21.7 
57.9 
18.9 
12.1 
19.1 
5.4 
Third-P 
23 
39 
11 
133 
3 
70 
40 
6 
106 
46 
13 
18 
144 
Total 
84 
59 
14 
199 
6 
83 
43 
13 
131 
54 
18 
20 
188 
Table 6.3: Percentage of Passenger Trains Arriving Within 5 mins of Booked Time(Un1ess otherwise indicated) 
Source: International Railway Gazette (1992). 
SNCB 
DSB 
VR 
SNCF 
BR 
CIE 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
Renfe 
SJ 
CFF 
Long Dist.[85%] 
Suburban [92%] 
- 
[3 min] 
Long Dist.[3] 
Suburban 
Regional 
Intercity [lo] 
Network SE 
Regional 
Regional long[lO] 
Regional short 
Long Dist.[lO] 
Suburban [2] 
Long Dist.[5] 
Long Dist.[l5] 
Suburban [5] 
Suburban [15] 
[41 
[51 
Long Dist. 
Suburban 
Long Dist. 
Suburban 
[lo] 
- 
Suburban [2] 
1985 
94.2 
- 
- 
- 
80.0 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
96.4 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
76.6 
66.2 
- 
90.0 
1989 
94.7 
- 
- 
87.0 
80.0 
- 
- 
- 
87.0 
92.0 
90.5 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
97.8 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
78.4 
78.3 
- 
93.0 
1990 
93.8 
- 
- 
89.2 
78.0 
- 
- 
- 
85.0 
90.0 
90.5 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
89.0 
97.3 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
87.5 
79.1 
- 
92.0 
1991 
93.5 
81.0 
94.6 
- 
- 
78.3 
93.2 
92.5 
84.1 
91.0 
- 
92.0 
90.0 
89.1 
98.1 
55.7 
80.0 
73.1 
93.7 
- 
96.5 
97.1 
92.8 
78.0 
82.0 
- 
80.7 
93.0 
- 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 The extent to which we have been able to disaggregate data in such a way so as to 
be able to make meaningful comparisons has been limited. Any policy conclusions 
we can draw are necessarily limited and highly qualified. 
7.2 Our overall impression is that BR's commercial performance is mixed, its operational 
performance is medium to good and its financial performance is good to excellent. 
The general impression that emerges is that BR is one of the most consistently good 
performers in our sample along with SJ, NS and CFF. However, most railways 
perform well with respect to at least one indicator. 
7.3 Given our inability to disaggregate data, we have not been able to compare all our 
results with those of the earlier (1979) study in any detail. However aggregate 
comparisons can be made for three indicators, market share, receipts divided by 
operating costs and train km per staff for nine railways (BR, DB, DSB, FS, NS, NSB, 
SJ, SNCB and SNCF). The results are shown by Table 7.1 and Figures 7.1 and 7.2. 
7.4 Table 7.1 summarises the findings of our most recent work compared with those of 
our earlier work in 1979. Between 1976 and 1990, BR lost market share in both the 
freight and passenger markets (down 41% and 17% respectively) at a greater rate than 
the average for the nine railways (down 20% and 12% respectively). However, 
between 1977 and 1990 BR increased train kms per member of staff by 32% compared 
to the 27% average increase for the nine railways studied. Moreover, BR increased 
its cost recovery ratio by almost 16% in the period 1977 to 1990, whereas the average 
for the nine railways studied showed a 22% decrease. Overall then it appears that the 
achievements of British Rail in the 1980's are impressive by Western European 
standards in terms of productivity and financial performance. BR has achieved the 
fastest rate of productivity improvement of any Western European railway other than 
that of Spain, and has ended the period one of the most productive railways, and 
certainly the most profitable national rail network, of Western Europe (see also Nash 
and Preston, forthcoming). 
7.5 Overall, our work has been slightly disappointing in that, despite repeated efforts we 
have been unable to collect anything like the desired set of data. In part, this may be 
because data availability has, contrary to our expectations, worsened since our earlier 
study. However, we do believe much of the data we require could be made available 
and we shall be pursuing this matter both with the railway companies themselves 
and with the research community. In terms of future research, we would suggest that 
two directions are worth considering: 
(i) Disaggregate comparisons of BR with two or three other railways. Of the 
railways contacted, only CFF and SNCF have stated that they can, potentially, 
provide all the disaggregate information we are interested in. This might 
suggest that if work was to proceed in this direction, SNCF should be 
targeted. 
(ii) Make comparisons at a service group level.   or example a BR Intercity route 
could be compared with inter-city routes elsewhere (possible cost comparisons 
could be made with CFF, NSB, SJ and SNCF) or Network SouthEast/PTE 
services could be compared with commuter services elsewhere (possible cost 
comparisons could be made with CIE's DART service, SJ's services in 
Gothenburg, Malmo and Stockholm or SNCF's Ile de France services). Some 
data has been collected on urban railways and will be analysed over the next 
year, as part of an MSc dissertation. 
Table 7.1: Market Share, Train Kms Per Staff and ReceiptsICosts Comparisons 
Sources: British Railways Board and University of Leeds (1979) 
Preston et al. (1993) 
Figure 7.1: Receiptsloperating Costs 
European Railway Comparisons 1977 and 1990. 
I-] :  =  
=  
I  
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EUROPEAN RAILWAY COMPARISONS 
APPENDIX ONE 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
EUROPEAN RAILWAY COMPARISONS - QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please give the following information, by market sector, for the railway business of your 
company (unless specified otherwise) for the calendar year 1990: 
A. ASSETS 
Passenger Freight Parcels Total 
1. Number of Locomotives: 
- Diesel (>750kW) [ I[ I[ I[ 1 
- Electric (>750kW) I[ I[ I[ 1 
- Other (<750kW) [ I[ I[ I[ I 
2. Fixed Formation I I[ I[ I[ I 
High Speed Trains 
3. Number of Multiple Unit Vehicles 
(including both powered and non powered vehicles) 
- Diesel [ I[ I[ I[ 1 
- Electric [ I[ I[ I[ I 
4. Number of Locomotive-hauled Coaches 
- Passenger carrying t I[ I[ I[ I 
- Non-passenger carrying [ I[ I[ I[ 1 
5. Number of Freight vehicles 
- Railway owned [ I[ I[ I[ I 
- Privately owned [ I[ I[ I[ I 
B. ASSET UTILISATION in thousand train kms 
6. Locomotives 
- Diesel-Kms [ I[ I[ I[ 1 
- of which shunt [ I[ I[ I[ I 
- Electric-Kms [ I[ I[ I[ I 
- of which shunt 
- TOTAL 
7. Fixed Formation [ I[ I[ I[ 1 
High Speed Train-Kms 
8. Multiple Units 
- Diesel-Kms [ I[ I[ I[ I 
- of which shunt E I[ If I[ I 
- Electric-Kms [ I[ I[ I[ I 
- of which shunt 
- TOTAL 
Passenger Freight Parcels Total 
9. Locomotive-hauled Coaches 
- Passenger carrying-Kms [ I[ I[ I[ I 
- Non-passenger carrying- [ I[ I[ I[ I 
Kms 
10. Freight vehicles 
- Railway owned-Kms I I[ I[ I[ 1 
- Privately owned-Kms [ I[ I[ I[ I 
TOTAL TRAIN KMs 
-Loaded I [ I1 I  I I 
-Empty [ I [ I 1 I  [ I 
C. TRAFFIC 
11. Passenger 
- Passenger Journeys [ I[ 
in thousands 
- Passenger Kms [ I[ 
in millions 
12. Freight (excluding parcels and departmental) 
- Tonnes forwarded I[ 
in thousands 
- of which international [ I[ 
- Tome Kms [ I[ 
in millions 
- of which international [ I[ 
13. Parcels 
- Tomes forwarded [ I[ 
in thousands 
- Tonne Kms [ I[ 
in millions 
14. Departmental 
- Tonnes forwarded I I[ 
in thousands 
- Tome Kms [ I[ 
in millions 
Passenger Freight 
COSTS in Domestic Currency - Thousands 
Train Operation 
- Train crew staff costs [ I[ 
- Train crew supplies [ I[ 
and services 
- Cleaning, servicing etc [ I[ 
staff costs 
- Cleaning, servicing etc [ I[ 
supplies and services 
- TOTAL [ I[ 
Fuel and Power 
- Diesel oil used [ I1 
for traction 
- Electricity used [ I[ 
for traction 
- Other ie lubricants [ I[ 
- TOTAL [ I[ 
Terminal Costs 
- Staff costs [ I[ 
- Supplies and services [ I[ 
Marshalling and Shunting (excluding engine power) 
- Staff costs [ I[ 
- Supplies and services [ I[ 
Diesel Locomotive Maintenance 
- Staff costs [ I[ 
- Supplies and services [ I[ 
Electric Locomotive Maintenance 
- Staff costs r I[ 
- Supplies and services [ I[ 
Diesel Multiple Unit Vehicle Maintenance 
- Staff costs [ I[ 
- Supplies and services [ I t  
Electric Multiple Unit Vehicle Maintenance 
- Staff costs [ I[ 
- Supplies and services [ I[ 
Locomotive-hauled Coaches Maintenance 
- Staff costs [ I[ 
- Supplies and services [ I[ 
Parcels Total 
Passenger Freight Parcels Total 
Freight Vehicle Maintenance 
- Staff costs [ I[ 
- Supplies and services [ I[ 
Track Maintenance 
- Staff costs [ I[ 
- Supplies and services [ I[ 
Structures Maintenance 
- Staff costs [ I[ 
- Supplies and services [ I[ 
Signal Operating 
- Staff costs [ I[ 
- Supplies and services [ I[ 
Signal and Telecommunications Maintenance 
- Staff costs [ I[ 
- Supplies and services [ I[ 
Fixed Electric Track Equipment 
- Staff costs [ I[ 
- Supplies and services [ I[ 
Administration 
- Staff costs [ I[ 
- Supplies and services [ I[ 
Depreciation - Historic Cost Basis 
- Diesel locomotives [ I[ 
- Electric lowmotives I[ 
- Diesel multiple units [ I t  
- Electric multiple units [ I[ 
- Locomotive-hauled [ I[ 
coaches 
- Freight vehicles [ I[ 
- Land and Fixed t I[ 
Installations 
- Other Equipment 1 I[ 
- TOTAL [ I[ 
- of which Transport Stock [ I[ 
Passenger Freight Parcels Total 
32. Depreciation - Current Cost Basis 
- Diesel locomotives [ I[ I[ I[ I 
- Electric locomotives [ I[ I[ I[ 1 
- Diesel multiple units [ I[ I[ I[ I 
- Electric multiple units [ I[ I[ I[ I 
- Locomotive-hauled [ I[ I[ I[ I 
coaches 
- Freight vehicles [ I[ I[ I[ 1 
- Land and Fixed [ I[ I[ I[ I 
Installations 
- Other Equipment [ I[ I[ I[ 1 
- TOTAL [ I[ I[ I[ 1 
- of which Transport Stock [ I[ l[ I[ I 
33. Interest [ I[ I[ I[ I 
34. Other costs [ I[ I[ I[ I 
Please specify 
............................................................................................................................. 
TOTAL COSTS [ I C 11 1 C I 
of which 
Staff Costs [ I C 11 1 C I 
Supplies and Services C I C 1 [ 1 C I 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE in Domestic Currency - Thousands 
Diesel Locomotives [ I[ I[ 
Electric Locomotives [ I[ I[ 
Diesel Multiple Unit [ I[ I[ 
Vehicles 
Electric Multiple Unit [ l[ I[ 
Vehicles 
Locomotive-hauled [ I[ I[ 
Coaches 
Freight vehicles [ I[ I[ 
Passenger stations1 [ 1I I[ 
Goods or parcel stations 
Marshalling Yards [ I[ I[ 
Traction and Rolling [ I[ I[ 
Stock Depots 
Plant and Machinery [ I[ l[ 
Passenger Freight Parcels Total 
45. Track [ I[ I[ I[ I 
46. Signalling and [ I[ I[ I[ I 
Telecommunications 
47. Electrification [ I[ I[ I[ 1 
48. Service Vehicles [ I[ I[ I[ I 
49. Rail Catering [ I[ I[ I[ I 
50. Administration [ I[ I[ I[ I 
Buildings 
51. Workshops [ I[ I[ I[ I 
52. Major New Projects [ I[ I[ I[ I 
Please specify 
53. Other [ I[ I[ I[ I 
---------.-...---.-.--...........----------------------------------------------------------------m---..-.------------------- 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE [ 1 [ 1 [ 1 C I 
............................................................................................................................ 
F. ACCUMULATED CAPITAL ASSETS in Domestic Currency - Thousands 
54. Historic Cost Basis [ I[ I[ I[ I 
55. Current Cost Basis [ I[ I[ I[ I 
G. INCOME in Domestic Currency - Thousands 
56. Receipts from passengers [ I[ I[ I[ I 
and freight shippers 
57. ContributionsISupport 
- Current operations I I[ I[ I[ 
- Investment items [ I[ I[ I[ 
- Other [ I[ I[ I[ 
- TOTAL [ I[ I[ I[ 
58. Receipts from customers [ I[ I[ I[ I 
of non-rail business 
59. Other income [ I[ I[ I[ I 
Please specify 
TOTAL INCOME I C I [ I 
Passenger Freight Parcels Total 
H. AVERAGE NUMBER OF STAFF EMPLOYED 
60. Train Crew 
-Drivers [ I[ I[ I[ I 
-Drivers Assistants/ [ I[ I[ I[ I 
Firemen 
-Guards [ I[ I[ I[ I 
-Travelling Ticket1 [ 11 I[ I[ I 
Examiners 
-TOTAL [ I[ I[ I[ I 
-of which contract labour [ I[ I[ I[ I 
61. Terminals [ I[ I[ 11 I 
-of which contract labour [ I[ I[ I[ I 
62. Marshalling and Shunting [ I[ I[ I[ I 
-of which contract labour [ I[ I[ I[ I 
63. Other Train Operations 
-Train cleaning 1 I[ I[ I[ I 
and servicine 
--  -- -- 
-of which contract labour [ I[ I[ I[ I 
64. Traction and Rolling Stock Maintenance 
-Diesel Locomotives [ I[ I[ I[ I 
-Electric Locomotives [ I[ I[ I[ I 
-Diesel Multiple Units [ I[ I[ I[ I 
-Electric Multiple Units [ I[ I[ I[ 1 
-Locomotive-hauled [ I[ I[ I[ I 
Coaches 
-Freight Vehicles 
-TOTAL 
-of which contract labour [ I[ I[ I[ I 
65. Signalling and Maintenance 
-Maintenance [ I[ I[ I[ 1 
-Operation [ I[ I[ I[ I 
-of which contract labour [ I[ I[ I[ I 
66. Track Maintenance [ I[ I[ I[ I 
-of which contract labour [ I[ I[ I[ I 
67. Fixed Electric Track 1 I[ I[ I[ 1 
Equipment Maintenance 
-of which contract labour [ 11 I[ I[ I 
Passenger Freight Parcels Total 
68. Administration [ I[ I[ I[ I 
-of which contract labour [ I[ I[ I[ I 
69. Civil Engineering [ I[ I[ I[ I 
-of which contract labour [ I[ I[ I[ 1 
70. Other [ I[ I[ I[ I 
-of which contract labour [ I[ I[ I[ I 
Please specifi 
TOTAL STAFF I I [ I C I [ I 
-of which contract labour I I [ I C I [ I 
-number of hours worked I [ 11 I[ I 
I. TRACK AND INSTALLATIONS 
71. Length of Line (Km) [ I[ I[ I[ I 
72. Length of Track (Km) [ I[ I[ I[ 1 
-of which electrifid [ I[ I[ I[ I 
-of which in tunnel [ I[ I[ I[ I 
73. Number of stations and stops 
-Passenger and Freight [ I[ I[ I[ I 
-Passenger Only I[ I[ I[ I 
-Freight Only [ I[ I[ I[ I 
74. Number of Depots [ I[ I[ I[ I 
75. Number of Workshops [ I[ I[ I[ I 
76. Number of 
-Level Crossings [ II I[ I[ I 
-Bridges [ I[ I[ I[ I 
-Tunnels [ I[ I[ I[ I 
J. GENERAL. INFORMATION 
77. Are more detailed cost figures available by passenger traMic type, for example: 
-Inter City yes  [ 1 NO [ I  
-Commuting Yes [ I No C I  
-Rural and other services Yes [ I  No [ I  
-International services? Yes [ I NO [ 1  
78. Are more detailed output figures available by passenger traffic type, for example 
by: 
-Inter City yes [ I  NO [ I  
-Commuting Yes [ 1  No [ I  
-Rural and other services Yes [ 1  NO [ I  
-International services? Yes [ I  No [ I  
79. Are more detailed cost figures available by freight commodity group, for example 
by: 
-Agricultural products 
-Foodstuffs 
-Solid h e l s  
-Petroleum 
-Ores 
-Metals 
-Building materials 
-Fertilisers 
-Chemical products 
-Other 
-International 
-Inter-modal? 
Yes [ I 
Yes [ I  
Yes [ 1  
Yes [ I  
Yes [ I  
Yes [ I  
Yes [ I  
Yes [ I 
Yes [ I  
Yes [ I  
Yes [ 1  
Yes [ I  
Not applicable [ 1  
Not applicable [ 1  
Not applicable [ I  
Not applicable [ 1  
Not applicable [ I  
Not applicable [ I  
Not applicable [ I  
Not applicable [ 1  
Not applicable [ 1  
Not applicable [ I 
Not applicable [ 1  
Not applicable [ I  
80. Are more detailed output figures available by freight commodity group, for 
example by: 
-Agricultural products 
-Foodstuffs 
-Solid Fuels 
-Petroleum 
-Ores 
-Metals 
-Building materials 
-Fertilisers 
-Chemical products 
-Other 
-International 
-Inter-modal? 
Yes [ I  
Yes [ I  
Yes [ I  
Yes [ I  
Yes [ -1 
Yes [ I  
~ - 
Yes [ I  
Yes [ 1 
Yes [ I  
Yes [ I  
Yes [ I  
Yes [ I  
[ I Not applicable [ 1 
[ I Not applicable [ 1  
[ I  Not applicable [ I  
I I  Not applicable [ 1  
[ I Not applicable [ 1  
[ I  Not applicable [ I  
[ I  Not applicable [ I  
[ I  Not applicable [ 1  
[ I  Not applicable I I 
[ I Not applicable [ 1 
[ I Not applicable [ I  
[ I  Not applicable [ I  
81. Is market share info~lnation available for the following passenger businesses: 
-Inter City Yes [ 1 NO [ I 
-Commuting Yes [ I No [ 1 
-Rural and other services Yes [ 1 No [ I 
-International services yes [ I No [ 1 
-All passenger services? Yes [ 1 No [ I 
82. Is market share information available for the following freight businesses: 
-Agricultural products 
-Foodstuffs 
-Solid Fuels 
-Petroleum 
-Ores 
-Metals 
-Building materials 
-Fertilisers 
-Chemical products 
-Other 
-International 
-Inter-modal 
-All freight services? 
Yes [ 1 
Yes [ I 
Yes [ I 
Yes I I 
Yes [ I 
Yes [ I 
Yes [ I 
Yes [ I 
Yes [ I 
Yes [ I 
Yes [ I 
Yes [ I 
Yes [ I 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
83. Is any of the information in questions 77 to 82 available for geographic regions? 
Yes [ I No [ I 
84. Are reliability standards set for: 
-Passenger services Yes [ I NO [ I 
-Freight services Yes [ I No [ I 
-Parcels? Yes [ I No [ I 
85. Are measures of reliability performance available for: 
-Passenger services Yes [ I No [ I 
-Freight services yes [ I No I 1 
-Parcels? Yes [ I No [ 1 
86. Are load factor standards set for passenger services? 
Yes [ I No [ I 
87. Are measures of load factor performance available for passenger services? 
Yes [ I No [ I 
THANE-YOU FOR YOUR HELP. We shall be arranging to visit you shortly in 
order to collect this questionnaire. 
EUROPEAN RAILWAY COMPARISONS - DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE - GUIDANCE 
NOTES FOR RESPONDENTS 
GENERAL 
Please give information for the rail business only of your company (including international 
traffic), unless requested to do otherwise, ie exclude bus services, shipping services, hotels 
etc. Give information for the calendar year 1990 but if this is not possible please give 
information for the financial year 1990191. 
Parcels services should include, if possible, postal and baggage trafiic. 
SECTION A - ASSETS 
Please give details of the number rail vehicles owned or operated by your company at  the - - 
end of the appropriate year (or the mean number of vehicles over the year if this is more 
readily available). Locomotives of less than 750kW power (eg shunters) should be counted 
seperately. 
SECTION B - ASSET UTILISATION 
Please give details of the use of rail vehicles. Treat vehicles used for shunting as a 
separate category. Non-passenger canying-Kms for locomotive-hauled coaches refers to 
coaches and vans used for freight and parcels. 
SECTION C - TRAFFIC 
Please give details of the amount of traffic carried by your rail operations. Departmental 
traffic refers to traffic carried by railways on their own account (eg ballast, sleepers etc). 
SECTION D - COSTS 
Please give details of out-turn costs of rail operations 
SECTION E - CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 
Please give information on capital expenditures in 1990 (1990191) at out-tuln prices 
SECTION F - ACCTJMULATED CAPITAL ASSETS 
Please give information on capital stock at  replacement cost a t  mid 1990 prices. 
SECTION G - INCOME 
Please give information on the income from your company a t  out-turn prices. 
SECTION H - AVERAGE NUMBER OF STAFF EMPLOYED 
Please 9ve  the average number of staff employed by your company over the year, or if 
this is not possible a t  the end of the appropriate year. Include casual labour and trainees. 
Treat part-time staff as units of full-time staff eg two part-time employees each required 
to work half the annual statutory number of days, according to the Railway's own rule of 
pay, should be counted as equivalent to one full-time member of staff. Show contract 
labour separately. 
SECTION I - TRACK AND INSTALLATIONS 
Please give figures for the end of the appropriate year, or the mean number for the year 
if this is more readily available. 
SECTION J - GENERAL INFORMATION 
This section is intended to give an indication of further detailed information that is 
possessed by your railway company and that might be made available for subsequent 
research. In the interviews information will also be requested concerning: 
(i) Objectives, including ownership and control, objectives and-constrainh and 
subsidiary activities. 
(ii) Finance, including Government support, investment and taxation. 
(iii) Competition and Regulation, including service and pricing policies, for the 
passenger, freight and parcels businesses. 
(iv) Investment in, and taxation of, competing modes. 
EUROPEAN RAILWAY COMPARISONS: 
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ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS: TRANSLOG 
MODELS OF RAIL OPERATIONS 
Dr J Preston 
January 1994 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this appendix is to outline the work undertaken by the Institute for transport Studies 
in developing a Translog model of rail operating costs which enables the estimation of economies 
of scale, density and scope for western European railways. In section two, the translog model is 
briefly described and some recent applications to the railway industry discussed. In section three, 
the data used to estimate a translog model of rail operating costs is described and the basic 
structure of the model outlined. In section four, some exploratory results obtained by Vigoroux- 
Steck (1987) for 13 railways for the period 1971 to 1987. In section five, this model was revised 
and updated to 1990. This work is described in detail by Preston and Nash (1993). In section 
six this work is extended to cover 15 railways (Tao, 1993, Garcia, 1993) and sensitivity analysis 
is undertaken concerning capital costs and economies of scope. This work is described in detail 
by Preston (1994). Lastly, in section seven some conclusions and recommendations for further 
work are made. 
2. THE TRANSLOG COST FUNCTION 
Transcendental logarithmic (or translog) functions were initially developed to examine production 
frontiers (see, for example, Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau, 1973), as work had shown that the 
assumptions of linearity and homogeneity that are made by production functions such as the 
Cobb-Douglas and the Constant Elasticity of Substitution may hold for functions involving more 
than one output or more than two outputs. In such cases, a more flexible function that permits 
a greater variety of substitution and transformation patterns is required. The translog production 
function, being quadratic in the logarithm of the quantities of inputs and outputs, is such a 
function as it provides a local second order approximation to any production frontier. 
By exploiting the duality between production and cost functions it is possible to develop cost 
functions that are quadratic in the logarithms of outputs and factor prices thus paralleling the 
translog production function. Reviews of translog cost functions are given by Dodgson (1985) 
and Hensher and Waters (1993). Their application to the rail industry is particularly appropriate 
given its multiple output, multiple input nature. Thus early applications of the translog cost model 
include the work of Caves et al. (1990). Friedlander and Spady (1981) and Caves et al. (1985) 
on Noah American Class I railroads. Subsequent studies have tried to improve the methodology, 
particularly with respect to the treatment of capital costs (Friedlander et al., 1993). The results 
of these studies, along with studies by Keeler (1974 - based on a Cobb-Douglas production 
function), Harris (1977 - based on a linear cost function) and Harmatuck (1979) are given by 
Table 1. They indicate increasing returns to density but, based on expansion around the point of 
means, broadly constant returns to scale. 
Table 1: Economies of Density and Scale for US Rail Roads 
The studies in Table 1 are based on Class I North American rail roads, which have sizeable 
networks, are predominantly long haul freight and have a high degree of specificity of rolling 
stock. The European railway industry is much more diverse. The few translog cost studies that 
have been undertaken in Europe have concentrated on historical data (Foreman-Peck, 1987; 
Dodgson, 1993) or have focused on Europe's smaller railways such as CIE or the Swiss private 
railways QdcGeehan, 1993; Fillippini and Maggi, 1993). The results of these studies are 
summarised in Table 2. As with the North American studies, the overall finding is one of 
constant returns to scale but increasing returns to density, although Dodgson did find that some 
of the larger railways in Britain in 1912, including the Great Western, exhibiting diseconomies 
of density and Fillippini and Maggi tend to find increasing returns to scale for the small, so called 
private, railways in Switzerland. 
Table 2: Economies of Scale and Density for European Railways 
Returns 
to 
1.16 
- 
1.92 
1.72 
1.79 
1.76 
2.24 (SR) 
4.03 (LR) 
Returns to Scale 
Friedlander and 
S P ~ ~ Y  
Caves et al. 
Harmatuck 
Harnis 
Keeler 
Caves et al. 
Friedlander et al. 
Fixed haul 
and trip 
length 
0.88-1.08 
1.01 
1.01 
0.93 
1.01 
0.98 
1.27 (SR) 
1981 
1980 
1979 
1977 
1974 
1985 
1993 
Foreman-Peck 
(1987) 
Dodgson (1993) 
McGeehan (1993) 
Fillippini and 
Maggi (1993) 
Increased 
haul and 
trip length 
1.07-1.37 
1.13 
1.02 
1.02 
- 
1 .OO 
1.21 (LR) 
*Includes United States, Australia, Canada and India 
Data 
ppp 
(a) Britain 1865 
@) 12 countries 1940- 
1910' 
(a) Britain 1912 - 
Translog 
@) Log 
Linear 
CIE 1973-1983 
Swiss Private Railways 
1985-1988 
Returns 
to Scale 
1.05 
1.25 
(Capital Costs 
Only) 
1.00 
1.00 
0.99 
1.03-1.35 
0.81 
>1.00 
1.33 
1.45-1.55 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A data set has been assembled for 15 western European railways (listed in table 3) for the period 
1971 to 1990 based on information published by the Union Internationale des Chemins de fer 
(UIC). The data set consists principally of total operating costs, three input prices (Labour, 
Energy, Materials and Services and three outputs (passenger train kms, freight train kms and 
length of route). The variables used are listed in Table 4. 
Table 3: Railways Included in the Study 
Country 
Great Britain 
Switzerland 
Eire 
West 
Germany 
Denmark 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Austria 
Spain 
Belgium 
France 
Sweden 
Portugal 
Finland 
Acronym 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
RENFE 
SNCB 
SNCF 
SJIBV 
CP 
VR 
Name 
British Rail 
Chemins de Fer Federaux Suisses 
Coras Iompair E'ieann 
Deutsche Bundesbahn 
Danske Statsbaner 
Ente Ferrovie dello Stato 
Nederlandse Spoorwegen 
Norges Statsbaner 
Osterreichische Bundesbahn 
Red Nacional de 10s Ferrocaniles Espanoles 
Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Belges 
Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer 
Francais 
Statens JarnvagerBanverket 
Caminhos de Ferro Portugueses 
Valtiomautatiet 
Table 4: Definition of Key Variables 
A number of points should be stressed. 
RTC 
WM 
WE 
WV 
TKT 
%TKP 
LL 
YEAR 
DBR 
DCFF 
Firstly, we concentrate on operating costs because there are major problems of comparability 
concerning published data on depreciation, capital stock and interest. However, our definition of 
operating costs includes expenditure on materials and services. This will be affected by 
accounting policy. For example, up to financial year 1992193, BR treated expenditure on track, 
signalling, electrification and associated structures and buildings as an operating rather than a 
capital cost. As a result, for BR, operating costs are 94.6% of all costs, whilst, at the other 
extreme, for DSB operating costs are only 66.1% of all costs (Preston et al., 1993). Secondly, 
we concentrate on a supply-related, intermediate output measure, train kms. This is because 
demand-related, final output measures, such as passenger-kms and freight tonne-kms are affected 
by differing Government policies concerning fare levels, services operated and the degree of 
competition and therefore may be poor measures of managerial and organisational performance. 
Our measure of network output, length of line, fails to take into account quality. Length of track 
would be a better measure but this data is incomplete for many railways in our sample. Thirdly, 
our data is made comparable between time periods by expressing costs in 1990 prices and 
converting to pounds sterling through the use of purchasing power parity rates published by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Lastly, it should be noted 
that our models assume that all railway firms are cost minimisers. This may not be true for some 
of the railways in our sample. In particular, FS is an outlier in our sample. 
Railway Total Operating Costs (excludes depreciation and interest charges (E 
million) 
Price of labour (E per employee) calculated as salary costs divided by staff 
numbers 
E'rice of energy (E per thousand train km) calculated as energy costs divided by 
total train km 
Price of materials and services (f per thousand train km) calculated as materials 
and service costs divided by total train km 
Total Train km for all types of traction (thousands) 
Percentage of Total Train km operated by passenger services 
Length of route at the end of year (km) 
Time trend variable 
Dummy Variable for British Rail 
Dummy Variable for Chemins de Fer Federaux Suisses etc. 
The analytical method we choose to use is the transcendental logarithmic (translog) cost function, 
which in our case takes the form: 
(1) 
In RTC =aa + x aJnYi + x @nPj + 112x G$nYJnY, + 112x x &,lnPjlnPm 
i i i k j m 
where Yi,k = Output measures (TKT, %TKP, LL) 
pi,m = Factor prices (WM, WE, WV) 
Dn = Railway specific dummy variable 
T = Time Trend 
Z = Error term. 
For homogeneity of degree one in input prices, we require that the following restrictions be 
satisfied: 
Input cost shares can then be derived using Shepherd's lemma. In general: 
where Wj = cost share of input i 
Xj = quantity of input i. 
So for the translog: 
4. EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS 
Exploratory analysis was undertaken by Vigoroux-Steck, who made use of a sub-set of our data, 
based on 13 European railways (CP and RENFE excluded) for the years 1971 to 1987. This data 
set has also been used by Jara-Diaz and Munizaga (1992). A unrestricted translog model was 
developed using ordinary least squares and the resultant model is given by Table 5. 
Table 5: Translog Model - Exploratory Analysis 
- 0.2611nWM . LnWE + 0.0671nWM . lnWV - 0.1681nWM . lnTKT (-5.9) (1.7) (-4.7) 
+ 0.35DBR + 0.38DCFF - 0.12DCIE + OAODDB + 0.15DDSB + 0.48DFS (2.7) (4.9) (-1.1) (2.0) (2.4) (4.3) 
Source: Vigoroux-Steck, 1989 
The model involved the estimation of 41 parameter values, of which 11 were insignificant at the 
10% level. From this model the elasticity of cost with respect to size of output (train km), 
holding density constant, could be calculated as: 
q, = a Ln RTC 
a Ln TKT 
with returns to scale (RTS) estimated as llq, and constant returns where 11, = 1. 
Similarly, the elasticity of cost with respect to traffic density, holding train km constant, was 
calculated as: 
qd = a Ln RTC 
a Ln DEN 
In this case, returns to density (RTD) were estimated as 1 - qd, with constant returns where q, 
= 0. 
Table 6: Returns to Density and Scale - Exploratoly Results 
* The corresponding dummy variable was insignificant at the 10% level. 
These initial results are given by Table Seven. In terms of returns to density, two railways exhibit 
decreasing returns (RTD < 1). These two railways (CFF and NS) have high traffic densities with 
in excess of 40,000 train km per line km per annum. Two other railways @SB and SNCB) 
exhibit constant returns to density (RTD = 1). whilst all other railways exhibit increasing returns 
to density (RlB > 1). These include the large state operators (BR, DB, FS, and SNCF), the 
Nordic operators WSB, SJ and VR) and the lightly used CIE and, to a lesser extent, OBB 
networks. 
Operator 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
SJ 
SNCB 
SNCF 
VR 
In terms of return to scale, the pattern that emerges is that the larger railways (BR, DB, FS, SJ 
and SNCF) have decreasing returns to scale (RTS 4 I), whilst the smaller railways (CFF, CIE, 
Network size 
m) 
16584 
2978 
1944 
26949 
2344 
16066 
2798 
4044 
5624 
10801 
3479 
34070 
5867 
Network density 
(train km per line km) 
26837 
41099 
7323 
22405 
22252 
19560 
41928 
9076 
20839 
9225 
26675 
14314 
6993 
RTD 
1.45 
0.88 
1.30 
1.72 
0.99 
1.56 
0.80 
1.55 
1.44 
1.83 
1.07 
1.96 
1.79 
RTS 
0.86 
1.35 
1.51 
0.78 
1.45 
0.83 
1.46 
1.15 
0.96 
0.88 
1.23 
0.72 
1.04 
Operator 
Comparisons 
1.40 
1.48 
0.90* 
1.46 
1.19 
1.60 
1.07* 
0.94 
1.97 
0.79 
1.75, 
0.99* 
1.00 
DSB, NS, NSB and SNCB) have increasing returns to scale (RTS > 1). Two medium sized 
railways (OBB and VR) exhibit approximate constant returns to scale (RTD = 1). This suggests 
that optimal network size may be around 5,000 to 6,000km. This might suggest that the BR 
network could be split into three units, the DB network could he split into five units and the 
SNCF network could be split into six units. 
The findings from the exploratory analysis concerning returns to scale and density seemed 
plausible. The interpretation of the operator dummy variable also has some plausibility indicating 
that OBB, SNCB and FS were cost inefficient. However, the finding that, all other things being 
equal, BR's costs were 40% greater than those of VR was not thought to be plausible. 
5. INTERMEDIATE ANALYSIS 
Further analysis was undertaken, reported by Aldridge and Preston (1992) and Preston and Nash 
(1993) and involved four main amendments. 
Firstly the data was up-dated from 1987 to 1990 and re-indexed to incorporate the most recent 
information on international prices. Secondly, the cost model was constrained to ensure linear 
homogeneity of degree one in factor prices, so that if all factor prices increase by lo%, costs 
increase by 10%. This was done by introducing the constraints given by equation (2). 
The constrained model was estimated using the Statistical Analysis Systems computer package 
(SAS, 1988), with the restrictions being imposed by the method of Lagrangian parameters 
associated with Pringle and Raynor (1971). Thirdly, problems of heteroscedasticity introduced 
by the use of pooled time-series and cross-sectional data was reduced by re-defi~ng variables 
around the sample mean as suggested by Mundlack (1978). Fourthly, the RTD and RTS measures 
were redefined so as to he consistent with other studies, principally Caves et al. (1985). The 
measure of RTD used by Vigoroux-Steck was a long run one, in that in order to increase density, 
given constant total train km, track length must be reduced. A more common, short run, measure 
of density examines the changes in costs as a result of changes in total train kms, given constant 
track length. Thus in our further analysis the variable DEN was replaced by LL. The resultant 
model is given in Table 7. It should he noted that 14 out of 41 parameters are insignificant at 
the 10% level, including the LL first order term and five out of six cross terms. With this model 
we define: 
- q l  = aLnRTC ; q2 - a Ln RTC 
a ~n TKT a ~n LL 
RTD = l/ql ; RTS = lI(q, + qJ 
Table 7:: Translog Model - Further Analysis 
Source: Aldridge and Preston, 1992 
Table 8: Returns to Density and Scale - Further Results 
* The corresponding dummy variable was insignificant at the 10% level. 
n.a. Not appropriate 
The results of this further analysis are given by Table Eight. In terms of returns to scale, our 
models suggest the largest railways (BR, DB, FS, SJ and SNCF) exhibit decreasing returns but 
are now joined by the medium sized railways (NSB, OBB and VR). The smaller railways have 
increasing returns to scale, with the anomalous exception of the smallest railway in our sample 
(CIE), which exhibits constant returns to scale. 
Operator 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
SJ 
SNCB 
SNCF 
VR 
In terms of return to density, the most densely used railways (CFF, NS) continue to exhibit 
decreasing returns, whilst DSB and SNCB continue to exhibit broadly constant returns. All other 
railways exhibit increasing returns to density. In the case of SJ and VR these economies of 
density are such that the elasticity of rail costs with respect to train kilometres is the wrong sign. 
q 2  
0.68 
-0.49 
0.74 
1.04 
-0.10 
0.96 
-0.55 
0.97 
0.37 
1.47 
-0.07 
1.59 
1.44 
V I  
0.66 
1.25 
0.28 
0.46 
0.93 
0.47 
1.29 
0.16 
0.75 
-0.06 
0.96 
0.08 
-0.17 
In terms of operators' comparisons, the results appear more plausible. All other things being 
equal, only SJ's operating costs are lower than VR's (by 4%). A number of railways have 
significantly higher operating costs than VR, including NSB (by I%), NS (by 6%), BR, CFF and 
DSB (by 8%), FS (by 9%) and SNCB and OBB (by 13%). All other operators' costs are broadly 
the same as VR. This suggests that most of the big differences in operating cost performance are 
explained by geography (which determines the scale and density of operations) and factor prices. 
It should also be noted that the proportion of total costs that are defined as operating costs varies 
in our sample from 94% (BR) to 71% (DSB), with the figure for VR being around 82%. An 
analysis that takes into account capital costs could give different results. 
RTS 
0.74 
1.30 
0.97 
0.66 
1.20 
0.70 
1.36 
0.88 
0.88 
0.71 
1.12 
0.60 
0.79 
RTD 
1.50 
0.80 
3.57 
2.17 
1.08 
2.1 1 
0.75 
6.19 
1.33 
n.a. 
1.04 
12.11 
n.a. 
Operators 
Comparisons 
1.08 
1.08 
1.02* 
1.05* 
1.08 
1.09 
1.06 
1.01 
1.13 
0.96 
1.13 
0.98* 
1 .OO 
6. FINAL ANALYSIS 
6.1 OPERATING COST MODEL 
Our analysis was extended further by adding CP and RENFE to our data base and, given n (three) 
factor prices, using n-1 (two) cost share equations of the form given by equation (4) to be 
estimated jointly with the translog cost model in order to improve the efficiency of the estimation. 
Given n factor prices, n-1 cost share equations may be estimated jointly with the translog cost 
function. The estimation method used was the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (Zellner, 1962) 
procedure provided by the Statistical Analysis Systems Computer Package (SAS, 1988). The 
resultant models are given in Table 9. Statistical tests indicated that autocorrelation, 
beteroscedasticity and multicollinearity were not significant problems. The econometric problems 
that arise from the use of pooled data have been reduced by the use of fm-specific dummy 
variables and a time trend variable, and may be thought of as a form of the covariance model 
advocated by Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991, p224). It should be noted that of the 57 parameter 
values estimated in the three modal system, only 27 are significant at the 5% level. It should also 
be noted that we can not readily compute standard errors for the elasticity measures, but we 
would anticipate that they would be large. Additional work will be undertaken in this area. 
Table 9: Translog Model and Cost Share Models (t-statistics in brackets) 
16.083 + 1.172 ZnWM 0.030 lnWE 0.142 1nWV + 0.179 lnTKT 
lnRTc = (3.56) - - (7.07) (-0.24) (-0.86) (0.36) 
+ 2.071 ln%TKP - 1.051 ZnLL - 0.010 YEAR (1.60) (-1.03) (-11.34) 
+ 0.15 DBR + 0.38 DCFF - 0.15 DCIE - 0.03 DDB + 0.32 DDSB (1.59) (2.63) (-0.83) - (0.17) (2.12) 
+ 0.33 DFS + 0.15 DNS - 0.01 DNSB + 0.69 DOBB 0.35 DSJ - (4.93) (1.07) (-0.1 1) (6.97) (-9.79) 
+ 0.60 DSNCB - 0.31 DSNCI; - 0.07 DVR - 0.50 DCP (4.78) (-1.416) (-0.07) - (2.42) 
1.172 + 0.004 ZnWM - 0.0003 ZnWE - 0.004 lnWV 0.086 lnTKT 
- (7.07) (1.23) (-0.04) (-0.51) (-2.68) 
- 0.422 ln%TKP + 0.023 ZnLL (-3.58) (0.59) 
SN = Staff Numbers 
Three key results from the translog model are presented in Table 10. By taking the exponential 
of the firm specific dummy variables, cost efficiency may be assessed relative to the base 
operator, RENFE. All other things being equal, seven railway companies would have the same 
costs as RENFE, one railway would have lower costs (SJ) and six would have higher costs (OBB, 
SNCB, CP, FS, CFF and DSB). 
Table 10: Cost Efficiency (1971 - 1990), Returns to Density (1990) and Returns to Scale (1990) 
Twelve of the fifteen railways exhibit increasing returns to density and this finding is particularly 
marked for the four railways with a traffic density of less than 10,000 train km per annum per km 
of line (VR, CIE, NSB and SJ). The Belgian railway (SNCB) exhibits constant returns to density, 
with a traffic density of almost 27,000 train km per km of line. The two most densely used rail 
networks in western Europe (NS and CFF, both with traffic densities of over 40,000 train km per 
km of line) exhibit decreasing returns to density, suggesting existing infrastructure is congested 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
OBB 
SJ 
SNCB 
SNCF 
VR 
CP 
RE= 
* Not significantly different from 1.0 at the 5% level. 
Operators 
compariso 
ns 
1.17* 
1.46 
0.86* 
1.03* 
1.38 
1.39 
1.17* 
0.99* 
2.00 
0.70 
1.82 
0.73* 
0.94* 
1.65 
1.00 
Returns 
to 
Density 
1.11 
0.81 
6.00 
1.33 
1.10 
1.48 
0.77 
4.44 
1.25 
6.04 
1.00 
2.37 
53.83 
1.98 
2.08 
Returns 
to 
Scale 
0.72 
1.22 
1.23 
0.64 
1.26 
0.69 
1.25 
1.02 
0.88 
0.76 
1.10 
0.60 
0.89 
1.05 
0.73 
Train Km 
Per 
annum 
(000) 
445060 
122394 
14237 
603797 
52160 
314255 
117314 
36705 
117201 
99634 
92802 
487670 
41026 
33693 
168960 
Length 
of line 
(km) 
16584 
2978 
1944 
26949 
2344 
16066 
2798 
4044 
5624 
10801 
3479 
34070 
5867 
3064 
12560 
Density 
(train km 
Per 
line km) 
26837 
41099 
7324 
22405 
22252 
19560 
41928 
9076 
20839 
9225 
26675 
14313 
6993 
10996 
13452 
and that investment plans to expand rail capacity in both the Netherlands and Switzerland may 
be justified. 
It can be seen that only seven of the fifteen railways exhibit returns to scale greater than one and 
of these NSB, CP and SNCB may be characterised as having broadly constant returns to scale, 
whilst the remaining four (CIE, DSB, NS and CFF) may be characterised as having increasing 
returns. Of the remaining eight railways with returns to scale that are less than one, VR may be 
characterised as having constant returns and SNCF, DB, FS, RENFE, BR, SJ and OBB have 
decreasing returns to scale. 
6.2 Capital Costs 
In Table 11 we look at the sensitivity of our results concerning returns to density and scale to 
assumptions about capital costs. Data on capital costs was based on historic cost depreciation and 
interest determined from UIC data for 1990 (1991 for VR), supplemented by data collected by 
the Institute for Transport Studies (Preston et al, 1993). We test two broad assumptions: 
Firstly, that capital costs are fixed. For returns to density we assume that a change in TKT 
will not affect capital costs and for returns to scale we assume that a change in TKT and 
LL will not affect capital costs (or put another way we assume that the elasticity of capital 
costs with respect to TKT and LL is zero). 
Secondly, we assume that capital costs are variable. For returns to density we assume that 
a proportionate change in TKT will lead to a proportionate change in capital costs (that is 
the elasticity of capital costs with respect to TKT is one). For returns to scale we assume 
initially that a proportionate change in TKT and LL will lead to a proportionate change in 
capital costs; that is the elasticity of capital costs with respect to TKT and LL is one. An 
alternative assumption is that the elasticity of capital costs with respect to TKT is one and 
the elasticity of capital costs with respect to LL is one, implying a return to scale with 
respect to capital costs of 0.5. 
Analysis of Table 8 indicates that our results are sensitive to assumptions concerning capital costs. 
For returns to density, if we assume capital costs are fixed, compared to Table 6, returns increase 
so that all railways exhibit inmasing retums except NS (decreasing returns) and CFF (constant 
returns). If capital costs are assumed to be variable, then there is a tendency for returns to 
converge towards unity, but with most railways exhibiting increasing returns, with the exceptions 
of CFF and NS (decreasing retums) and DSB and SNCB (constant returns). 
For returns to scale, if we assume capital costs are fixed then, compared to Table 6, returns to 
scale increase so that OBB now appears to be the railway with the optimal size network as it 
exhibits constant returns. Under our first assumption concerning variable costs (returns to scale 
with respect to capital costs equals one), returns converge towards unity, with CP and NSB 
exhibiting constant returns. Under our second assumption concerning variable capital costs 
(returns to scale with respect to capital costs equals 0.5), retums reduce so that NS and CIE 
exhibit constant returns and all other railways exhibit decreasing returns. 
From section two, we hypothesise that capital costs are likely to have a large fixed element (50% 
plus) and the most plausible estimates of returns to density and scale may be between those given 
in Table 6 and by the capital costs fixed columns of Table 11. 
6.3 Economies of Scope 
There has been very little work undertaken on the existence of economies of scope in European 
railways. The only study that we are aware of is the one by Jara Diaz and Munizaga (1992) who, 
using a sub-set of the data base we have developed (13 railways for the period 1971 to 1987), 
developed a quadratic cost function and found increasing returns to scope for 11 railways and 
constant returns for two (DB and SNCF). 
One of the reasons there has not been much work in this area is due to the fact that the translog 
can not handle zero outputs. A sophisticated solution to this problem is to replace the logarithmic 
function with a suitable Box-Cox transformation. A rather simpler approach is to estimate costs 
at near zero levels of output. This approach was adopted in Table 12 with economies of scope 
defined as: 
where RTC, = Estimated Total Costs of Producing Passenger Train Km Only 
R?C, = Estimated Total Costs of Producing Freight Train Km Only 
RTc,, = Estimated Total Cost of Producing Passenger and Freight Train Km. 
The results in Table 12 suggest that all railways exhibit decreasing returns to scope, with the 
exception of British Rail, which is paradoxically the railway in our sample where the freight and 
passenger businesses are most separated. Sensitivity analysis based on differing definitions of 
near zero outputs was undertaken but did not dramatically affect the results. However, a word of 
caution should be issued here. Additional work suggests that results are sensitive to model form 
(Garcia, 1993), which is also backed-up by the conclusions of Jara Diaz and Munizaga, who used 
similar data to ourselves but produced dramatically different results. We are undertaking further 
analysis in this area. 
Table 10: Sensitivity of Returns to Density and Scale to Assumptions concerning Capital Costs 
Table 11: Economies of Scope between Passenger and Freight Operations (Approximations) 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
BR 
CFF 
CIE 
DB 
DSB 
FS 
NS 
NSB 
Translog models have been developed for wester European railways and appear to give plausible 
and consistent results. However, we have some concern about the precision of our estimates and 
in future work we hope to compute the standard errors associated with our elasticity estimates and 
undertake more rigorous statistical comparisons of the different model forms we have developed. 
our results suggest that the western European railway industry exhibits U-shaped average cost 
curves with respect to output (train krn or network km). Average costs exhibit a downward 
sloping curve with respect to traffic density over a broad range of densities but even here may be 
upward sloping at extremely high traffic densities as in the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
1.13 
0.65 
0.77 
0.65 
0.80 
0.83 
0.82 
0.66 
The economies of density findings are relatively easy to explain. As infrastructure is used more 
intensively, the fixed cost element of total costs reduces and hence average costs reduce. 
However, a point may be reached where the infrastructure is being used too intensely, resulting 
in congestion problems. Economies of scale in operations may arise from better utilisation of 
rolling stock and staff though better scheduling and the operation of faster through trains (which 
our models can pick-up and are better described as economies of scope) and though the operation 
of larger and longer vehicles (which our models do not explicitly handle). Economies of scale 
OBB 
SJ 
SNCB 
SNCF 
VR 
CP 
RENFE 
0.77 
0.74 
0.66 
0.77 
0.68 
0.79 
0.7 1 
may also result from the purchasing power held by large f i .  These factors suggest that there 
is a minimum efficient size for a network rail operator. The diseconomies of scale exhibited by 
large railways are more difficult to explain but may be the organisational complexities of large 
firms leading to spiralling transaction costs (Williamson, 1975) and X-inefficiencies. 
In terms of minimising capital and operating costs, our model suggests that the optimal network 
is likely to be around 5,500 km and the optimal density around 40,000 train km per line km per 
annum. This suggests that, in cost terms assuming the existing network is to be maintained the 
optimal structure for the railway industry in Britain would be to have around three (or possibly 
four) railway operating companies, each with a traffic density about 50% greater than that which 
currently exists for BR. 
In terms of further work, we see scope in combining our work on partial productivity measures 
and in developing the translog cost function, in order to develop measures of total factor 
productivity in a manner similar to that of Caves et al(1982). Hensher et a1 (1992) and McGeehan 
(1993). 
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ABSTRACT 
PRESTON, JM and NASH, CA (1992). European Railway Comparisons. ITS Working 
Paper 379, Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds. 
This work was undertaken as part of a project sponsored by the British Railways 
Board entitled 'European Railway Comparisons'. The aims of this project are as 
follows: 
(i) To compare the current efficiency of European railway operators and examine 
recent trends at both aggregate and disaggregate levels. 
(ii) To assess the effects of economies of scale and economies of density on 
Europeag rail operations. 
(iii) To make an exploratory assessment of the potential for further disaggregation 
by market type (Intercity, Commuter, Freight) in order to make detailed 
comparisons of market shares. 
The main methods employed to carry out this study are as follows: 
(i) A review of the literature on railway cost and productivity analysis. 
Preliminary findings are given in Working Paper 354 and a paper presented to 
the World Conference on Transport Research (Nash, C.A. and Preston, J.M. 
(1992) "Assessing the Performance of European Railways"). 
(ii) Collation of published data for 14 European State Railway Operators. 
(iii) Face to face interviews with managers at the 14 State Railway companies in 
order to check our understanding of published data sources, gain more 
- - 
information at a disaggregate level (administered by a self e&npletion 
questionnaire) and obtain an understanding of the institutional background. 
This report summarises some of the background information that was obtained from 
the interviews undertaken in the summer of 1992. A company profile is developed for 
each operator under four main headings: Objectives and Management, Finance, the 
Freight Market and the Passenger Market. 
KEY- WORDS: 
Contact: J Preston, ITS (tel: 0532 335340) 
1. AUSTRIA - Oesterreichische Bundesbahn (OBB) 
A. OBJECTIVES and MANAGEMENT 
1. Ownership and Organisation 
OBB is currently still operated as a department of state, being part of the government 
budget. A new railway law will come into effect on Y1193, which will implement EC 
requirements ready for Austrian membership and give OBB much greater commercial 
freedom. Under this law, OBB will be split into operating and infrastructure divisions as 
part of the same organisation. The government will pay for the infrastructure but will 
charge for its use (charges, based on marginal cost, will cover 318 of the cost with the state 
bearing the rest). The operating division will be free to act commercially; the government 
will be able to buy uncommercial services, but will have to negotiate a contract, with 
proper payment, to do so. At present OBB is required by law to provide various 
uncommercial services. 
2. Objectives and Controls 
Currently, OBB's objectives and constraints are largely defined in terms of legal 
obligations. Under the new law, the operating arm of OBB will have clear commercial 
obligations, with social obligations being the responsibility of the state to provide and 
fund. 
3. Subsidiary Activity 
OBB owns a large fleet of buses and some lorries and ships. It also operates some 70 
narrow-gauge secondary railways, which complicates comparisons with Switzerland, 
where these are totally separate from SBB. Many studies over the years have 
recommended closure of most of these, but whilst some have closed, further closures are 
not currently under consideration. 
B. FINANCE 
1. Government Support 
OBB currently receives support ex post under four legal provisions. These are (amounts 
received in 1990 in brackets): 
a. Tariff obligations for passengers (3110m schillings) 
freight (1503m schillings) 
b. Provision of local passenger services (2800m schillings) 
c. Maintenance of the infrastructure (4560m schillings'r 
d. Operation of secondary railways (1951m schillings) 
Total support from the state is therefore 13924m or 36% of turnover. 
2. Investment 
The Neue Bahn concept was launched in 1987, the aim being to relieve pressure on the 
road system by massive investment in rail infrastructure. As part of the deal, OBB was 
required to improve its efficiency and marketing. 
The Neue Bahn concept requires investment of some 60000m. Austrian schillings over 
10 years 1991-2000, and will upgrade the Vienna-Salzburg line for speeds for 160-200 
kmph, build a Semmering base tunnel, improve the Brenner and Taker routes as 
improving many other passenger and freight terminals, provide new rolling stock and 
expanded track capacity for freight and passenger services. Further studies on high speed 
and on the Bremer base tunnel under the Alps for international freight and passenger 
traffic are continuing. 
Currently OBB cannot borrow fmm the private capital market, but under the new law it 
will be able to, probably with government guarantee. 
C. FREIGHT M A . T  
1. Services 
In 1990, OBB carried 62.6m tomes of freight of which .769rn was less than wagonload 
traffic. Of the wagonload traffic, only 18.392m tomes was domestic; 18.475 was imports, 
13.426 was exports and 11.528 transit. A total of l l m  tonnes of inter modal traffic was 
carried, of which almost all was international. A breakdown of commodities carried is 
given in Table 1.1; from which the continued importance of food and agriculture is 
apparent, no doubt in part as a result of the continuation of wagonload traffic to many 
small stations under the requirements of cany and tariff obligations. 
2. Pricing 
OBB is free to set freight tariffs except where it is obliged to provide uncommercial tariffs 
and compensated by the state for it. 
3. Competition 
Road haulage competition is very severe. Although road hauliers are subject to a tonne 
krn tax for traffic of over 175kn-1, this is levied on the basis of consignment notes, and can 
be widely avoided by splitting the journey into stages. This also distorts data on mad 
haulage operations. 
D. PASSENGER MARKET 
1. Services 
OBB operates international and intercity domestic trains, stopping trains, suburban trains 
and secondary railways. Part of the Neue Bahn concept is to introduce regular interval 
inter city and inter regional services throughout the system. 
2. Pricing 
Tariffs are currently controlled by the state, which has held them down as part of anti- 
inflation policy. Generally an increase has been permitted only once every three years. 
Under the new law, OBB would have commercial freedom except where prices were the 
subject of a contract with the state. 
OBB is a member of several Verkehrsverbund (or WE) arrangements whereby local 
authorities set fares for all modes of public transport. In this case local authorities make 
a payment to the state in respect of these costs. 
3. Competition 
OBB used to hold all bus licences throughout Austria, although it franchised many 
services to the private sector it still owns many buses. Private operators are now licensed 
by the 9 districts. Although car is the main competitor, coach competiton is growing - 
particularly as a result of liberalisation in Eastern Europe - and raises bigger issues 
regarding fair competition regarding insfrastructure costs. 
Table l.l(a) Wagonload Traffic by Type of Goods (tonnes) 
Tonnes 
0. Agricultural products 
& live animals 
1. Foodstuffs & fodder 
2. Solid fuels 
3. Oil products 
4. Minerals & wastes for 
the metals industry 
5. Metal products 
6. Minerals & 
construction materials 
7. Fertiliser 
8. Chemicals 
9. Machines, vehicles, 
manufactured goods & 
specialised transactions 
Total 
61 821 312.1 
100.0 
8 034 114.3 
13.0 
2 876 860.2 
4.6 
3 639 159.2 
5.9 
3 633 626.5 
5.9 
6 745 191.0 
10.9 
4 259 185.3 
6.9 
4 569 991.9 
7.4 
1 911 185.1 
3.1 
5 175 878.8 
8.4 
20 976 119.8 
33.9 
Domestic 
18 392 077.6 
100.0 
3 185 173.7 
17.3 
1 109 790.4 
6.1 
770 747.0 
4.2 
1 391 360.3 
7.6 
3 001 630.2 
16.3 
991 623.6 
5.4 
2 855 859.0 
15.5 
329 739.5 
1.8 
1 181 203.5 
6.4 
3 574 950.4 
19.4 
International 
43 429 234.5 
100.0 
4 848 940.6 
11.2 
1 767 069.8 
4.1 
2 868 412.2 
6.6 
2 242 266.2 
5.2 
3 743 560.8 
8.6 
3 267 561.7 
7.5 
1 714 132.9 
3.9 
1 581 445.6 
3.6 
3 994 675.3 
9.2 
17 401 169.4 
40.1 
Imports 
18 475 201.9 
100.0 
2 382 703.7 
12.9 
554 896.5 
3.0 
2 799 487.8 
15.2 
1 460 894.9 
7.9 
2 290 620.5 
12.4 
983 770.5 
5.3 
596 909.3 
3.2 
606 237.4 
3.3 
1 966 207.8 
10.6 
4 833 473.5 
26.2 
Exports 
13 426 140.3 
100.0 
1 440 302.1 
10.7 
747 887.9 
5.6 
1 981.3 
0.0 
342 027.3 
2.5 
522 262.0 
3.9 
1014 519.8 
7.6 
790 458.2 
5.9 
696 322.2 
5.2 
967 608.8 
7.2 
6 902 770.7 
51.4 
Transit 
11 527 892.3 
100.0 
1 025 934.8 
8.9 
464 285.4 
4.0 
66 943.1 
0.6 
439 344.0 
3.8 
930 678.3 
8.1 
1 269 271.4 
11.0 
326 765.4 
2.8 
278 886.0 
2.4 
1 060 858.7 
9.2 
5 664 925.2 
49.2 
Table l.l(b) 
Wagonload Traffic by Type of Goods (tonne km) 
- 
Tonne km 
0. Agricultural products 
& live animals 
1. Foodstuffs & fodder 
2. Solid fuels 
3. Oil products 
4. Minerals & wastes for 
the metals industry 
5. Metal products 
6. Minerals & 
construction materials 
7. Fertiliser 
8. Chemicals 
9. Machines, vehicles, 
manufactured goods & 
specialised transactions 
Domestic 
3 473 467.0 
100.0 
626 085.4 
18.0 
290 454.7 
8.4 
101 368.5 
2.9 
498 397.6 
14.3 
377 096.9 
10.9 
115 409.1 
3.3 
322 296.3 
9.3 
64 343.5 
1.9 
228 527.7 
6.6 
849 487.3 
24.4 
Total 
12 506 932.5 
100.0 
1 706 178.1 
13.6 
728 930.2 
5.8 
625 656.1 
5.0 
907 474.9 
7.3 
1 084 920.4 
8.7 
972 835.0 
7.8 
663 249.3 
5.3 
348 690.8 
2.8 
1 102 206.2 
8.8 
4 366 791.5 
34.9 
International 
9 033 465.5 
100.0 
1 080 092.7 
12.0 
438 475.5 
4.9 
524 287.6 
5.8 
409 077.3 
4.5 
707 823.5 
7.8 
857 425.9 
9.5 
340 953.0 
3.8 
284 347.3 
3.1 
873 678.5 
9.7 
3 517 304.2 
38.9 
Imports 
3 183 933.6 
100.0 
401 355.7 
12.6 
99 223.5 
3.1 
507 291.4 
15.9 
127 582.5 
4.0 
410 188.5 
12.9 
181 538.0 
5.7 
88 098.9 
2.8 
102 776.5 
3.2 
318 664.6 
10.0 
947 214.0 
29.8 
Exports 
2 986 622.6 
100.0 
356 227.3 
11.9 
181 509.9 
6.1 
189.6 
0.0 
50 645.6 
1.7 
149 339.5 
5.0 
297 671.6 
10.0 
183 519.3 
6.1 
106 936.6 
3.6 
206 632.2 
6.9 
1 453 951.0 
48.7 
Transit 
2 862 909.3 
100.0 
322 509.7 
11.3 
157 742.1 
5.5 
16 806.6 
0.6 
230 849.2 
8.0 
148 295.5 
5.2 
378 216.3 
13.2 
69 334.8 
2.4 
74 634.2 
2.6 
348 381.7 
12.2 
1116 139.2 
39.0 
2. BELGIUM - Soci6t6 Nationale des Chemins de Fer Belges (SNCB) 
A. OBJECTIVES and MANAGEMENT 
1. Ownership and Organisation 
In October 1992, SNCB became a public economic company for an indefinite period of 
time. It is organised into 6 main departments (Transport, Rolling Stock, Infrastructure, 
Finance and B-Cargo), with operations divided into 5 districts (see Figure 2.1). 
2. Objectives and Controls 
An important change in law on March 21st 1991 strengthened the autonomy of four public 
companies (aviation control, postal company, communication and railways). A council of 
administration and a committee of directors were to be installed and a managerial 
contract was to be drafted. 
Since October 1992 the five year renewable contract between the state and SNCB defines 
the public mission as being: 
a) To provide domestic passenger train services; 
b) The acquisition, installation, maintenance, management and operating of 
infrastructure and investments in rolling stock; 
c) To deliver services which meet the needs of the Nation. 
The managerial contract also regulates the financial contributions by the state, covering 
the consequential costs of the public mission. 
The contract states the passenger network to be served and the stations to be regarded 
as intercity and local. For each type of station a minimum frequency of service is 
specified (for inter city, this is 16 per day in each direction on working days and 12 on 
other days and for local at  least 4 per day in each direction). Overall SNCB is to operate 
a minimum of 160,000 passenger train kilometres (including at least 70,000 intercity and 
60,000 local) on working days and 100,000 (including at  least 55,000 inter city and 30,000 
local) on other days. With the permission of the Minister, some of these connections may 
be made by bus, and SNCB may withdraw services from any station for which traffic falls 
below 150 passengers per working day and 75 per other day. 
The contract also specifies detailed quality standards, for instance concerning the facilities 
to be provided on trains and at  stations, reliability (95% of passenger trains to arrive 
within 5 minutes of schedule), overcrowding. SNCB must produce an annual corporate 
plan. 
3. Subsidiary Activity 
Recently SNCB decided to continue parcel transport, mainly by road, as a largely 
autonomous subsidiary. SNCB owns shares in several companies, their activities being 
complementary to railway objectives (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). 
B. FINANCE 
1. Government Support 
In 1990, SNCB received 34.81b BF in state compensation for public missions and 
normalisation of accounts, of which 20.94b BF was direct state support towards passenger 
operations, compared with 12.lb BF of revenue from passengers. However, this 
undoubtedly understates the level of support. 
20,948,310 state compensation for passenger traffic, covering partially infrastructure 
costs. 
13,746,194 state compensation for imposed financial charges disadvantaging the 
com~ensation wsition of SNCB. 
115.996 contribution to normalisation of the cost of personnel 
34,810,500 
20.221.004 contribution to pension 
The new contract has restructured state compensation and contributions. It guarantees 
SNCB, from 1992 to 1996, an annual contribution of 12.lb BF in respect of service level 
and tariff obligations in the domestic passenger sector and a yearly non indexed payment 
of 24b BF in order to contribute to the cost of maintainance, management and operation 
of the infrastructure. Together this comes to 36.lb BF compared to 34.8b BF in 1990. On 
top of this an annually calculated support to pension and other social charges will be 
acredited. 
2. Investment 
In 1990, SNCB had a total investment of 9.7b BF, of which 3b was for rolling stock 
(including 0.6b BF towards TGV rolling stock) and most of the rest towards infrastructure 
including electrification. Under the 10 year investment plan (1991-2000) agreed with the 
state and adopted in the new contract, investment is fixed at l l b  BF for two years, then 
rising to 15b BF per annum from 1993 on. The breakdown of these investments varies 
greatly from year to year. Each year, SNCB has to provide details of proposed 
investments for state approval. Included in the 11 to 15b BF investment amount are the 
costs of adaption, renewal and modernising of infrastructure and the acquisition of rolling 
stock destined for domestic passenger trai5c. 
Investment may be funded by state grant, by borrowing from the private market with 
state approval and guarantee or by sale and lease back arrangements for rolling stock. 
In the latter two cases the state then compensates SNCB for all the costs involved so that 
in effect SNCB receives all its capital free of charge. 
C. FREIGHT MARIEET 
1. Services 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show the volumes transported by rail in tonnes and tonne kilometres, 
and the market share for 1983 to 1990 inclusive. It is seen that the rail share has 
dropped to 11.6% of to nnes and 21.7% of tonne kilometres. Table 2.5 disaggregates rail 
traffic by commodity. As for most railways, bulk commodities form most of the traffic, but 
the total amounts available for transport of these commodities are declining. 
2. Pricing 
SNCB has complete commercial freedom in pricing freight traffic. Although it publishes 
a tariff, it carries most of its freight at  a discount on specially negotiated tariffs. 
3. Competition 
Waterways remain very competitive for bulk traffic and roads for general merchandise. 
Neither fully covers its infrastructure cost. 
D. PASSENGER MARICET 
1. Services 
Passenger services operate mainly on a regular interval basis, and are marketed as Inter 
City (Including Eurocity international trains), Inter regional and stopping services. 
However, in reality the three are intimately intertwined both in terms of operations and 
traffic; thus for instance much commuting takes place on inter regional and inter city 
trains. 
2. Pricing 
Pricing is based on mileage, with supplements for some international trains. An 
enormous list of categories of passenger, including police, war-wounded, large families etc 
are entitled to varying discounts, compensated by the state. 
3. Competition 
Although buses and coaches are mainly owned by the regions and could compete, they 
mostly perform a complementary role, generally connecting with rail services. Only on 
international services is there serious coach competition. The principal competition, at 
national level is seen as being the private car. In the interests of relieving congestion, it 
is intended to maintain and if possible extend the SNCB share of the passenger market, 
this will entail an increase in traffic of some 50% over 20 years. In the case of Brussels, 
SNCB caters for some 50% of commuters. Rail serves the central area well, due to the 
north south tunnel, but increasingly jobs are decentralising away from this corridor. 
Figure 2.1: Organisation of SNCB 
Council of Administration 
I I Director General 
Districts .General Services 
Transport Centre Coordination & General 
Rolling Stock 
Infrastructure 
North East 
North West 
Personnel & 
Social Affairs 
Finance South East Information 
Marketing & Sales South West Purchasing 
Table 2.1: SNCB subsidiaries with majority SNCB shareholding 
Table 2.2: SNCB subsidiaries with minority SNCB shareholding 
Main Activity 
Inter. Group expedition, road transport 
Storage and distribution 
Development and marketing of 
transport software 
Transshipment Terminals in Zeebruge 
Expedition by rail of large containers 
Service and prospection for DB & OBB 
in Belgium 
Repair and maintenance of containers 
Social housing loans for SNCB 
personnel 
Mortgage loans for SNCB personnel 
Affiliation 131.12.91) 
Depaire nv 
Bruxelles Terminal Brussel 
H.V.H. International nv 
Feny-Boats nv 
Interferry nv 
Euratral nv 
Zeebmgge Container 
Repair nv 
Home van de 
Spoorwegbediende 
Woningkrediet voor 
Spoormannen nv 
Control 
99.10% 
100.00% 
99.90% 
67.82% 
100.00% 
100.00% 
80.00% 
99.99% 
99.97% 
Major shareholdership 20-50% 
(31.12.91) 
TRW nv 
Euro-Combi-Est nv 
Sea Ro Terminal 
Sea Technology - Zeebrugge nv 
Railtour C.V. 
Transurb Consult C.V. 
Publifer nv 
Control 
21.27% 
40.00% 
25.00% 
50.00% 
38.22% 
24.29% 
49.85% 
Main activity 
- 
Trailer and truck transport by rail 
Operating of multimodal terminals 
Diverse harbour activities 
All activities and services related 
to transport 
Rail Travel Agency 
Transfer of Railway Engineering 
and Technology 
Publicity on railway property 
Table 2.3(a) 
Tonnes Transported (m) 
(1) by vehicles with a carrying capacity of at least 1 tonne. 
Source: SNCB 
Road (1) 
- Domestic 
- Imports 
- Exports 
- Transit 
TOTAL 
Inland Waterways 
- Domestic 
- Imports 
- Exports 
- Transit 
TOTAL 
Rail 
- Domestic 
- Imports 
- Exports 
- Transit 
TOTAL 
1983 
269.999 
31.245 
31.245 
10.810 
343.299 
20.050 
37.195 
30.249 
3.728 
91.222 
19.162 
17.919 
12.263 
13.961 
63.305 
1984 
267.727 
34.049 
34.049 
13.232 
349.057 
22.026 
41.119 
31.487 
4.056 
98.688 
20.150 
19.915 
13.994 
16.773 
70.832 
1985 
265.383 
35.409 
35.409 
10.620 
346.821 
21.471 
39.471 
28.944 
3.775 
93.641 
20.127 
20.101 
14.467 
17.744 
72.439 
1986 
257.556 
36.294 
36.294 
11.195 
341.339 
20.884 
40.129 
30.910 
3.415 
95.339 
29.700 
11.507 
17.122 
4.740 
72.439 
1987 
259.480 
41.564 
41.564 
11.913 
354.521 
22.034 
40.658 
28.809 
2.876 
94.378 
31.360 
11.746 
16.064 
4.818 
63.988 
1988 
287.611 
47.452 
47.452 
13.887 
396.402 
22.110 
45.452 
28.446 
3.151 
99.159 
30.713 
12.112 
18.092 
4.867 
65.724 
1989 
287.078 
50.303 
50.303 
14.119 
401.803 
20.310 
46.959 
28.123 
2.876 
98.269 
30.812 
11.736 
18.472 
4.859 
65.879 
Table 2.3(b) 
Tonnes Transported (%I 
m: SNCB 
Road (1) 
- Domestic 
- Imports 
- Exports 
- Transit 
TOTAL 
Inland Waterways 
- Domestic 
- Imports 
- Exports 
- Transit 
TOTAL 
Rail  
- Domestic 
- Imports 
- Exports 
- Transit 
TOTAL. 
1983 
87,3 
36,l 
42,3 
37,9 
68,9 
6 4  
43,O 
41,O 
13,O 
18,3 
61 
20,7 
16,6 
48,9 
12,7 
1984 
86,4 
35,8 
42,8 
38,8 
67,3 
7,l 
43,2 
39,6 
11,9 
19,O 
6,s 
20,9 
17,6 
49,2 
13,7 
1985 
86,5 
37,2 
449 
33,O 
67,6 
6,9 
41,6 
36,7 
12,O 
18,3 
6 6  
21,2 
18,4 
55,O 
14,l 
1986 
83,6 
41,3 
43,O 
57,9 
68,3 
6 3  
45,6 
36,7 
17,6 
19,l 
9,7 
13,l 
20,3 
24,4 
12,6 
1987 
83,O 
44,2 
48,l 
61,2 
69,l 
7,o 
43,3 
33,3 
14,7 
18,4 
10,O 
12,5 
18,6 
24,6 
12,5 
1988 
84,5 
45,2 
50,5 
63,4 
70,6 
6,s 
43,3 
30,3 
14,4 
17,7 
9,O 
11,5 
19,2 
22,2 
11,7 
1989 
84,9 
46,2 
51,9 
64,6 
71,O 
6,o 
43,l 
29,O 
13,2 
17,4 
9,1 
10,7 
19,l 
22,2 
11,6 
Table 2.4(a) 
Tonne km Transported (billion) 
m: INS - SNCB 
- 
Road (1) 
- Domestic 
- Imports 
- Exports 
- Transit 
TOTAL 
Inland Waterways 
- Domestic 
- Imports 
- Exports 
- Transit 
TOTAL 
Rail 
- Domestic 
- Imports 
- Exports 
- Transit 
TOTAL 
1985 
10.380 
3.310 
3.310 
2.124 
19.124 
1.678 
1.729 
1.177 
479 
5.063 
1.024 
2.240 
1.819 
3.171 
8.254 
1983 
9.910 
2.764 
2.764 
2.162 
17.600 
1.589 
1.646 
1.246 
49 1 
4.972 
986 
1.916 
1.539 
2.429 
6.870 
1984 
10.684 
3.150 
3.150 
2.646 
19.630 
1.720 
1.776 
1.223 
523 
5.242 
1.054 
2.173 
1.720 
2.958 
7.905 
1986 
10.834 
3.583 
3.583 
2.261 
20.261 
1.641 
1.782 
1.322 
461 
5.205 
2.270 
1.743 
2.680 
730 
7.423 
1987 
10.958 
3.982 
3.982 
2.383 
21.305 
1.671 
1.809 
1.262 
380 
5.122 
2.389 
1.751 
2.421 
705 
7.266 
1988 
12.375 
4.497 
4.497 
2.777 
24.146 
1.748 
2.053 
1.204 
430 
5.435 
2.429 
1.762 
2.791 
712 
7.694 
1989 
12.513 
4.867 
4.867 
2.824 
25.071 
1.610 
2.089 
1.236 
387 
5.322 
2.601 
1.772 
2.965 
711 
8.049 
Table 2.4(b) 
Tonne km Transported (%) 
m: INS - SNCB 
Road (1) 
- Domestic 
- Imports 
- Exports 
- Transit 
TOTAL 
Inland Waterways 
- Domestic 
- Imports 
- Exports 
- Transit 
TOTAL 
Rail 
- Domestic 
- Imports 
- Exports 
- Transit 
TOTAL 
1984 
79,4 
45,4 
51,7 
43,2 
59,9 
12,8 
25,O 
20,l 
8 3  
16,8 
7 3  
30,6 
28,2 
48,3 
24,l 
1983 
79,3 
46,3 
49,8 
42,5 
59,7 
12,7 
26,O 
22,4 
9,6 
16,8 
7 3  
30,2 
27,7 
47,7 
23,3 
1986 
79,4 
45,4 
52,5 
33,3 
59,O 
12,8 
23,8 
18,6 
7 3  
15,6 
7,s 
30,8 
28,9 
59,2 
25,4 
1986 
73,5 
50,4 
47,2 
65,3 
61,6 
11,l 
25,l 
17,4 
13,4 
15,8 
15,4 
24,5 
35,3 
21,3 
22,6 
1987 
73,O 
52,8 
51,9 
68,7 
63,2 
11,l 
24,O 
16,5 
11,O 
15,2 
15,9 
23,2 
31,6 
20,3 
21,6 
1988 
74,7 
54,l 
52,9 
70,8 
64,8 
10,6 
24,7 
14,2 
11 ,O 
14,6 
14,7 
21,2 
32,9 
18,2 
20,6 
1989 
74,8 
55,8 
53,7 
72,O 
64,O 
9,6 
23,9 
13,6 
9,9 
14,3 
15,6 
20,3 
32,7 
18,l 
21,7 

Table 2.5o.d 
Tonne km by Commodity (1989) 
m: SNCB 
16 
Commodity 
0. Agricultural products and live animals 
1. Foodstuffs and fodder 
2. Solid fuels 
3. Oil products 
4. Minerals and wastes for the metals industry 
5. Metal products 
6. Minerals and construction materials 
7. Fertiliser 
6. Chemicals 
9. Machines, vehicles, manufactured goods and 
specialised transactions 
TOTAL 
Rail 
196 
250 
1.162 
654 
1.782 
1.714 
340 
209 
480 
1.262 
8.049 
Inland 
Waterway 
35 1 
365 
400 
809 
429 
345 
1.881 
265 
404 
73 
5.322 
Road 
3.547 
4.465 
369 
935 
217 
2.221 
5.963 
572 
3.285 
6.821 
30.395 
TOTAL 
4.094 
5.080 
1.931 
2.398 
2.428 
4.280 
8.184 
1.046 
4.169 
10.156 
43.766 
3. DENRlARK - Danske Statsbaner (DSB) 
A. OBJECTIVES AND MANAGEMENT 
1. Ownership and Organisation 
DSB is operated as a government agency, with the Director-General directly responsible 
to the Minister of Transport under arrangements established by the 1969 Act on the 
Administration of DSB which was last revised in 1989. DSB's accounts are part of the 
Ministry of Transport's accounts in the National Budget. A Railway Advisory Board, 
consisting of politicians, trade unions and industrialists gives advice to the Ministry of 
Transport and the Finance Committee. 
DSB's activities are divided into divisions according to product. There are several 
subsidiaries. An organisational chart is given by Figure 3.1. 
2. Objectives and Constraints 
DSB's objectives are determined by four year agreements with Government (the current 
agreement covers the period 1990-93) in which Government predetermines budget support 
and investment levels and DSB outlines rationalisation programmes, personnel reductions 
and revenue increases. Line closures require an Act of Parliament. From March 1990, 
DSB can change and differentiate its tariffs without the permission of Parliament's 
Finance Committee as long as the average price increase does not exceed the average 
increase in DSB's costs. Preparations are in hand for EC directives; infrastructure and 
operations accounts are being separated, whilst the bus, feny and travel agency divisions 
are being established as separate businesses. DSB also operates commuter services in 
Copenhagen. 
3. . Subsidiary Activities 
DSB has three substantial non-rail business: 
1. Ferry Division. DSB operates 10 ferry crossings served by 28 ships. Three of the 
routes are combined train and car crossings, two are train-only crossings and five 
are for cars and passengers. In 1990, the Ferry Division had earnings of DKK 
1167m and 2700 employees. 
2. Bus Division. DSB operates as a contractor for county and intermunicipal 
corporations competing on an equal footing with private contractors. DSB accounts 
for about 25% of traffic outside Greater Copenhagen. DSB's current contracts are 
from 1989 and have a term of 5 years. The Bus Division has 580 buses and 1530 
employees. 
3. Travel Agency Division. This business has 22 outlets, 360 staff and a turnover of 
DKK 1,000m. DSB has entered into collaboration with a privately owned agency, 
Maersk Travel, with joint offices in Esbjerg and Billund. 
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Catering activities on trains and ferries and at  stations are taken care of by three 
privately owned public limited companies (DSB Tog Service A/& DSB Faergerestaunter 
A/S and DSB Restuaranter og Kiosker A/S respectively), which hold concessions from 
DSB. Another concessionaire (Trans Media A/S) handles all advertising activities on DSB 
property. Altogether these companies employ 3300 and have a turn-over of DKK 2.5b. 
DSB's income from these activities amounted to DKK 380m. 
B. FINANCE 
1. Government Support 
The rail budget is approved in advance at  a global level; subsequent adjustments require 
parliamentary approval. Operating losses in 1990 were DKK 1041m (1989 1022m), 
excluding depreciation and interest payments, but this included an extraordinary item of 
115m for the transfer of S-trains from HT to DSB. If this is taken into account and 
corrections made for inflation, the 1990 result was the best for 11 years. 
A cash grant is made by the State to DSB to maintain a nationwide traffic system that 
provides customers in all parts of the country with a suitable level of service and 
frequencies at a reasonable price. For 1990 the cash grant included in the Annual 
Appropriations was DKK 2758m but following negotiations this was increased by 283m. 
2. Investment 
DSB's gross investments in 1990 amounted to DKK 2,862m (1607m 1989), broken down 
as follows: 
(i) Replacement of fned assets - 15% 
(ii) New fmed assets - 23% (including electrification Copenhagen- 
Odense, establishment of ATC and a new line between Snegheg and Taulov in 
Jutland)). 
(iii) Rail rolling stock - 42% (including new IC3 train sets, 17 electric 
IR4 sets and 12 electro-locomotives). 
(iv) Ferries and ships - 7% (including the building of a ferry and a 
ferry terminal for the Elsinore-Helsingborg crossing). 
(v) %ad vehicles - 3% 
(vi) S-Trains - 7% (including renovation of train sets) 
(vii) Other - 2% 
Net investments in 1990 amounted to DKK 2691m, DSB having sold property and land 
for DKK 97m and received investment reimbursements of 74m. . 
Future investment schemes include: 
(i) The Storbelt link. This combined road and rail link involves a bored rail tunnel 
and road bridge between Zealand and Sprog~i and a roadlrail bridge between 
Sproga and Funen. The rail service is now planned to operate by mid 1996, with 
the road link being completed some two to three years later. 
The railway technical installations were designed and built by DSB at a cost of 
DKK 1.4b. The scheme has been financed by a free standing company, 100% 
owned by the Ministry of Transport, raising capital on the open market. These 
loans are expected to be serviced by user charges, with those for rail expected to 
be DKK 900m p.a. According to forecasts up to 12 to 14 million people will be 
crossing the Great Belt (Storbelt) by train p.a., compared to the 1990 figure of 
4.5m. Freight volumes are expected to increase. 
(ii) The Oresund link. In 1991 Acts were passed in Sweden and Denmark authorising 
the establishment of a tunnel and high level bridge fixed link. The cost of the 
connection is estimated to be DKK 12b and the Danish on-shore installations at 
approx. DKK 2.5b. A rail link to Copenhagen airport (at Kastrup) might be 
included at a cost of DKK 2b. It is proposed the same financial arrangements as 
to the SMrbelt will apply. User charges for rail freight alone will amount to DKK 
150m p.a. 
(iii) Femer Belt, Studies and investigations are being carried out in collaboration with 
the Deutsche Bundesbahn concerning a fixed link between Fbdby and Puttgarden. 
However, it will be the turn of the century before such a link can be established. 
(ivl High Speed Services. In 1993 services between Copenhagen and Aarhus will be 
increased fi-om 160 k m h  to 180 km/hr, with an eventual increase of up to 200 
krnfhr possible. Investment of DKK 4.3b will be made on tracks, signalling, level 
crossings and IC3 rolling stock. Automatic Train Control (ATC) will account for 
DKK 700m. 
(v) Electrification. By the end of 1992, the rail network from Elsinore to Odense will 
be electrified at  a cost of DKK 1.7 trillion. 
(vi) Rolling Stock. A rolling stock replacement programme is underway at  a cost of 
DKK 3.2b. This programme includes 85 diesel Inter City IC3 train sets, 17 
electrical regional IR4 train sets and 12 electrical multiple units. S-train rolling 
stockis being renovated but consideration is also being made of wide bodied trains. 
($1) Remote Control. In May 1990 a new control centre was inaugurated at  
Copenhagen, covering the area between Klampenborg and Roskilde. Four systems 
are integrated in one location: remote control of driving current, remote control of 
signalling equipment, automatic train number system and electronic public 
announcement system. The remote control system will be continued across 
Zealand via the St~rbelt o Fredericia. 
As part of the four year political agreement, DSB must sell land and buildings at. a value 
of DKK 690m. DSB owns around 5,500 properties and a number of major projects are 
planned but none have yet been realized due to the general fall-off in the property market. 
1. Services 
Rail services concentrate on container and unit load traffic at  ten main depots, with mega- 
terminals being developed at  Taulov, in Jutland, and H@je Taastrup, near Copenhagen. 
Parcels are handled by eleven terminals. International traffic accounts for 69% of tons 
lifted, 64% of ton-kms and 41% of freight revenue (1990 figures). 
2. Pricing 
Railway rates are published, but most traffic is subject to discounts. Tariffs are based on 
weight and distance, but wagonload traffic is also distinguished by commodity. 
Rail carried 8 million tons in 1990 (1787m ton-kms). Although road transport is licensed, 
entry is relatively free. 
D. PASSENGER NIARKET 
1. Services 
Services are split between Inter-City (including international services), Regional and S- 
Trains. The Inter City and Regional network consists of 2174 route Ism and 205 stations. 
Copenhagen's S-train network consists of 170 route km and 79 stations. Inter City 
frequencies are generally hourly, S-trains operate every 10 minutes in the peak, 20 
minutes off-peak. Regional frequencies vary. The Inter City and Regional network 
carried 54m passengers (3.6b passenger-kmYi 1990; the S-train network carried 97m 
passengers (1.3b passenger-km). 13 private passenger railways exist, carrying l lm  
passengers and 200111 pass-km in 1990. Market shares within the rail market are: 
Passengers Passenger-kms 
RegionallInterCity 33% 71% 
S-train 60% 25% 
Private 7% 4% 
2. Pricing 
There is a fixed price per km up to a certain distance, after which a taper applies. An 
exception is Copenhagen where a zonal fare system operates. Reductions apply to season 
tickets and old-age pensioners. 
3. Competition 
Inter City services face competition on three long distance express bus routes (two 
established in 1983) and from three air companies GAS, Maerskair and Cimber). 
Expansion of the long distance express bus network has been blocked by regulation as has 
development of DSB bus services to act as contractors in the Greater Copenhagen area. 
The SMrbelt fxed link is thought to enable rail to capture most non-interlining air traffic 
but will increase car competition. 
4. EIRE - C6ras lompair ~ireann (CIE) 
A. OBJECTIVES AND MANAGEMENT 
1. Ownership and Organisation 
Coras Iompair ~ i r eann  is a stated owned traqsport company which was reformed by the 
Transport (Re-organisation of C6ras Iompair Eireann) Act 1986, which was implemented 
on 2 February 1987. Three new subsidiary companies were established: 
. Iarnrod ~ i r e a n n  (IE) which operates the national railway including DART (Dublin 
Area Rapid Transit) and the mad freight service. 
. Bus ~ i r e a n n  which operates the national bus services 
. Bus ~ t h a  Cliath which operates the Dublin city bus services. 
CIE as the Holding Company is responsible for the overall direction and development of 
the Group for the continued operation of CIE Tours International, CIE Outdoor 
Advertising and ancillary businesses. This re-organisation replaced the previous 
structure, established in 1961, based on five areas (Waterford, Cork, Limerick, Galway 
and Dublin). 
The board of IE includes the chairman of CIE, the managing director of IE, an executive 
director of CIE, a non-executive director and two elected directors. Below the managing 
director of IE there are seven management units. 
. Finance and Company Secretarial 
. Business Development (Freight) 
. Business Development (Passenger) 
. Operations 
. Human Resources 
Mechanical Engineering and Manufacturing 
. Civil Engineering 
In addition, there are nine business units 
. Intercity. High quality, fast and eequent passenger services are provided between 
the major centres of population and Dublin. 
. Suburban. Diesel hauled commuter rail services are provided for the outer Dublin 
region and Cork. 
. DART. Electric commuter rail services are provided in the Dublin area between 
Bray and Howth. 
• Rail Freight - Bulk Traffic. These include Minerals, Beet, Cement, Ammonia, 
Fertiliser and Acrylonitde. 
. Rail Freight - Unit Load. Containerail provides a service for containerised freight, 
whether single units or full train loads. 
. Rail Freight - Other Services. Transtrack provides a nationwide distribution 
service for groupage traffic on dedicated freight trains and a distribution service 
for Letter Mail is provided by An Post. Fastrack provides a nationwide 
distribution system for express parcels using passenger trains. Navigator Freight 
Agency provides a complete international freight forwarding agency. 
. Road Freight services are operated as an adjunct to rail services and provide a 
railhead service. In addition, a direct road service is provided which does not 
compete with the railway. 
. Catering. Catering services are provided on-trains and at stations. 
. Rosslare Harbour. IE is the port operator at  Rosslare. 
2. Objectives and Control 
Section 8 of the 1986 Act specifies that 
"The principal objective of the railway company shall be to provide within the state 
and between the state and places outside the state, a railway service and a road 
freight service and for those purposes to exercise functions in that behalf conferred 
on the Board by the Transport Act of 1950 or any other enactment." 
IE is intended to have total autonomy for all aspects of its operations (including industrial 
relations and personnel matters) with two exceptions: 
(1) Overall financial control because of the lack of capital and the existence of 
substantial borrowings. 
(2) Competition issues so that wasteful competition between the different modes of 
transport be eliminated. Section 8(9) of the Act provides that the Board shall 
decide competition issues with due regard to its overall interests and the interests 
of the companies concerned. 
Government concern with the railways has been related to containing the railway deficit. 
A report by McKinsey and Co. Inc (1981) found that if no changes were made to existing 
arrangements, the railway deficit would double by the year 2005. Their analysis focused 
on four options: 
(1) Increase volume 
(2) Maintain with modifications 
(3) Reduce network. (Close all lines exce~t those from Dublin to Belfast. Cork and - 
Limerick) 
Close down the system after either 10 or 25 years (ie in 1990 or 2005). 
The Govenunent decided in June 1983 to implement option 2. This involved a 
requirement that CIE should reduce its rail expenditure in real terms by 2.5% per annum 
for five years. This was extended by one year to 1989 and the reduction target increased 
to 3.7% per annum. In addition, there was to be no new investment in mainline rail 
services other than essential safety-related expenditure. 
The 1985 Transport Policy Green Paper viewed these measures as providing a temporary 
breathing space. In the long term, consideration of reducing or closing down the 
(mainline) rail network would have to be made. However, robust performance in recent 
years (revenue up 5% in 1990 compared to 1989; 25 million passengers carried in 1990 - 
an all time record) has led to the postponement of consideration of service closures. 
Indeed, given the availability of EC stmctural funds there may be some expansion of the 
network. Up to IR E80m is committed to improving the Dublin-Belfast mainline and IR 
E12m to introduce commuter services to SW Dublin. In addition, bids are being made for 
up to IR E350m to upgrade the mainline network and up to IR E300m for the Dublin 
Transport Initiative (not all of which will be rail related). 
3. Subsidiary Activity 
There are three main areas of subsidiary activity, all of which operate profitably 
(1) Road Freight. IE operates 247 road vehicles with gross revenue in 1990 of IR 
218.45m (profit IR E0.48m) 
(2) Rosslare Harbour, with gross revenue in 1990 of IR E5.20m (and profits of IR 
E2.16m) 
(3) Catering Services, with gross revenue in 1990 of IR E5.42m (and profits of IR 
E0.3m). 
B. FINANCE 
1. Government Support 
In 1990 IE received IR 287.97m in state support. This may be broken down as follows: 
(i) Public Service Obligation (EC Regulation 1191169) 242.65m 
of whieh: Main line Services E38.06m 
Bray-Howth (DART) E4.59m 
(ii) 50% of rail freight infrastructure costs (Article 3.l(b)) and residualE20.32m 
deficit (Article 4) (EC Regulation 1107/70) 
TOTAL REVENUE RELATED E62.97m 
(iii) Normalisation of Accounts - Pensions (Class 111, EC Regulation E7.14m 
1192169) 
(iv) Normalisation of Accounts - Level Crossings (Class IV, EC E1.80m 
Bgulation 1192169) 
(v) Freight Infrastructure Grant (EC 1107/70) 24.89m 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE RELATED E13.83m 
(vi) State Grant for DART Interest E11.17m 
TOTAL STATE GRANTS E87.97m 
Overall, in 1990 IE had total revenue of IR E105.6m compared to expenditure of IR 
E187.8m representing a cost-recovery ratio of 56%. For the rail business this can be 
subdivided as follows: 
Figures in Irish Pounds 
The above shows the importance of interest payments, particularly for the Bray - Howth 
Service which was electrified in 1984. 
Mainline 
Bray - Howth 
Rail Only 
2. Investment 
Expenditure 
(incl interest) 
f 138.6m 
E26.lm 
E164.7m 
Revenue 
E66.6m 
E9.9m 
f76.5m 
In 1990 capital investment by IE was IR f7.8m of which IR fl.lm was spent on Rosslare 
Harbour. The balance (IR E6.7m) was spent on carriage refurbishment, station 
development, engineering equipment, signalling and ticketing equipment. This "falls 
short of what the Group's management considers desirable to maintain and develop 
dependable services". It is also noted that the EC Regional Development Programme for 
Ireland has concentrated transport infrastructure investment almost entirely on roads; 
"The Board views this issue with some seriousness and seeks special consideration of the 
additional capital needs of the rail infrastructure without deflecting resources from other 
rail or bus operations". (CIE, 1990, Annual Report and Accounts, page 11). 
C.  FREIGHT 
Expenditure 
(excl interest) 
E130.2m 
£14.9m 
f145.lm 
1. Services 
Cost Recovery 
Ratio 
0.48 (0.51) 
0.38 (0.66) 
0.46 (0.52) 
Goods l'rain Traffic was responsible for IR S20.9m of revenue in 1990, carrying 3.3m 
tonnes. Fastrack (parcels) was responsible for IR E3m revenue. The tonnage in 1990 was 
broken down by the following categories (m) 
In addition, IE's road freight operation carried 1.2m tonnes in 1990. 
Ales, Beer and Stouts 
Beet and Beet Pulp 
Cement 
Fertiliser 
Mineral Ores 
Petrol and Oil 
General Freight 
TOTAL 
2. Pricing 
IE has some 6,000 freight customers. Standard tariffs are produced but large contracts 
are negotiated. The average receipt per tonne km of rail freight was IR 3.55 pence in 
1990. 
Tonne 
s 
0.21 
0.15 
0.67 
0.21 
0.78 
0.05 
1.22 
3.29 
% 
6.4 
4.6 
20.4 
6.3 
23.7 
1.5 
37.0 
3. Competition 
The freight market is deregulated and highly competitive. In 1990 IE's rail semices were 
estimated to have a market share of around 10%. 
D. PASSENGERS 
1. Services 
There are three types of passenger services for which figures were published in 1990, as 
follows: 
The average passenger trip length in 1990 was 49km. 
2. Pricing 
- 
Mainline 
Bray-Howth 
Other Dublin 
Suburban 
TOTAL 
The average fare in 1990 was IR 4.05 pence per km. 
% 
31.1 
60.0 
7.9 
Passengers 
(Thousands) 
7,787 
15,249 
1,974 
25,010 
3. Competition 
IEs official competition comes mainly from Bus ~ i r eann  and Bus ~ t h a  Cliath. In theory, 
the bus industry is regulated but, in practice, there is de facto deregulation. In particular, 
a large number of unofficial private operators cater for the week-end commuter market 
between Dublin and the rest of the country. Official deregulation of the bus industry is 
being considered. 
Receipts 
(IR E Thousands) 
37,622 
9,643 
2,421 
49,686 
-7 
% 
75.7 
19.4 
4.9 
5. FRANCE - Sooiete Nationale de Chemin de Fer (SNCF) 
A. OBJECTIVES and MANAGEMENT 
1. Ownership and Organisation 
SNCF was founded as a public service enterprise, initally as a 50 year franchise, in 1937 
following the merger and nationalisation of the six companies operating the French rail 
network at the time. This role was reconfirmed when the official SNCF remit was 
renewed on 30 December 1982. This confirmed SNCF as an 'epic' organisation 
(establissment publique industrielle et commercialle), a public company that must, after 
subsidy, cover costs. Three sets of documents are particularly relevant to SNCF: 
(i) Lo1 d'orientation des transports interieurs (LOTI) 
(ii) Cahiers des Charges and 
(iii) Contrat du Plan 
Management is rested in the Council of Administration which consists of members of 
Government and of SNCF. The President of SNCF must be a member of Government and 
it is this, combined with the strong government representation on the Council of 
Administration which ensures the close link between Government and SNCF policy. 
Management remains centralised but there has been some decentralisation of 
responsibility to the 23 Regions in that responsibility for regional passenger services has 
been devolved. Recent organisational changes have concentrated on re-structuring central 
activities and introducing business sectors. The current organisational structure is given 
by Figure 5.1. 
2. Objectives and Controls 
The financial relationship between SNCF is stipulated in five yearly Contrat du Plan, 
with the current plan covering the period 1990-1994 for national services. A separate 
Contrat du Plan between SNCF and the Ile de France region for the period 1989-1993 
covers services in the Paris conurbation. These plans: 
(i) Authorise SNCF to proceed with both service development and investment plans. 
(ii) Undertake that Government will provide or ensure the necessary grant aid and 
investment support for the period and 
(iii) Commit SNCF to achieve the objectives of the Business Plan, indicating service 
quality targets. 
Investment for the current national plan is estimated at  FF lOOb (compared with 70b 
1985-89). In turn the French government has agreed to make available the necessmy 
funds, through direct provision or support for access to capital markets. This support is 
aimed to provide annually (at 1990 prices) about 
- FF 2b for revenue support for fare levels 
- FF 3.5b for revenue support for regional services 
- FF 14b for SNCF pension funds 
- FF lob for infrastructure investment support 
The plan stipulates that an overall minimum of 34% of all investment should be self 
financed, with the remainder supplied by local and central government. Specific proiects 
may be as little as 20% self financed as long as the annual average is not below 34%.. 
SNCF is authorised to borrow on the international financial markets. 
SNCF prices are tightly controlled by Government, as the Council of Administration 
determines published tariffs and rates (Cahiers des Charges). The Ministry of Transport 
has powers to delay proposed closures, especially in the Paris region, but after a fured 
time period (usually six months) must pay subsidy. Regions may specify services, 
provided they also finance them under arrangements set up by LOTI. 
3. Subsidiary Activity 
Through its SCETA group holding SNCF is involved in some 247 subsidiary companies 
divided into 8 groups: 
. Combined Transport 
. Specialist Transport 
. Zusti Ambrosetti Group 
. Road Transport 
. Tourism and Passengers 
. Finance 
. Location 
. Diverse 
In addition, SNCF has three groups of direct subsidiaries; housing, ferries and a variety 
of other businesses, including for example a 12% share in Air Inter, a domestic airline 
company. Total turnover of subsidiaries in 1990 was FF 19b, approximately 20% of total 
turnover. 
B. FINANCE 
1. . Government Support 
The budget, including Government support Cversements contractuels de l'Etat et des 
Collectives Publiques') is determined annually, but can be revised if required. 
Government support excluding pension contributions, in 1990 stood at  FF 15,379b, 
approximately 16% of total group turnover. Surpluses (earned in the years 1988 to 1990) 
are carried to a special reserve fund. Deficits (expected for 1991) are firstly charged to 
the special reserve, then carried forward to be serviced by loan finance. 
2. Investment 
Investment reached FF 17b in 1990 of which 51% was on the principal network, 39% was 
on new lines and 10% was on the Parisian network. Around 14% of investment 
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was on rolling stock. The main element of the investment plan is for a major high speed 
network approved by the National Transport Council, the Regional Councils and the 
Regional Transport Councils under LOTI legislation. The Master Plan includes 4,700 km 
of new lines (including the 500 km already in service and the 560 km under const~uction) 
but the network of TGV services will total 11,000 km in all if account is also taken of 
existing lines, upgraded to different degrees for higher speeds. The proposals are as 
follows: (see Figure 5.2) 
(i) Two lines are in operation TGV Sud-Est (Paris - Lyons) and TGV Atlantique (Paris 
- Toursh  Mans) 
(ii) Three lines are under construction: TGV Nord (Paris - Channel Tunnel), extending 
TGV Sud-Est to Valence and Eastern interconnection around Paris. 
(iii) Sixteen TGV schemes have been proposed: 
- Aquitaine (Tours - Bordeaux - LangonDax) 
Auvergne (Paris - Clermont-Ferrand) 
Brittany (Le Mans - Rennes) 
- Est (Paris - Strasbourg) 
Southern Interco~ection 
Alpine (Lyons - Montmelian - Turin) 
- Limousin (Paris - Lirnoges) 
- Provence (Valence - Marseilles) 
Riviera (Aix-en-Provence - Frijus-St Raphael) 
Languedoc-Rousillon (Avignon - Perpignon - Barcelona) 
- Midi Pyrenees (Bordeaux - Toulouse) 
Normandy (Paris - RouenICaen) 
h i r e  (Le Mans - Angers) 
- Picardy (Compiegne - Channel Tunnel) 
Rhine-Rhone (Dijon - Mulhouse) 
Overall, the various projects covered by the Master Plan represent an investment of FF 
180b for infrastructure and 30b for TGV trainsets. Table 5.1 shows the main features of 
the dserent projects in terms of financial and socio-economic rate of return is calculated 
from a combination of the financial benefits for the SNCF, the value of time saved by 
passengers and the general benefits of reductions in congestion and in accidents on the 
roads. 
C .  FREIGHT MARRET 
1. Services 
Freight services are divided between combined transport (14% of tonne-km moved in 
1990), 'train entiers' (47%) and other (wagonload or groupage) traffic. The breakdown of 
traffic by product type is given by Table 5.2. The two most important commodity groups 
are metals and ores (16% of ton-kms in 1990) and foodstuffs (also 16%). 
Parcels are handled through a special subsidiary SERNAM (Service National des 
Messagereies de la SNCF). 
igure 5.2: Map of TGV Proposals 
Table 5.1: Evaluation of TGV Lines 
The 16 projects selected 
(of which first possible phases) 
AQUATAINE 
of which Tours-Bordeaux 
AUVERGNE 
BRITTANY 
EAST 
"GRAND SUD" 
SOUTHERN 
INTERCONNECTION 
ALPINE LIM( 
of which Avignon-Montemelian 
LIMOUSIN 
PROVENCE 
RMERA (COTE D'AZUR) 
LANGUEDOC-ROUSSILLION 
of which Avignon-Montpellier 
MIDI-PYRENEES 
NORMANDY 
LOIRE 
PICARDY 
RHINE-RHONE 
of which Mulhouse-Dole 
(1) These values have been 
the final layout has been decided. 
krn of new line 
480 
361 
130 
156 
460 
70 
49 
251 
107 
174 
219 
132 
290 
75 
184 
169 
78 
165 
425 
190 
obtained from initial 
before 
14,7 
(14,7) 
2,9 
9 s  
8,4 
3,7 
12,6 
11,4 
(8,2) 
3,3 
16,6 
5 J  
5 8  
(5,8) 
2 3  
5,5 
7,5 
13,5 
9,5 
(9,6) 
return on 
financial 
7,5 
9,5 
371 
7,4 
4,3 
5 
8 2  
5 
8,s 
2,4 
9,8 
8,4 
6,1 
7,s 
5,5 
0 s  
5 34 
4 8  
5,9 
8,4 
to be corrected 
Traffic in millions investment 
(1) 
soclo- 
econornlc 
10 
12,3 
6,7 
13,6 
8 3  
12 
9 5  
10 
14,7 
4,4 
13 
I 
11 , I 
I 
9 
10,5 
6 5  
3 
737 
5 
10,7 
13,s 
once 
of passengers 
after 
20,1 
(19,7) 
3,9 
12,2 
14,5 
5,3 
13,4 
19,l 
(11,8) 
4,O 
20,9 
7 3  
9,5 
(7,l) 
3,3 
7,1 
8 4  
14,4 
15,3 
(13,8) 
calculations and 
594 
(5,O) 
120 
3,1 
6,1 
1,6 
0 3  
7,7 
(3,6) 
0,7 
4,3 
297 
3,7 
(1,3) 
1 
1,6 
039 
0 3  
5,8 
(4,2) 
will have 
Table 5.2: SNCF Freight Products (b tonne-km) 
- - - - 
2. Pricing 
Combined Transport 
Metallurgy Products 
Cereals, Animal Fodder 
Construction Materials 
Chemical Products 
Petroleum Products 
Beverages 
Fertilizers 
Solid Fuels 
Vehicles 
MineraWOres 
Timber 
Grocery Products 
Perishable Commodities 
Paper 
Other Products 
TOTAL 
SNCF is constrained by an obligation to cany and publish rates but since 1971 has been 
free to offer discounts for competitive reasons or to enter into contractual arrangements 
for bulk or regular traflics. Over 95% of traffic is moved a t  such special rates. 
3. Competition 
1988 
7.17 
6.38 
5.60 
5.55 
4.01 
3.34 
3.31 
2.94 
2.34 
2.14 
1.62 
1.32 
1.06 
0.90 
0.86 
2.13 
50.67 
SNCF had a 32% share of the freight market in 1990, compared to road, 60% (exclusive 
of short haul traffic), waterways 5% an& pipelines 4%. Obligatory tariffs for road haulage 
were removed in 1990 whilst licensing restrictions have been relaxed. As a result, 
competition from road is intensifying and rail is losing market share. 
1989 
7.43 
6.57 
5.64 
5.61 
4.02 
3.44 
3.42 
2.96 
2.49 
2.22 
1.77 
1.29 
1.06 
0.72 
0.93 
2.00 
51.57 
1990 
7.29 
6.40 
5.53 
5.33 
3.86 
3.53 
3.60 
3.62 
2.11 
2.10 
1.67 
1.33 
1.99 
0.49 
0.92 
1.87 
50.64 
D. PASSENGER MARKET 
1. Services 
Passenger services consists of four groups: 
(i) TGV services 14.92 b p a s s h  in 1990 
(ii) Intercity services 33.24 b p a s s h  
(iii) Ile de France services - 8.99 b passkm 
(iv) Services Regionaux 6.80 b passkm 
This tends to understate the importance of Paris services. 842m passengers used SNCF 
services in 1990, of these 530m (63%) used Ile de France services. 
2. Pricing 
The basic passenger fare structure consists of a boarding charge plus mileage charge, with 
supplements on express and TGV services. These supplements vary by route, time of day, 
day of week and season. This allows price discrimination and the development of revenue 
yield techniques. Abonnements (season tickets) are an important option and there are 
reduced fares for school children, students, pensioners and families. Maximum tariffs are 
fixed by Government. 
3. Competition 
Bus and Coaches are regulated and perform a complementary rather than competitive 
role. Domestic airline competition has increased in terms of price but the main 
competition has been the car which has been aided by a large autoroute development plan 
and harmonisation of VAT which has lowered purchasing costs. 
6. GERMANY - Deutsche Bundesbahn (DB) 
A. OBJECTIVES and MANAGEMENT 
1. Ownership a n d  Organisation 
DB is the rail operator in the former Federal Republic of Germany; i t  is subdivided into 
10 regions. It is a state enterprise, embodied in the Federal Law, and is subject to public 
service regulations and budget laws which prevent it from operating as a commercial 
enterprise. For instance 130,000 of its 220,000 staff are classified as Civil Servants, with 
guaranteed jobs for life and relatively high pay and pensions. 
Following the report of the Government Railway Commission, the German government 
decided that DB tvi11 merge with the railway of the former German Democratic republic 
on January lst, 1994. The new company, German Railway PLC, will be freed of many of 
its former debts and obligations, and will be operated as a public limited company wholly 
owned by the Federal government and divided into three business sectors - passenger, 
freight and infrastructure. It is the intention ultimately to privatise these, although 
probably not for some 10 years. To avoid the current situation whereby the states succeed 
in demanding loss making services whilst having no financial responsibility for them, it 
is intended that subsidies for local and regional services should be devolved to the states; 
this is however a very controversial proposal. 
2. Objectives and Controls 
Under the existing Federal Law, the Minister of transport has the right of intervention 
in many matters, including tariffs, personnel, wages, line closures and investment. 
Although railway deficits have been a matter of great concern to the government for many 
years, a continued high level of investment has failed to secure a substantial and 
sustained improvement in financial performance. 
3. Subsidiary Activity 
Through its subsidiary holding company (Deutsche Bundesbahn Holding Company) the 
railway owns a number of travel agencies, consultancies, bus companies and road freight 
companies, including Schenker. 
B. FINANCE 
1. Government Support 
In 1990, DB incurred a deficit of 5.0b Deutschmarks, after receipt of Federal grants of 
3.75b., mainly on account of short distance passenger services. A further 5.3b was paid 
on grounds of equalisation of competition, and 4.3b. in contributions ta capital costs. In 
1991, the deficit grew to 5.3b. and grants for public service obligations to 4.lb. It was 
predicted that the combined losses of DB and DR would total 13.9b. in 1993, and that in 
the absence of reform these would rise to over 40b. by the turn of the century. 
A detailed breakdown of receipts from government is given below: 
Public Service Obli~ations 
Short distance rail passenger traffic 
Long distance rail passenger traffic 
Lack of fares on DBDR traffic 
Maintenance of routes 
Education traffic (bus) 
Losses on DBDR traffic 
Total 
Equalisation of Competition 
Level crossings 
Staff and social security costs 
Total 
Ca~ital  contributions 
Interest 
Contributions to investment 
Total 
Other 
-
GRAND TOTAL 
2. Investment 
Rail investment has been at  a high level for many years, this being seen as the key to 
increasing traiXc and improving financial performance, and a continued investment of 
some E2b. per annum through the 1990's is planned in rail infrastructure alone, including 
new high speed lines and upgrading of existing lines. A high level of investment has also 
taken place in the freight sector, including new marshalling yards for traditional 
wagonload traffic. 
C. FREIGHT MARKET 
1. Services 
DB runs a mixture of bulk trainload, traditional wagonload and intermodal services 
(carrying containers, swap boches and complete semitrailers). Traffic and receipts in 1990 
were split as follows: 
Tonnes Tonne km Receivts 
m. b. m Dm 
Wagonload 272 60.3 5600 
Less than 3 1.0 1413 
wagonload 
Container 13 6.1 \791 
Piggyback 13 6.0 I 
2. Pricing 
DB is subject to laws requiring it to publish freight tariffs and not to discriminate 
between customers. It can offer discounts for particular flows of traffic but must make 
these available to a!J customers in comparable circumstances. 
3. Competition 
DB has enjoyed a degree of protection from road haulage both from a licensing system 
which restricted the number of vehicles used on long distance road haulage, and from 
tariff controls on road operators. In the light of the completion of the single European 
market and the introduction of cabotage these controls are breaking down and it is 
expected that road competition will become much more severe over the next few years. 
Germany already has a relatively high level of taxation on road haulage, and is dealing 
with the threat of competition from hauliers in low tax countries by proposing a special 
licence fee for the use of motorways, which would be compensated by reduced annual 
licence fee for domestic operators. 
D. PASSENGER MARKJ3T 
1. Services 
Passenger services are in the course of being reorganised into four main groups: 
-Inter City, including ICE high speed services and Eumcity international services, which 
form a high quality regular interval service over the main lines. 
-Inter Regional, which will form a similar if somewhat slower network of services over 
secondary and cross country routes. 
-S Bahn, which are suburban services operated as part of consortia with local government 
(Verkehrsverbund) forming part of integrated public transport networks in the main 
conurbations. 
- other local services. 
63% of passengers and 22.5% of passenger kilometres were accounted for by S Bahns. 
Passenger receipts in 1990 (in m. Dm) were split as follows: 
Inter City and EC 1998 
Other long distance 1830 
Connurbation 
(with and without S Bahn) 1018 
Other short distance 783 
Total 5576 
2. Pricing 
Pricing is based on mileage, with supplements for inter city and international trains. 
Charges on S Bahns are determined by the Verkehrsverbund, which invariably operate 
zonal ticketing systems covering all modes of public transport. 
3. Competition 
Buses and coaches are regulated and perform a complementary role, generally connecting 
with rail services. Air services compete over longer routes, although in some cases 
Lufthanse has transferred to the use of rail for the domestic leg of its services. The 
principal competition is seen as being the private car; there is no speed limit on german 
motorways. 
7. GREAT BRITAIN - British Railways Board (BRB) 
A. OBJECTIVES AND MANAGEMENT 
1. Ownership and Organisation 
Railways in Britain came under public ownership in 1948 as a result of the 1947 
Transport Act. British Railways were an operating division of the British Transport 
Commission, which also operated a full range of other transport services. The current 
British Railways Board (BRB) was established as a result of the 1962 Transport Act, with 
rail services being promoted under the British Rail banner. The Board consists of six full- 
time member (all rail managers) and seven part-time members (all managers or ex- 
managers of other businesses) appointed by the Government. BRB's initial organisational 
structure was hierarchial in structure, based on geographical divisions (Regions, Divisions 
and Areas) and separation of functional responsibilities (eg Finance, Marketing, Traction 
& Rolling Stock, Infrastructure, Personnel and Public Affairs). From 1982 onwards, 
superimposed on this organisational structure was a further division between business 
sectors. This assisted BRB in its efforts to adopt commercial business principles but the 
'matrix management' structure that resulted (see Figure 7.1) led to unclear divisions of 
responsibility and lack of bottom line accountability. 
It was therefore decided to re-organise BRB under the Organising for Quality (OfQ) 
programme, which was completed in June 1992. The Business Sectors became the key 
organisational unit and were defined as follows; four passenger businesses namely: 
1. Intercity which is responsible for mainline services and is responsible for five 
routes (also referred to as profit centres) (the East Coast Main Line, the West 
Coast Main L i e ,  the Great Western Main Line, the Midland MainlineICross 
Country and GatwicWNorwich). 
2. Network SouthEast which is responsible for local services in the London and 
South East England region and is split into nine divisions (Thames and Chiltern, 
North, West Anglia and Great Northern, London, Tilbury and Southend, 
Thameslink, South East, South Central and South West). 
3. Regional Railways (formerly Provincial) which is responsible for secondary and 
local services in the rest of the country and is divided into five regions (Scotrail, 
North East, North West, Central and South Wales and West). 
4. European Passenger Services which will be responsible for BRB's passenger 
services through the Channel Tunnel. 
In addition there are two freight sectors: 
5.  Train Load Freight specialising in the movement of bulk commodities and 
consisting of four businesses (Coal, Metals, Construction and Petroleum). 
6. Railfreight Distribution specialising in intermodal traffic, especially containers, 
but also operating some trainload services eg for automotive products, and 
consisting of two businesses (European and UK). 
The former parcels sector is operated jointly by the three main passenger businesses 
whilst corporate functions are provided by Central Services Division. As a result BRB is 
now divided into 28 profit centres, each of which is vertically integrated with 
responsibility for operations and infrastructure (in the latter case, either through 
ownership or leasing through inter-business trading arrangements). 
However, further organisational reforms have been proposed by the White Paper "New 
Opportunities for the Railways - the Privatisation of British Rail" published in July 1992. 
This sets out six policy intentions to be achieved in the current parliament (ie by April 
1997, at the very latest). These are: 
1. To sell BR Freight and Parcels to the private sector. 
2. To establish a Franchising Authority and to franchise a substantial number of 
passenger services. 
3. To restructure BR to own and operate track and infrastructure separately. 
4. To establish rights of access for new operators to the rail network. 
5. To establish an independent Regulator. 
6. To provide opportunities for the sale or leasing of stations. 
BRB's main role in the future will be as an infrastructure authority ('Railtrack') and a 
residual passenger rail operator of those services (expected to be grouped by profit sector) 
for which private sector franchisees can not be found. However, it may be expected that 
BRB staff will transfer to private sector operating companies, the Franchising Authority 
(yet to be named) and the independent Regulator ('Ofrail'). It should be clear that the 
proposed reforms imply a massive organisational shake-up with infrastructure being 
separated from operations, thus reversing recent organisational trends, and three new 
corporate bodies being created (Ofrail, Railtrack and the Franchising Authority). Figure 
7.2 shows how this will transform the rail businesses organisational structure from a 
simplified multi-divisional structure to a more complex form. 
2. Objectives and Constraints 
The statutory framework under which BRB currently works was established by the 1974 
Railwavs Act which introduced the conceut of a Public Service Oblieation (which was also 
required given Britain's entry into the EEC), which the Minister Gf Transport could lay 
on the Board, and in return for which he would have to provide compensation. The initial 
obligation (issued in a Ministerial directive of January 1975) was for BRB to provide a 
network of passenger services 'comparable generally with that provided by the Board at 
present'. However, it is not clear exactly what 'comparable generally' means in this 
context and major cutbacks in service have been possible but complete withdrawals have 
been problematic. For passenger services to be withdrawn and lines or stations closed, 
a detailed closure procedure enacted by the 1962 Transport Act, has to be undertaken and 
has, in some cases, prevented closure (with Settle - Carlisle being the most famous case). 
By contrast, freight services should be operated commercially and there are no closure 
procedures for freight-only lines. 
This obligation was amended by a new Ministerial directive issued in March 1988 which 
removed from the directive services which 'are or may be operated as Intercity services', 
services in the PTE areas (the main conurbations outside London) and of experimental 
services under the Speller amendment to the 1962 Transport Act (which exempts these 
experimental services from the closure procedures discussed above). 
InterCity services, like Freight, are now expected to be operated on a commercial basis, 
with an ultimate goal of an 8% rate of return on assets, although in the meantime lower 
targets have been set. For the two subsidised sectors (Network South East and Regional 
Railways) target reductions in subsidy are set. Indeed, it had been hoped at  one time that 
Network SouthEast would operate without subsidy by 1992193 but this has subsequently 
been abandoned. 
BRB has, in theory, total pricing freedom with the exception of the PTE areas where it 
acts as an operations sub-contractor to the Local Authorities under arrangements set up 
by Section 20 of the 1968 Transport Act. BRB's fares are market based, with price 
discrimination the norm. However, there is some evidence that Government has limited 
some price increases, particularly on Network SouthEast services which is the one area 
of operations where BRB is perceived to have a transport monopoly. 
BRB has much less of a free hand in terms of capital investment. It is not permitted to 
raise capital on the open market and its borrowings from government are limited by the 
External Funding Limit (EFL) which limits the amount an operator may spend in any one 
year from services other than its own, internally generated finances. Given that up to 
40% of BRB's investments have been internally generated and given the information 
presented in Table 7.1 it can be seen that the EFL has not been a binding constraint in 
the recent past but may become so in the future (especially as  the property market slump 
has curtailed a major internal revenue source). 
Table 7.1: British Rail (BR) EFL and  Investment (Em, cash) 
Source: Department of Transport 1992 "Government Expenditure" Plans for Transport". 
Cm1907. 
Year 
1986187 
1987188 
1988189 
1989190 
1990191 
199 1/92 
1992193 
1993194 
1994195 
3. . Subsidiary Activities 
BRB's main non-rail operations subsidiary activities were privatised in the 1980s. These 
included: 
EFL 
777 
591 
375 
673 
1016 
1522 
2041 
1361 
975 
(i) British Hovercraft Limited sold in 1981. 
Out-turn investment 
428 
543 
590 
7 15 
834 
1095 
(ii) British Transport Hotels sold between 1982 and 1984 to a variety of private sector 
groups for 230m. 
(iii) Sealink ferries sold to British Ferries Limited, a subsidiary of Sea Containers, in 
1984 for 266m (despite a book value of E108m). 
(iv) British Railway Engineering Limited (BREL) and the Horwich Foundry sold in 
1988. 
(v) Traveller's Fare Limited, the on station-catering company sold to the private sector 
in 1988. 
(vi) Doncaster Wagon Works, sold to a management buy-out (RFS Industries). 
(vii) British Transport Advertising. 
Further, a narrow gauge passenger railway (the Vale of Rheidol) has been transferred to 
the private sector. Private sector involvement has also been encouraged for on-train 
catering, train cleaning, station maintenance and property redevelopment. 
British Rail has three main wholly owned subsidiary companies; Transmark, a 
Consultancy company, British Rail Maintenance Limited, responsible for the National 
Supply Centre a t  Doncaster and four other heavy maintenance depots, and BR 
Telecommunications Limited, to provide business telecommunication services on a 
commercial arms-length basis and exploit new opportunities. BRB also has a minority 
share-holding in three railfreight companies designed to increase private sector 
involvement; Masterhaul, principally involved in the movement of deep sea containers, 
Charterrail (22% holding) and Combined Transport Limited (10% holding) 
B FINANCE 
1. Government Support 
BRB recorded a Group loss in 1991192 of £144.7m, compared to a loss in 1990191 of 
210.9m and a surplus of E269.8m in 1989190. Table 7.2 gives the result for the rail 
businesses only for 1990191 and 91/92. 
Table 7.2: British Rail - Financial Results (Em) 
Source: BRB Annual Report and Accounts 1990191, 1991192. 
Figures In Brackets Are Deficits 
Inter City 
Network South East 
Regional 
Trainload Freight 
Railfreight Distribution 
Parcels 
TOTAL 
Grant 
It can be seen that Trainhad Freight and Intercity operated 'profitably' during this 
period with costs recovery ratios in 1991192 of 115.4% and 100.2% respectively. Network 
SouthEast achieved a respectable cost recovery ratio of 85.2% but all other businesses are 
heavy loss makers with cost recovery ratios a t  74.5% (parcels), 59.6% (Railfreight 
Distribution) and 34.9% (Regional Railways). 
However, there have been substantial reductions in subsidy. Table 7.3 shows that during 
the four-year period 198617 to 1989190 subsidy decreased by 37% in real terms, although 
1990191 
Revenue 
851.2 
998.3 
203.7 
509.5 
172.8 
115.8 
2951.3 
671.5 
1991192 
Surplus 
49.7 
(154.9) 
(503.4) 
98.7 
(152.3) 
(25.8) 
(688.0) 
(16.5) 
Revenue 
896.7 
1044.3 
312.9 
505.3 
174.9 
101.5 
3035.6 
766.9 
Surplus 
2.0 
(181.9) 
(583.6) 
67.5 
(118.7) 
(34.7) 
(849.4) 
(82.5) 
it is now beginning to increase again (up 9% between 1989190 and 1990/91). In 1990/91, 
20% of Government support was to Network SouthEast services, 14% was to PTE services 
and 61% was to Regional Railway services outside the main conurbations (with the 
balance due to capital grants for level crossings). 
Table 7.3: British Rail Subsidy (;Em, 1990191 prices) 
* Capital Grants for Level Crossings (not included in Table 7.2). 
Intercity 
Network SouthEast 
Regional - PSO 
- S20 
Other * 
TOTAL 
of which PSO 
2. Investment 
Out-turn figures for investment are given by Table 7.1 and illustrated by Figure 7.3. This 
shows that the real level of investment is at its highest for 30 years but in part this just 
reflects the cyclical nature of rail investments. The last major investment programme was 
the Modernisation Plan of the late 1950s/early 1960s. These assets are now life-expired. 
Major future investments were outlined in the document "Future Rail" published in 1991 
which envisaged investment of £lob over the next decade. The main schemes outlined 
were: 
1986187 
137.4 
258.5 
534.7 
94.5 
- 
1025.1 
930.6 
(i) £1.5b of new railway for the Channel 'l'unnel, due to open in 1993. In addition, a 
new fast route is being developed by Union Railways (a steering group of BRB and 
private sector interests) to develop a fast link to the Tunnel, accessing London via 
the East Thames Corridor, Strafford and Kings Cross. 
(ii) Upgrading of West Coast Main line services (London - Birmingham - Manchester - 
Glasgow) by introducing Intercity 250 services. This scheme was to be completed 
in 1995 at a cost of £0.75b but has been postponed given the uncertainties 
surrounding the White Paper proposals. 
1987188 
134.1 
263.3 
512.6 
97.2 
- 
1007.2 
910.0 
(iii) "Total Route Modernisation" for Network South East services including the 
deployment of a new generation of Network turbo and electric trains. In addition 
four major schemes are proposed that will lead to the development of a regional 
express network in London similar to the RER in Paris. These are: 
(a) Paddington to Heathrow Airport, a joint project with BAA (British Airports 
Authority), which is in abeyance due to funding problems 
(b) East - West Crossrail, a joint project with London Underground Limited 
which will link Paddington and Liverpool Street by a new route via 
Farringdon 
(c) Thameslink 2000, improvement of the existing North - South link between 
1990191 
142.7 
428.1 
100.7 
28.4 
699.9 
599.2 
1988/89 
155.0 
472.2 
89.7 
- 
716.9 
627.2 
1989190 
87.8 
431.6 
100.2 
24.1 
643.7 
543.5 
Kings Cross and Blackfriars via Farringdon 
(d) Kent Express, introduction of fast commuter services using infrastructure 
developed for Channel Tunnel services. 
(iv) Regional Railways main investment need, fleet renewal, will be virtually completed 
by 1993 but "Future Rail" promises service improvements including 150 miles of 
electrification, 60 miles of new route and 100 new stations over the next decade. 
(v) The main investments in rail freight relate to the Channel Tunnel. In 1992 the 
Government announced its approval of Railfreight Distribution plans to buy fleets 
of 450 intermodal and 550 fully enclosed car carrying wagons for Channel Tunnel 
services. In addition a network of eight intermodal terminals at  Mossend 
(Glasgow), Wilton (Teeside), Wakefield (West Yorkshire), Trafford Park 
(Manchester), Seaforth (Liverpool), Bescot or Hams Hall (Birmingham), Cardiff, 
Willesden and Stratford (both Londou) is being planned. This network will be 
served by three freight operating centres at  Wembley (London), Doncaster and 
Crewe. 
C.  FREIGHT MARmT 
1. Pricing 
BRB's freight market is dominated by a small number of major customers. Individually 
negotiated contracts are therefore the norm. 
2. Services 
The bulk of BRB's freight is moved in trainload services. TrainLoad Freight carried 
123.lm tonnes (7,553m tome miles) in 1990191 compared to Railfre'ight Distributions 
15.lm tomes (2,380111 tonne miles). In 1990191 total freight train mites operated was 
29.8m and for parcels was 7.2m. Wagonload services continue to be unprofitable; in 1991 
BRB withdrew its Speedlink services (although managed to retain 70% of traffic) and is 
continually restructuring its Freightliner services. Two quany companies (Foster- 
Yeomans and ARC) own their own locomotives but these are operated on their behalf by 
BRB. 
3. Competition 
In 1990 rail was estimated as having an 8% share of the United Kingdom freight market 
(measured in tonne kms) compared to road 62%, water 25% and pipeline 5%. Rail's share 
varies by commodity category; it has a 54% share of the Solid Mineral Fuels market and 
a 33% shares of the Ores and Metal Waste market but a near zero share of the 
Manufactured goods market. The dominance of four bulk products can be seen from Table 
7.4. 
Table 7.4: BR Freight Traffic by Commodity (million tonnes lifted) 
* Affected by industrial action 
Coal and Coke 
Steel and Metals 
Construction 
Petroleum 
SUB TOTAL - 4 main 
Commodities 
SUB TOTAL - Other 
TOTAL 
In 1990, these four bulk commodities (coal, steel, construction materials and petroleum) 
accounted for 89% of tomes lifted. 
Road haulage was deregulated in 1968 and this, along with the motorway building 
programme has led to intense competition, virtually wiping out rail's presence in the 
general merchandise market. Coastal shipping and pipeline are particularly effective 
competitors in the petroleum market. 
1980 
94.1 
13.0* 
15.9 
13.7 
136.7 
16.8 
153.5 
D. PASSENGER MARRET 
1990 
74.9 
18.4 
21.9 
10.1 
125.3 
15.8 
141.1 
1. Pricing 
BRB has near total pricing freedom, prices vary by route, by time of day, day of week and 
week of the year as well as by distance. Most services offer both First Class and Standard 
services. Intercity services operate a series of discounted Saver-fares, including an airline 
style book in advance APEX fare. Cheap day returns and season tickets are available on 
most routes. Price discrimination is enhanced by a series of Railcards entitling holders 
to reduced fares; these are available for Senior Citizens, Students and Young Persons, 
members of the Armed Services and Families. 
2. Services 
Services are mainly distinguished by business sector, although both Network SouthEast 
and Regional railways operate some Express services. In 1990, the breakdown of 
passenger kms was Network SouthEast 15.3b (45%), Intercity 13.lb (38%) and Regional 
Railways 5.7b (17%). In a recent development, a private bus company, Stagecoach, is 
providing and marketing two carriages on the overnight Aberdeen to London service. 
Some BRB urban services have been transferred to other operators, most recently the 
Manchester Metrolink (subsequently withdrawn). 
3. Competition 
In 1990 rail had a 6% share of the UK passenger market (in terms of passenger km) 
compared to cars and taxis 85%, bus 6%, pedal-cycle, motor-cycle and air (1% each). Rail 
has a higher share in certain market segments, in particular the central London 
commuter market. In 1990 rail's share in this market was estimated to be 76% compared 
to car 14%, bus 8% and pedalfmotor-cycle 2%. However, rail's share was split 55:45 
between Network SouthEast services and London Underground Services. Rail also has 
relatively high shares of medium distance travel between conurbation centres and the 
capital (eg Leeds to London). 
BRB's main competition comes from the car, which has been encouraged by the road 
building programme and generous tax-allowances for company motoring. Express coaches 
were deregulated as a result of the 1980 Transport Act and this led to intense competition 
with rail. This competition has stabilised in terms of service but periodic price wars do 
still occur. Local buses were deregulated as a result of the 1985 Transport Act but, except 
in isolated cases, have had little effect on rail services. Domestic airline services were 
liberalized during the 1980s and have been particularly successful in the long haul 
business market (eg London - Scotland). 
Figure 7.1 BRB Organisational Structure 1982 to 1992 (Matrix Management) 
Source: Allen, D and Wiiams, G. (1985) in  Button, K. and Pitfield, D. (Eds) "International 
Railway Economics". Gower, Aldershot, p90. 
Figure 7.2: British Railway Industry Organisational Structure Before and After 
the 1992 White Paper (Simplified) 
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Figure 7.3: Past Investment in British Rail 
1 
Source: Brown, C. (1992). "The British Rail View". In Institution of Civil Engineers, Rail 
Privatisation, Deregulation and Open Access", p29. 
8. ITALY - Ente Ferrovie Dello Stato (FS) 
A. OBJECTZVES AND MANAGEMENT 
1. Ownership and Organisation 
FS is formally an independent company, through which the State runs the national 
network. In practice, it is controlled by the Minister of Transport who has wide ranging 
responsibilities. In arriving at his decisions the Minister consults the Board of Directors 
("Amministratore Straordinairo"), of which he is Chairman, and is composed of the Civil 
Service, FS employees, members of the judiciary and FS customers. Members of the 
Board are appointed by decrees of the President of the &public on the proposal of the 
Minister, except .representatives of FS staff who are elected by the staff themselves. 
Board members remain in office for three years and can be re-appointed. The Board is 
sub-composed into an Advisory Board, a Legal Committee and a Management Committee, 
whilst members also sit on the Committee that revises the accounts. 
FS is managed by a Director General who, while adhering to the directives of the 
Minister, is responsible for the direction and supervision of the whole network. A major 
internal re-organisation was enacted in 1990 in an attempt to commercialise the 
organisation and stimulate efficiency. Central functions are divided into ten departments 
to support nine operating divisions that are managed by 15 regional divisions 
("Compartimenti"). The organisation chart is given by Figure 8.1. The key division is the 
Business division which co-ordinates the activities of all other divisions. 
Figure 8.1: Organisational Chart for FS 
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FS is entrusted with the management of the railway network nationwide. Regional 
railways, covering around 4,000 route kms (FS covers around 16,000 route kms), are run 
by private companies under the supervision of ministerial authority. The largest regional 
railways are Ferrovie del Sud-Est and Ferrovie Nord Milano Esercizio. 
Fares are fixed by the State; restructuring and increases of a generalised nature are 
approved by Ministerial decree. The FS capital budget is part of the Central Government 
budgetary process. FS investment plans are approved by law. Level of service is 
politically determined; there have been few withdrawals of passenger services but there 
has been some rationalisation of freight services. Remuneration of FS personnel is also 
fxed by law. 
3. Subsidiary Activities 
FS has two main non-rail activities. It runs bus services which are closely integrated into 
the rail network and appear on rail timetables and it operates a fleet of train ferries to 
Sicily and Sardinia. These activities are financed and priced in the same way as the 
railways. 
FS is permitted to take an interest in enterprises engaged in the growth and provision of 
rail services and the development of complementary services. Wholly owned subsidiaries 
include: 
(i) INT (Istituto Nazionale Trasporti) which provides freight collection and delivery 
services 
(ii) CIT (Compagnia Italiana Turismo) 
(iii) BNC (Banca Nazionale delle Communicazioni) 
(iv) ITAL PER, a railway development institute. 
Partially owned subsidiaries include Sigma, a telematics company, Eurofima, a finance 
house, the Straits of Messina fixed link development company, nine "interporti" (roadhail 
interchanges), two freight companies (INTER CONTAR\TER and INTERFRIGO), as have 
many rail companies and the Banco Nazionale del Lavaro. 
1. Government Support 
The FS budget must be approved by Parliament as part of the Ministry of Transport's 
budget. In accordance with EC regulations receipts are received from the Treasury for 
public service obligations, infrastructure grants, concessionary fares and repayment of 
capital contributions. The residual deficit is covemd by grants from the Treasury to 
which, in principle, any surplus would go. Table 8.1 shows that FS is heavily reliant on 
government support; in 1990 revenue only covered 31% of operating costis (defined so as 
not to include capital costs), despite re-classification of the accountancy system. 
Table 8.1: Reclassified FS Accounts, 1990, 1991 (milliardi lire) 
2. Investment 
As FS is an inteeral Dart of the Ministrv of Transwrt. its investment fundine comes 
through the annuk Gernmen t  budgetary a result investment plans may 
be subject to un~redictable cuts. Bv 1990. the cumulative investment ~ l a n  stood a t  49.535 
1991 
4320.46 
13574.47 
10739.08 
2835.39 
-9254.01 
4300.00 
1500.00 
730.00 
375.22 
-2348.79 
0.0 
307.31 
700.20 
85.58 
132.07 
-2959.51 
438.80 
2520.71 
Operating Revenue 
Operating Costs 
- Labour Costs 
- Materials and Services 
Operating Result 
State Intervention 
- Public Service Obligation 
- Infrastructure Grant 
- Concessionary Fares 
- Internal Capital Costs 
Revised Operating Result 
Depreciation 
Property Receipts 
Pension Obligations 
Interest 
Tax Obligations 
Business Result 
Losses covered by 
Equilibrating Subsidy 
Residual Deficit 
milli&di L, of which 54% had been paid for, 12% had contracts awarded and 10% had 
Government approval (the remaining 22% had not yet received approval). Between 1989 
to 1990 actual investment increased by 3,323 milliardi L. The main scheme is to develop 
a T-shaped high speed network Nuova Rete ad Alta Velocita) between Milan-Florence- 
Rome-Naples and !l'urin-Milan-Venice. Development is to be by a separate company TAV 
(Treno Alta Velocita) in which FS will have a 40% stake, with the remainder held by 
banks and insurance companies. A further high speed line is being considered to link 
with the Swiss Transalpine proposals (Linee d i  Valico) whilst major track upgrades are 
in progress on four key sections (Genoa-Ventimiglia, Pescara-Foggia, Bologna-Padua and 
Rome-Pescara) and seventeen major schemes are on the books. 
1990 
4031.48 
12544.62 
10254.46 
2519.16 
-8513.14 
4300.00 
2360.00 
730.00 
334.00 
-789.14 
0.0 
55.41 
872.00 
133.43 
143.34 
-1882.50 
658.40 
1224.10 
1. Services 
FS has been attempting to develop full train load and container traffic as well as multi- 
modal transport. 43% of tonne-km in 1990 were domestic based, 39% were for imports 
and 18% were for exports. 20% of tonne/km were accounted for by containers and 5% by 
combined traffic. Postal services are an important revenue source, accounting for 5% of 
FS' revenue in 1990, compared to freight's 34%. 
2. Pricing 
There is a general obligation to cany at the published tariffs (which were established by 
law in 1940) but there is legislation (dating back to 1970) which allows the Minister to 
grant discounts on the total level of traffic consigned by one customer. Freight tariffs are 
distinguished in three ways: by length of haul, size of consignment and type of goods. 
Table 8.2: Indices of Freight Tariffs 1990 (FS = 100) 
Source: 
- FS AMual Report and Accounts 1990 
Table 8.2 shows that as a result of Government intervention FS has some of the lowest 
freight tariffs in western Europe. 
3. Competition 
In 1990 rail was estimated to have a 12% share of the goods market compared to road 
63%, sea 19% and pipeline 5% (for distances above 50km). Although hire and reward mad 
haulage is controlled by a quota system, this is ineffective as own-account operations are 
not restricted. Road haulage rates are controlled only for scheduled (lines) operations 
which constitute a very small part of the sector. For the rest, free market rates prevail. 
D. PASSENGER MARISET 
1. Services 
A distinction is made between main line services (linee commerciali), regional services 
( b e e  integrative) and local services (linee locali), whilst further distinctions are made on 
the basis of speed (rapido, espresso, diretto, locale). 
The network on which services are provided is determined by law, though the level of 
service is set by FS. FS requests the closure of low traffic lines each year but these 
requests are usually rejected and compensation has to be awarded. 
2. Pricing 
The basic structure of fares was determined by a law of 1935, with there being three 
broad tariffs; ordinary, concessionary and commuter (pendolare). Fares have failed to 
keep up with inflation and a low fare level exists (see Table 8.3). Commuter fares are 
even lower. 
Table 8.3: Indices of Rail Fares (Ordinary tariff for lOOkm journey) 
Source: FS Annual ~ & o r t  and Accounts 1990 
3. Competition 
FS and other railways accounted for 12% of the passenger market in 1990 compared to 
road 86% and air 2%. Road-based passenger transport is regulated and heavily subsidised 
but domestic airlines are allowed some pricing freedom in order to compensate for their 
lack of subsidy. 
9. NETHERLANDS - Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS) 
A. OBJECTNES and MANAGEMENT 
1. Ownership and Organisation 
NS is a public corporation wholly owned by the state. It  was reorganised in 1988 into 
Headauarters, Business Units for freight and passenger sectors and Service Units for 
operating, rolling stock and infrastructure. Each business unit has a contract with each 
service unit for the provision of services. These contracts are in essence very simple. For 
instance, the rolling stock unit is required to supply vehicles at a charge (in 1990 prices) 
of 120,000 NLG per coach per annum. For infrastructure the price is 100,000 per km per 
annum and for operation 2.9 per train km, 0.94 per coach km (mainly to cover fuel) and 
0.016 per passci'ilger km (mainly to cover ticketing and inspection). The latter figures are 
based on 30% of kilometres being in the peak, a higher figure would be paid if this 
changed substantially. All these figures reduce by 2% per annum in real tenns; if units 
better this, they are allowed to retain the surplus and plough it back into additional 
investment, enhanced salaries etc. 
The Wijffels Commission, which reported on 5/6/92, recommended further changes to 
establish a more arms-length relationship between NS and the government. Under this, 
the government would take over responsibility for the infrastructure and NS would have 
complete commercial freedom regarding operations. Initially support would be paid for 
the operation of passenger services, but it was suggested that in the long run this might 
be phased out. NS would then be permitted to borrow from the private market without 
government control or guarantee. 
2. Objectives and Controls 
Under the latest contract between NS and the government, NS is promised a constant real 
level of support. Minimum service frequencies are stipulated, but in fact NS currently far 
exceeds these. Maximum passenger fares are also set. In freight traffic, NS has complete 
commercial freedom, although currently some subsidy is paid. 
However, the real objective comes from the growing concern with the congestion and 
environmental problems from the growth of road traffic. In 1988, NS put forward a plan 
(RAIL 21) to contribute towards solution of these by doubling its passenger carryings by 
the year 2005 with no increase in subsidy (ie. a 100% increase in traffic for a 50% increase 
in real costs, or a 25% cut in cost per passenger kilometre). In October, 1988, this plan 
was accepted by the government, as part of a package of measures (including inter-urban 
road pricing) designed to achieve a cut in the growth of car tr&c to 5% per annum. So 
far NS has achieved a 40% growth in passenger traffic. However, the failure by the 
government to implement effective measures to restrain the car is making it difficult for 
NS to achieve its targeted growth; it can only go on increasing traffic by holding fares 
down. 
A similar plan for a vast increase in freight traffic (RAIL 21 CARGO), dependent on 
providing a new freight route between Rotterdam and Germany, and the major 
development of international inter-modal services, was submitted late in 1990. The new 
freight route has now been approved. 
3. Subsidiary Activity 
NS no longer owns subsidiary companies in road transport; its subsidiaries are now 
closely aligned with its main business - eg. a travel agency, telecommunications, 
containers. 
B. FINANCE 
1. Government Support 
In 1990, NS received 1394m NLG in support for passenger services and 29m in support 
for freight, a total of 41% of turnover (for passenger services, support amounts to around 
50% of income). As commented above, currently a constant real level of support is 
promised by the state. 
2. Investment 
Up until 1988, investment in NS was running at around 700m NLG per annum. The plan 
to double rail traffic by the year 2005 requires a vast increase in investment to the level 
of some 2500m per annum. This breaks down as follows: 
Rolling stock replacement 300 
expansion 400 
Infrastructure existing lines renewals 400 
expansion 200 
new lines passenger 800 
freight 400 
Regarding infrastructure the main intercity network will be expanded from 2 to 4 tracks 
to enable a frequent pattern of inter city, interregional and stopping services to be 
accommodated. In terms of rolling stock, the fleet will be expanded from 2250 passenger 
carrying vehicles in 1988 to 3375 in 200012005. Since by then half of the fleet will 
comprise double deck vehicles this will increase the number of seats by 9096, and - with 
a small increase in vehicle utilisation, will suffice to carry twice the traffic volume with 
no increase in standing. The plan is then to achieve a doubling of passenger kilometres 
with an increase in track kilometres of 15%, an increase in rolling stock of 50%, an 
increase in train kilometres of 25% and consequently an increase in passengers per train 
of 60%. 
The current position is that new infrastructure is financed by the government, but NS has 
to finance replacement of assets and all rolling stock. It has access to the private capital 
market, with government permission and government guarantee; as commented above, 
the Wijffells Commission recommends that both the government guarantee and the need 
for government permission be removed as part of a further reorganisation. =vate 
financing of new high speed and fkeight lines on the basis of risk capital has been 
considered, but is very problematic, these lines are not very profitable, being at the 
extremities of the European network, and involve mainly international traffic, where 
cooperation with other railways is essential. 
C. FREIGHT MARKET 
1. Services 
In 1990, NS carried 18.4m tonnes of freight, of which 13.4m was international. 
By method of operation, freight traffic in tomes breaks down as follows: 
DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL TOTAL 
Trainload 1.7 6.7 8.4 
Wagonload 1.2 3.6 4.8 
Combined transport 1.3 3.1 4.4 
Other 0.8 0 0.8 
Total 5.0 13.4 18.4 
2. Pricing 
NS has complete commercial freedom in pricing freight traffic. Although it publishes a 
tariff, it carries most of its freight at a discount on specially negotiated tariffs. 
3. Competition 
NS has a small share of the domestic market, as a result of short distances and the wide 
availability of water transport for bulk commodities. NS also argues that neither water 
nor truck transport pays its infrastructure costs. 
D. PASSENGER MARKET 
1. Services 
Passenger services operate mainly on a regular interval basis, and are marketed as Inter 
City (Including Eumcity international trains), Inter regional and stopping services. 
However, in reality the three are intimately intertwined both in terms of operations and 
traffic; thus for instance much commuting takes place on inter regional and inter city 
trains. 
2. Pricing 
Pricing is based on mileage, with supplements for international trains. There is a 
growing pattern of off-peak discount fares and of season tickets, including a national card 
giving unlimited travel for students. 
3. Competition 
Buses and coaches are regulated and perform a complementary role, generally connecting 
with rail services. The principal competition is seen as being the private car. 
10. NORWAY - Norges Statsbaner (NSB) 
A. OBJECTnTES AND MANAGEMENT 
1. Ownership and Organisation 
The NSB Board is appointed by the Government and is responsible to the Ministry of 
Communications. It comprises the Director General and six  art-time members 
representing the major interest groups. The delineation of boundaries of the fields of 
responsibility of NSB and the Ministry of Communications are to be revised under the 
Government Enterprise Act  t tat sf ore task sloven), with a trend towards greater 
managerial autonomy. NSB accounts are part of the National Accounts but there is a 
move towards preparing commercial accounts (to be fully operational in 1993). 
Internally, NSB is organised at  three levels. Headquarter functions are divided between 
seven directors. There are also seven operational divisions: passenger services, freight 
services, road transport, travel agencies, property, rolling stock and production and (since 
January 1991) permanent way. Passenger services are further subdivided into two sub- 
divisions (short/medium distance and long distance) whilst freight services are split into 
sixteen units, on a geographic basis. Overall, NSB is moving towards becoming a free 
standing public enterprise. 
2. Objectives and Constraints 
NSB's Railway Plans, approved by Parliament, form part of the National Transport Plan. 
The plan for the period 1994-1997 is awaiting approval. Particular concerns are reducing 
transport costs and improving the environment. 
Passenger fares, maximum freight charges, passenger service levels and investment 
budgets all require Government approval. Fare increases have tended to be below 
inflation. Fares are based on distance; this can lead to anomalies. The construction of 
the Drammen tunnel reduced the distance to Oslo and hence fares had to be reduced even 
though service quality had been improved and there was scope for pricing up. Freight 
rates are based on volume rather than weight or value and can result in under-charging. 
The objective of passenger services is a break-even outcome. By contrast, freight services 
are operated on a commercial basis with an aim of breaking even by 1994. There has 
been abandonments of passenger services in the 1980s, whilst more recently some freight 
services have been withdrawn (e.g. the Hardanger line). 
3. Subsidiary Activities 
NSB Biltraf&k is the largest bus operator in the country. Buses are operated as 
separate regional companies and receive direct county subsidy on a kilometre basis. NSB 
operates three subsidiaries in the freight market, ~ in je~oods  A/  (the parcels carrier - 40% 
state owned), Transportinvest AfS and KombiFrakt. The latter operation which provided 
a freightliner type service was wound-up in 1991 although some services were taken over 
by a consortium of Swedish freight operators. NSB also has a 41% share in Namesen AIS, 
the catering and bookstall organisation and train catering franchise. 
B. FINANCE 
1. Government Support 
Although Government contributions are determined in advance at the global level, a 
balanced budget principle is adhered to: in practice any surplus/shortfall is absorbed by 
adjustments to Government contributions. The special fares policy (including travelcards) 
that effects NSB's suburban services in Oslo flokaltrafkk) receives local government 
support. In 1990 receipts from the passenger and freight railway businesses were NOK 
3,813m compared to expenditure of 4,584m. Figure 10.1 shows that Central Government 
support for NSB has increased approximately threefold during the 1980s (and it should 
be noted that these figures have not been adjusted for inflation). 
Figure 10.1: Costs and Revenue of NSB's Rail Activities 
Source: Norges Offisielle Statistikk (1992) "Transport and Communication Statistics 1990 
p39. 
58 
2. Investment 
Passenger investments are funded 100% by Government loans. Specific investments for 
freight services and subsidiaries are based on borrowings from Government at specified 
interest rates. However, at the end of 1991, application of commercial principles meant 
that NSB was re-defined as being wholly financed by loans with the debt to Government 
being estimated at  NOK 3.5 billion. By the end of the 1990s interest costs on new loans 
alone will be around NOK 100 million. A re-financing package is being considered. 
Recent trends in capital investment in the railways are shown in Table 10.1. 
Table 10.1: Capital Investment i n  State Railways. Million kroner 
Scource: Transport and Communications Statistics, 1990, p64 except "; NSB Annual 
Report and Accounts, 1991. 
Around 45% of expenditure in 1991 was on Permanent Way with the main investment 
items being: 
Year 
Expenditure 
(i) Doubling of track between Ski and Moss (1991-1995) 
(ii) The Finse tunnel (1991-19931, 
1988 
1146 
1987 
1108 
whilst the next major investment will be: 
(iii) The Oslo An-port (Gardermoen) link (1992-1999) 
1989 
1205 
Capital expenditure in the Traffic Sector is concentrated on fleet renewal, with a major 
upgrading of the Oslo-Lillehammer service being undertaken by 1993, whilst there are 
plans to replace the type 68 electric multiple units. 
Since 1990 property development has made a small contribution to the railways finances, 
raising NOK 41 million in 1990 and 67 million in 1991. The NSB's former head offices 
at  Storgaten were sold to property group Investa (but the sale will not figure in the 
accounts until 1992) and the Railway School premises at Blindernveien were sold to the 
University of Oslo. 
1990 
803 
Particular concern lies in the fact that NSB investment is lagging behind that of its 
Nordic neighbours, who are estimated to be investing NOK 100 billion in the next 10-15 
years, whereas the upper investment level for NSB is estimated to be 25 billion. Main 
priorities are reducing the age of the locomotive fleet and upgrading track, particularly 
along the Bergen-Oslo-Goteborg axis. 
1991 
1116 (Planned) 
1237 (Outturd* 
C. FREIGHT MARKET 
1. Services 
The major trainload flow is the 5,000 tonne ore trains from Kiruna to Narvik, accounting 
for 63% of tonnes carried but only 6% of net tome km in 1990. Inland wagonload traffic 
accounts for around 31% of tonnes carried and 89% of tonne-km. Foreign traffic makes 
up the balance. In 1990 the main wagonload traffics were (based on tonnes carried - 
excluding special transactions): 
Crude minerals other than ore: 30% 
Miscellaneous manufactured items 24% 
Wood and cork 23% 
The main origins and destinations for wagonload traffic are (based on tonnes carried): 
Origins: 
Nordland - 28% 
Telemark - 13% 
Hedmark - 12% 
Abroad - 8% 
Oslo - 7% 
Destinations: 
Nordland - 29% 
Telemark - 12% 
Buskerud - 9% 
Abroad - 8% 
Oslo - 5% 
2. Price 
Although maximum rates are published, over 90% of traffic is subject to specially 
negotiated discounts. Pricing policy is based on contribution maximisation, subject to 
covering variable costs. 
3. Competition 
In 1990 the mode split (based on tonne-km) was coastal shipping 4896, road 43% and rail 
9%. This compares to the figures of 6096,29% and 11% reported in the late 1970's. The 
growth of road-based goods transport relates to deregulation in the mid 1980's which led 
to fierce competition but mainly abstracted traffic from coastal shipping. Competition has 
now quietened down. It should be noted that scheduled local services by sea are often 
provided and subsidised by local authorities. 
D. PASSENGER MARmT 
1. Services 
Rail services are classed as Day trains (Dagtog) and Night trains (Nattog) and between 
Intercity, Regional, Local (Naertrafikktog) and Suburban (Localtog). A number of small 
branch lines in Southern Norway were closed in the 1980s (eg. Kragero, Flekketjord) and 
replaced by bus services, but others survived (eg Arendal, Notodden). 
2. Pricing 
Fares are based on a standard charge per krn (see above), tapering by distance. Around 
22% of passengers (16% of revenue) used monthly and half monthly season tickets in 
1990, whilst reduced ordinary ticket fares are available for pensioners, students, families 
and members of the armed services. 
3. Competition 
Around 79% of passenger km in Norway were made by car, with 11% made by bus, 5% 
made by plane, 4% by train and 1% by boat in 1990. By contrast, in 1980 the 
corresponding percentages were 76%, 12%, 3%, 6% and 2% respectively. In the 1980s 
there has been some relaxation of the licensing system for express coach services, whilst 
all road-based forms of transport have benefitted from a large scale road building 
programme. Air is a serious contender for business traftic with there being one publicly 
owned national company (SAS), one privately owned (Braathen) and a series of regional 
operators. Services remain licenced but as the market has grown the burden of cross 
subsidy on the main trunk routes has reduced. 
Rail journeys are relatively short, with 47.5% being under 30km, representing the 
dominance of Oslo based commuting. This is also borne out by an analysis of origins and 
destinations (based on passengers in 1990): 
Origin 
Oslo 22% 
Hordaland 14% 
Buskerud 12% 
Ostfold 10% 
Rogaland 8% 
Destination 
22% 
14% 
12% 
10% 
8% 
Oslo and its adjacent counties (Buskerund, Vestold, Ostfold, Akerhus and Oppland) 
accounts for 58% of travel. The main city in Hordaland is Bergen and the main city in 
Rogaland is Stavanger. 
11. PORTUGAL - Caminhos de Ferro Portuguesas (CP) 
A. OBJECTIVES and MANAGEMENT 
1. Ownership and Organisation 
CP is still a public corporation, wholly owned by the State. However some of its former 
divisions have been turned into subsidiary concerns and the whole railway itself has been 
re-arranged in a "Holding" company, in readiness for the possible privatisation of the most 
profitable constituents. 
CP owns all the rolling stock and infrastructure, but plans have been drawn up to set up 
a separate track and infrastructure authority along the lines of Banverket and Railtrack. 
Already the company's accounting system has been changed to separate infrastructure 
from other costs. 
The Portuguese government has expressed intentions to involve private companies in the 
building and running of new railway services. A policy it hopes will boost rail investment 
after many years of stagnation. The frst  stage of such a scheme would involve the sub- 
concession of services, in the manner of the former "Sociedade Estoril". Likely candidates 
would include the Cascais L i e ,  the Sintra Line, the Lisbon Half-Ring Line and the new 
suburban service in the Southern Shore. Later stages of the governments policy may 
possibly include privatisation of some Inter-City services, together with most of CP- 
Freight and the recently created TEX (Transport of Express Parcels). 
2. Objectives and Controls 
In theory CP's objectives are set by the Ministry of Transport, in terms of definition of its 
level of service and its respective prices for the passenger services. In practice the real 
objective of CP is diffcult to define, given this period of transition. A Decree in 1992, 
from the Ministry of Transport, established that Caminhos de Ferm Portugueses, E.P., 
was no longer a "Public Interest Corporation". An idea of what is to become a significant 
part of the existing and future railway services may be illustrated by part of the third 
paragraph, of the 1990 Accounting Report Preamble, with respect to a closure package 
affecting 750 Km of lines: "...it is not possible to imagine the existence of a modem rail 
network, adequate and prepared to the new future challenges, and, simultaneously, 
maintain sections of mute without any market perspectives and in a complete state 
of dereliction." This suggests that CP is tacitly a profit-making coneern, supporting a 
remaining set of activities, such as the Suburban Operations, as uncomfortable burdens. 
Opening and closure of l i e s  and services, must, according to Decree 63/83 and the New 
Land Transport Law, always have consent from the Ministry of Transport. Important 
indicators that are used include the state of infrastructure and the availability of funds 
to renew it; many services have been lost, not for lack of patronage, but on a mere 
avoidable cost basis. If a service is withdrawn, the rail operator must become responsible 
for the provision of replacement bus services for passengers (in practice such a policy is 
rarely enforced). A line without a service is abandoned, but in most cases remains 
"Classified, with the possibility of regional rail services being run by the local councils. 
3. Subsidiary Activity 
CP has recently added seven subsidiaries to its pair of long established subsidiaries, 
Fergrafica and Ferbritas. Fergrafica has traditionally been CP's graphic arts concern, 
producing tickets, timetables and other printed material for the rail operator and third 
parties. 
Ferbritas specialises in ballast and rock extraction, extracting good quality aggregate 
materials, used for both track renewal or construction, and to sell to third-parties, such 
as the National Road Board. 
Recently the following concerns were added: Stifa, Portif, Publifer, Tex, Fernave, Invesfer 
and Emefe. Stifa runs assembly plants. Portif runs the international container services, 
whilst TEX runs a new express parcels service. Publifer promotes advertising space in 
stations and other public spaces. Fernave deals with technical services and is a 
conjugation of efforts between CP, the Lisbon Metro, the Transtejo (Tagus Ferries), the 
STCP (Oporto Public Transport) and Ferbritas. 
Invesfer is responsible for "property development". Generally the land promoted is 
occupied by old depots, warehouses and in exceptional cases disused railways. Emefe, 
created in May 1993, is a repair and maintenance service, comprising the former CP 
workshops and personnel; though not as yet scheduled for privatisation, it has been 
suggested that this could take place at  a later stage, with groups such as ABB (Asea 
Brown-Boveri) taking it over. 
CP also has interests in two long-distance international coach service companies 
(Internorte and Intersul - 10.3% and 10.0% res~ectivelv) and automobile retailina business 
- 
Ultrena, with 10% of its Capital. 
B. FINANCE 
1. Government Support. 
Compensations vary from year to year and are granted on an ad-hoc basis through a 
resolution of the Council of Ministers. Since 1990, such awards have been subject to VAT 
(8%) taxation, which has contributed to a greater reduction of their amounts. In 1990, CP 
was granted Esc.Million 19,779 of Direct Compensations, plus Esc.Million 2,988 of 
"Equilibrium Fund". Both these contributions representing about 77.5% of all rail 
operating receipts. 
2. Investment. 
In the year of 1990, CP had a total investment of Esc.Million 27,100, comprising as 
follows, 
(i) Directly By The State (All figures in Esc.Million) 
(ii) Directly By Corporation (All figures in Esc.Million) 
- 
Track 
Stations 
Electrification 
- 
Signalling and Telecommunications 
Level Crossing Fkplacement 
Other 
- 
8573 
555 
498 
1950 
817 
Source: Transport Statistics, Institute Nacional de Estatistica, Portugal 
Fixed Installations 
Rolling Stock 
of which Traction Stock 
of which Passenger Stock 
of which Freight Stock 
of which Rolling Stock Improvements 
Equipment for Permanent Use 
Other 
Despite the apparent differences in investment sources, in practice all capital expenditure 
carried out by CP is an indirect form of state investment, since a significant part of it 
consists of non-returnable state grants. 
434 
8130 
2012 
3765 
670 
1684 
493 
25 1 
A closer look into the CP's 1990 Accounting Report may give a more accurate idea of the 
current sources of financing presently available for railway investment in Portugal: 
Long Duration Infiastruct. 
Source: CP Accounting Report 
Most infrastructure investment is covered by the PIDDAC (the Plan of Investment and 
Expenses of Development of the Central Administration), which is part of the yearly state 
budget. Other investment sources come from the European Fund and part of the Capital 
Donations (the remaining of the latter funding 20% of expenditure incurred with the 
purchase and modernisation of rolling stock and other investments); from the DGTT (the 
General Direction of Land Transport - a division of the Ministry of Transport), funding 
was obtained for an inter-change between the Cascais corridor directly to the Lisbon Half 
Ring Line. The majority of rolling stock investment was funded by Eurofma and loans, 
from both the naticmal and foreign banks and the EIB (European Investment Bank). 
The following projects were carried out from 1990 to 1993 - infrastructure: Northern 
Main-Line upgrading to 200 Kmhq ATC and radio-telephone; Beira Alta Main-Line 
upgrading, CTC, electrification; Vendas Novas Line: upgrading and electrification; Sado 
Line: CTC; construction of the new Southern Line from Pinhal Novo to Lisbon, together 
with several station reconstruction in the southern shore of the Tagus, part of the Sintra 
Line Quadruplication; bridge strengthening in several sections of the network, opening 
of the industrial branches of Neves-Corvo Mines, Pego power plant and Lourical pulp 
mills. 
Rolling Stock: new freight wagons, new diesel-electric metre-gauge units for the Povoa 
Line (7), new main-line electrics for 200 Km/h operation (30), new electric quadruple units 
for the Sintra Line (42), and refurbishment of existing stainless-steel coaches, including 
new air-conditioning equipment. 
Future investments include: double-tracking and electrification from Ermesinde (Oporto) 
to both Braga and Marco, a similar scheme between Cacem and Torres Vedras, in the 
Western Main-Line and Entroncamento-Abrantes, on the Eastern Main-Line, with an 
extension of the wires to the peg0 power plant; electrification of the Sado Line as far as 
Ermidas-Sados; electrification of part of the Western Main Line, to give the electric 
tractive units access to the Lourical industrial branch; purchase of the electric tilting 
trainsets, of the "Pendolino" Type or the Swedish X-2000. 
C. FREIGHT W K E T  
1. Services 
Despite remaining a minor freight carrier, Portuguese Railways managed to increase its 
role, increasing its traffic share between 1980 and 1990, from about 7.82% to 12.72%; 
corresponding in an absolute rise from 1 to 1.59 Thousand Million Ton-Km. Road was the 
main loser, falling from 11.8 to 10.92 Thousand Million Ton-Km and from 92.19% to 
87.29%. Inland waterways and pipe-lines both play meaningless roles in Portuguese 
freight, however the role of coastal shipping is still important for bulk items such as oil 
and chemicals. The increase in freight share can be attributed to the adoption of a more 
commercial approach (in particular towards industries responsible for the generation of 
bulk traffics), a streamlining policy concentrating freight movements in a certain number 
of terminals and an increase in the number of private sidings. Yet this success hides a 
continuous loss of rail freight market share in favour of road transport, particularly 
perishables, cork and most high value-added goods. Mail, a commodity traditionally 
carried by the railway during past decades, was also abandoned. So despite becoming 
more competitive and business-orientated, the rail freight sector in Portugal is now more 
vulnerable to the fluctuations of the market. 
A final note has to be mentioned regarding the lifting of all historic trade barriers 
between both Spain and Portugal (By 1986, both countries were in the European 
Community). In the short term this has helped increase rail's share of freight but the 
long term picture looks a lot more favourable towards road transport, given the highway 
construction programme which duplicates most of the old and neglected international rail 
trunk routes. 
2. Pricing 
There is no regulation of freight prices, so prices are free to vary with the market. To 
ensure consolidation of certain markets, a tying policy is frequently followed, by placing 
the responsibility of providing the freight stock in the hands of the client e.g. EDP 
(Electricity of Portugal), who own the hoppers employed on the Pego Traffic. 
3. Competition 
Coastal shipping is one of rail's competitors but is minor when compared to road 
transport. The only regulation to be found in Portugal's road freight transport is that 
regarding safety, for example, maximum speeds, maximum driving hours per day and 
maximum loading. Frequently these are disregarded and in some cases improve the 
competitiveness of road over rail. An example of this is in the Estremoz-Vila Vicosa 
region, where the railway loses a significant part of the marble traffic to small concerns 
who use surveyor vehicles to clear the way for their overloaded lorries. 
D. PASSENGER MARKET 
1. Services 
CP's share of the passenger market has seen a large fall from 11.1% in 1980 to 7% in 
1990, whilst private cars have increased their share from 75% to 80.3%. There are five 
types of service on offer: ALFA, IC, International, Suburban and Regional. ALFA trains 
are fast expresses covering Lisbon-Oporto (337 Km) in just three hours, consisting of 
french type Corail Stock. There were initial plans to extend the ALFA service to the 
Algarve, but these seem to have been postponed indefinitely, at least, until the arrival of 
the tilting trainsets. 
The IC network, consists of Expresses currently linking both Lisbon and Oporto to 
thirteen district capitals; however, only services from Lisbon to Aveiro and Lisbon to 
Braga may effectively be considered as true IC-services, given European Quality 
Standards: these are the two only services, apart fmm the ALFA, operating air- 
conditioned Corail stock. 
International trains comprise the expresses from Lisbon to Madrid and from Lisbon to 
Paris with through coaches from Oporto. The fwst route offers a daytime Talgo and a 
night service, the Lusitania-Expresso (the only International Express capable of competing 
with air travel). The Sud Express, takes 27 hours on its daily journey and is used 
primarily by immigrants. 
Suburban operations exist in the Lisbon Area, the Tagus Southern Shore, the Oporto Area 
and the Coimbra-Figueira da Foz Region. Finally, regional trains serve the Main-Lines 
as well as outlying branch lines. 
2. Pricing 
Prices are controlled by the Ministry of Transport. With the exception of suburban trains, 
fares are set on a kilometric base; for fast trains, l i e  the ALFA, the cost per kilometre 
is higher, and a supplement is charged; the minimum distance upon which fares are set 
for an Express service is 50 krns. Prices for suburban trains are set on a zonal basis. 
3. Competition 
The railways are now facing free competition from Coach Companies and as a result have 
seen large numbers of long-distance rail users switch to coach travel, primarily due to the 
poor speeds achieved by CP's Main-Line Trains. The increase in car ownership in recent 
years has also had an adverse effect on both railway and public transport patronage. 
The only factor in rail's favour is its low price, which is achieved through high rates of 
government subsidy. 
12. SPAIN - Red Nacional de 10s Ferrocarriles Espanoles (RENFE) 
A. OBJECTIVES and MANAGEMENT 
1. Ownership and Organisation 
RENFE is a state owned company; it is headed by an administrative council appointed by 
the government. The current philosophy is, however, to reduce the amount of state 
control, with a possible long term aim of dividing it into a number of separate companies 
and introducing private capital. 
RENFE has been sectorised into long distance, regional and suburban passenger services 
and freight; separate accounts are produced for each sector. However, stations, traction 
(including crews) and rolling stock maintenance remain common between the sectors. 
Infrastructure is provided and maintained by a totally separate division financed directly 
by the government. 
It should be noted that there is a separate national narrow-gauge railway company 
(Ferrocarriles espanoles de via estrecha, or FEVE) and separate - mainly metre gauge - 
suburban companies, for instance in Barcelona and Valencia. 
2. Objectives and Controls 
A 3 year contract with the state was signed in 1988, covering the amount of subsidy to 
be paid and the service levels to be provided. Associated with this was a massive 
programme of over 2000 billion pesetas of investment by the turn of the century, including 
new high speed stretches of main line, upgrading of existing lines and major investment 
in the Madrid suburban system. Long distance services were to become fully self 
supporting, but the state would continue to subsidise - and control the fares on - regional 
and suburban services. 
Since this contract expired in 1991, no new one has yet been signed, but as a result of the 
financial situation of the govenunent, both subsidy and capital spending have been cut 
(the fonner by 6% in 1992). The emphasis in investment has swung away from high 
speed services towards the improvement of the Madrid suburban system. 
RENFE has succeeded in reducing its dependence on state subsidy by means of an active 
pursuit of higher productivity; it has reduced its workforce by 4270 in the last ten years. 
B. FINANCE 
1. Government Support 
In 1990, RENFE received payments from the state covering its interest costs of 62 million 
pesetas, and PSO compensation and normalisation of 115m pesetas. Of the latter, 66% 
were in respect of infrastructure costs (which the state covers in full), 16% regional 
passenger services and 14% suburban passenger services. 
2. Investment 
Speeds in Spain are severely restricted by the fact that most main lines are single track 
and have steep and severely curved sections, particularly in mountainous areas. The long 
term investment plan which was agreed in 1987 covered the following new stretches of 
line on existing main Lines: 
Bilbao-Vitoria cutoff - 50km - to improve services to Bilbao 
Guadarrama line - 60km - to improve services between Madrid and Valladolid 
Work on the Madrid-Seville Alta Velocidad Espanol (AVE) high speed line was completed 
in 1992. Orifinallv intended as a further cutoff on an existine route. this was built as a 
new standari gauge line (the rest of mNFE is broad gauge). lit the ime  it was intended 
that all new high speed routes would be standard gauge and that most or all of the 
existing system would be converted. However, the cost of doing this is now seen as 
prohibitive, and it seems likely that further stretches of high speed l i e  will be built to 
broad gauge with convertible sleepers, except for the route from Barcelona to the French 
border if that goes ahead. The next priority for new high speed services is Madrid- 
Barcelona. 
In addition the plan involved extensive upgrading of existing lines for 200kmph running, 
double-tracking, electrification and improved suburban services. 
In 1990, investment was as follows (m. pesetas): 
High Speed line (AVE) 34.222 
Suburban 25.930 
Rolling stock 23.175 
Infrastructure 29.149 
Other 38.269 
TOTAL 150.745 
C. FREIGHT MARI(ET 
1. Services 
Freight traffic has been steadily declining; in 1990 RENFE carried 29 million tonnes 
(11206 million tonne km). Freight revenue totalled 58.773 million pesetas, of which 46 
million was from complete wagons and containers and the rest from parcels, sundries and 
post. Commodities were as follows: 
tonnes tonne km 
(mf (m) 
Cereals 
Solid fuel 
Wood 
Cement 
Limestone 
Minerals 
Iron and steel 
Oil 
Chemicals 
Butane and propane 
Fertilisers 
National cars 
Military 
Iberia tariff 
International cars 
Other international 
Containers 
Internal transport 
Coal is imported; the major category of bulk traffic, which is steel, is declining. The best 
prospects are for inter-modal traffic. 
2. Competition 
Rail is in principle protected from road competition by a quantity licensing system. 
Licences are issues either for the entire country or for a specific area. In practice, the 
amount of protection given has been small, partly because of free entry into own account 
carriage by mad. 
D. PASSENGER MARKET 
1. Services 
The fastest trains are operated by the special TALGO stock, which has a low centre of 
gravity and can thus achieve higher speeds on poor quality infrastructure. TALGO trans 
also have adjustable wheels so that they can run onto the high speed line and the 
standard gauge tracks of French Railways. Other long distance trains include 
Electrotrenes, rapidos and night espresos. Long distance traffic is stagnating and RENFE 
faces growing problems as road infrastructure improvements make road journeys faster 
on an increasing number of routes. On the new Madrid-Seville line trains were 100% full 
during EXPO 92, but the load factor is now 65%. It will be impossible to cover the 
enormous infrastructure costs of this route out of revenue. 
The big growth area is the Madrid suburban network where tr&c has doubled in the last 
3 years and is still growing at 30% pa. Regional traffic is generally declining. 
Passenger km in 1990 were divided as follows (m km): 
Talgos 
Electrotrenes 
Rapidos and others 
Night trains 
Total lone distance 
Regional 
Suburban 
Total 
2. Pricing 
RENFE has pricing freedom on long distance services, and has introduced new higher 
tariffs on the AVE. Regional fares are controlled by the state. In the Madrid region, 
RENFE services are part of the integrated ticketing system of the Consorcio de 
Transportes de Madrid, and the local authority compensates RENFE to the losses 
involved. 
3. Competition 
In the main cities, bus services are provided by the local authority or by a private 
company on a long term monopoly franchise. Elsewhere, bus services are mainly private 
and are free to compete with RENFE. There are domestic air services between many 
major cities, and it is widely believed that European air deregulation will make these 
much more competitive, with substantial reductions in price. 
13.SWEDEN - Banverket (BV) 
- Statens JZirnviigar (SJ) 
A. OBJECTIVES AND MANAGEMENT 
1. Ownership and Organisation 
Swedish railways were dominantly under state control by 1939, although a distinction was 
maintained between the national and the regional networks. The national network 
operated without subsidy until 1979. Despite being one of the most cost-effective 
operators in Europe a crisis of confidence emerged by the mid 1980s due to falling market 
shares, rising deficits (and forecasts of worse to come) and unclear/inconsistent objectives. 
The solution was the 1988 Transportation Act which proposed a "road model" for the 
railway sector. '' The main features were: 
(i) 
(ii) 
( iii ) 
(iv) 
(v) 
The rail network was divided into a trunk system of main arteries and county 
lines. 
Rail infrastructure became the responsibility of a new state administration, 
Banverket (BV). 
Statens Jarnvggar (SJ) became a train operator and marketing organisation 
keeping ownership of terminals, freight wagons, passenger cars and locomotives. 
SJ would maintain a monopoly of passenger services on trunk lines and freight 
services on trunk and county lines (excluding the Iron Ore lime). 
The 24 county public transport authorities would decide the level of passenger 
service to be operated on county lines and were free to choose other contractors for 
the local and regional passenger services. 
If SJ or the County did not wish to exploit their transportation rights, BV was 
given the right to grant other interested operators the equivalent rights and 
responsibilities. 
Infrastructure charges would be paid by train operators on the basis of marginal 
social cost. This would be consistent with the pricing regime employed by the 
Roads Authority. 
The state would provide for a substantial improvement of the major network. 
A study is being undertaken (to report in January 1993) that will examine measures to 
increase competition on the rail network and, in particular, the removal of SJ's monopoly 
by January 1995. 
BV has a board of 10 members, including the Director General, appointed by Government. 
BVis highly decentralised, being split into five regions and 21 districts (see Figure 11.1). 
In addition, there is an Industrial Division having commercial responsibility for 
purchasing, production and storage of material. Within BV, there is an independent 
Railway Inspectorate responsible for safety checks and accident investigations. 
SJ has a board of 13 members, including the Director General and representative 
members of Government, business and trade unions. Its organisation has moved from a 
regional basis to a product basis with four main divisions: passenger, freight, mechanical 
and real-estate. The company's organisational chart is given by Figure 13.2. 
2. Objectives and Constraints 
Responsibilities are divided between BV and SJ as follows: 
BV is responsible for: 
Railway lines; substructure, superstructure and track, signals and other safety 
installations, overhead electric equipment. 
Terminals; all through tracks, certain storage tracks and sidings, passenger 
platforms, lighting and some major marshalling yards. 
Fixed installations for traffic supervision and safety. 
SJ is responsible for: 
Locomotives, wagons and coaches. 
Terminal buildings and stations, iilcluding surrounding public services. 
Goods terminals (except for major marshalling yards and combined roadlrail 
transfer terminals. 
Industry tracks. 
Workshops for rolling stock. 
The boundaries are not always clear cut; particular concerns include timetable planning 
(currently done by SJ), traffic control (operated by SJ, infrastructure owned by BV) and 
telecommunications. The problem with the latter is one of joint use; the same cables can 
carry ordinary telephone connections (mainly SJ use), data transmission (SJ for ticketing, 
BV for safety installations), passenger information (SJ) and signalling information (BV). 
It was decided to have exchange installations and interconnecting cables assigned to the 
infrastructure (BV) while cables and facilities to portable equipment for direct use were 
taken by the user (SJ or BV). The right to exploit new cable capacity installations (e.g. 
glassfibre optics) along the tracks was included in the infrastructure. 
Figure 13.1 BVs Organisational Chart 
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BV is responsible directly under the Swedish Government (Ministry of Transport) for the 
overall planning of the national railway network and the correct and efficient realization 
of the railway development plans established by the state. As a government agency it 
must plan for a neutral treatment of different transport companies. BVs goals are to 
ensure that rail travel is safe and efficient and to act in the most beneficial way for 
society as a whole. 
By contrast, SJ is to act as a business company and turn deficit to a fair profit to cover 
costs for improved terminals and rolling stock. SJ is free to raise capital on the open 
market but cannot create new subsidiaries without Government permission. Some 
Government control regarding maximum tariffs and closure procedures remain. 
3. Subsidiary Activity 
SJ operates a number of subsidiary companies as part of the parent company Swedcarrier 
AB. These include: 
(i) ASG AB concerned with the transportation, forwarding and warehousing of goods. 
SJ holds 45% of the capital stock of the company which (in 1990) had 5,171 
employees and a turnover of SEK 7,312m. 
(ii) Swedbusgruppen AB operates bus services under its own auspices and in 
collaboration with the County Traffic Authorities. It has 4,779 employees and a 
turnover of SEK 4,779111. 
(iii) AB Svelast is a road haulage business with 700 vehicles providing feeder services 
to railway freight traiXc. It has 814 employees and an annual turnover of SEK 
378m. 
(iv) AB Trafkestuaranger provides on-board and off-board catering facilities. It owns 
81 restaurant cars and four conference cars. It employs 1,551 and has a turnover 
SEK 654m. 
(v) SFL AB operates SJ's ferry businesses under the name SweFerry AB. It operates 
five routes to Germany and Denmark with 14 ships. It employs 574 and has a 
turnover of SEK 979M. 
(vi) TGOJ AB operates some freight and passenger traffic by rail together with a 
workshop operation for railbourne rolling stock. It employs 301 and has a turnover 
of SEK 155m. During 1991, SJ's maintenance workshops were brought under the 
management of TGOJ. 
(vii) SJ Invest AB is administered by SJ's financial sector and handles certain internal 
financial services for the group. 
(viii) SwedeRail Consulting AB operates as a consultancy, marketing SJ and BVs 
combined competence internationally and to major railway projects. 
Some subsidiaries have been privatised, such as SJ Travel Agencies. SJ also has a 50% 
holding in Combitrans Sweden AB (which markets international wagon-load trfic) and 
Nordwaggon AB (a "private" wagon company.) SJ also jointly owns with ABB Traction 
AGEVE Maintenance AB, responsible for heavy maintenance of freight wagons. This 
subsidiary was restructured in 1991 with activities concentrated in Gothenburg and 
Gavle. Since July 1992, SJ has a 100% holding of Rail Combi AB, which is responsible 
for marketing and production of national and international combined transport. 
All subsidiaries are intended to be (and are) profitable, although bus services are 
responsible for a share of the SEK 3554m paid in 1990 by the County Traffic Authorities 
and the Swedish Board of Transport for bus and rail services. (The Swedish Board of 
Transport has subsequently been abolished). In order to concentrate on profitable 
activities Swebusgruppen has pulled out of the tourist and private hire markets but has 
moved into the taxi market. Overall, subsidiaries account for 59% of the SJ Group's 
revenue. 
B. FINANCE 
1. Government Support 
SJ  is expected to be profit making, once subsidies for passenger services (outlined above) 
and for certain freight services are taken into account. In 1990 the SJ Group earned 
profits of SEK 681m, of which the rail businesses accounted for SEK 372m. The results 
for the rail business were forecast to be a profit of SEK 200m. This target was exceeded 
but still falls short of the SEK 600m p.a. profit SJ believes is necessary to support 
forthcoming investments in locomotives, coaches, freight cars, stations, workshops and 
personnel premises. In 1990 SJ made a payment to BV of up to SEK 665m based on a 
two-part tariff designed to reflect marginal social costs (or, as a proxy, short run variable 
social costs). 
Aside from infrastructure fees, BV is funded by an annual appropriation from central 
government which has increased as follows (SEK, M): 
These increases are due to increased investment (see below). 
2. Investment 
BV investment levels have increased from SEK 600m in 1988189 to SEK 2500m in 199112 
and are expected to be at  SEK 3000-4000111 per year for the rest of the century. In 
addition, expenditure of around SEK 2000m will be made on maintenance per annum (see 
Figure 11.3). Around 18% of investment is currently financed by non-Government loans. 
Investments form part of a ten year plan (1991-2000) to upgrade the railway and includes 
the following projects: 
(i) West Main line upgrading (1986-1992) at  an initial cost of SEK 425m to allow 
operation of the high speed X2000 service between Stockholm and Gothenburg. 
A further SEK 500m is to be spent replacing level crossings with road tunnels or 
bridges. 
(ii) Griidinge line (1989-1995) a new 30km line south of Stockholm, allowing faster 
Intercity trains to Gothenburg and Malmo and commuter services on the Svealand 
line. The total budget is around SEK 3000m, of which two-thirds will be 
contracted out. 
(iii) South Main line upgrading (1991-1996) to allow operation of X2000 trains between 
Stockholm and Malmo, reducingjourney times from 6 hours 15 minutes to 4 hours 
30 minutes (down 28%). The cost of this project is estimated at SEK 2000m. 
(iv) Hallandsas tunnel (1992-1996) and associated improvements on the West Coast 
line. The tunnel and 15km of double track has been costed at SEK lOOOm whilst 
other impmvements have included: 
Double tracking Gothenburg-Kungsbacka (25km at a cost of SEK 400m). 
One third of costs were covered by Local Government. 
Double tracking and re-alignment Varberg-Falkenberg (20km at  a cost of 
SEK 300m). 
Remodelling of Helsingborg station at a cost of SEK 500m. 
Complete double track between Gothenburg and Malm8 would require a 
further SEK 3000m and would only be possible with Local Government 
support. 
(v) The North link to Oslo. 
Improvements to this service involve the option of a westerly alignment (partially 
using the run-down Bohus line) or an easterly alignment (partially using the 
existing Gothenburg-Oslo line). BV favour the easterly alignment and have costed 
a scheme at SEK 9500m which, using X2000 technology, could reduce journey 
times from 4 hours 30 minutes to 2 hours (down 55%). 
(vi) Rail connection to Stockholm airport (Arlanda) (1991-1996). This scheme involves 
quadrupling the existing double track between Stockholm and Roserberg and then 
providing new double track to the terminal, rejoining the main line at Odensala. 
Some 120km of new tracks would be provided at a cost of SEK 3500m, whilst an 
additional SEK 1500m would be required for the terminal buildings. 
In most instances, the rail services are not expected to contribute to the capital costs of 
the schemes. An exception is the Arlanda scheme. It is proposed that this service will 
be franchised in such a way that a significant share of the investment costs can be 
captured ex-post. BV and the Airport authority will specify train type, minimum 
frequencies and service quality. The franchisee will be able to specify fares and check-in 
and baggage handling arrangements which will be evaluated as part of the bid. 
Guarantees for SJ to operate on the new line will be included but SJ will have to pay a 
fee per passenger using the Arlanda terminal to the franchisee. This, it is hoped, will 
maximise the share which does not need s ta t .  funding. 
A similar concept is envisaged for the proposed besund fued link between Sweden and 
Denmark. Although tolls on motorists will pay for the bulk of construction costs, on the 
Swedish side, rail access to the fixed connection will cost SEK 1500m. It is believed that 
a share of this could be covered by charges to prospective train operators. 
The other alternative source of investment funds is that of Local Government. In addition 
to the one-third funding in the Gothenburg region, two-thirds funding from Local 
Authorities is available in the Stockholm region, and up to one-quarter funding has been 
secured for the Lake Mlilar schemes. Funding for part of this last scheme is on the 
condition that a major share of construction is carried out by local private contractors. 
BV assesses investments using social cost-benefit analysis in the same way as the Roads 
Authority. The Study Alternative is compared with a Comparison Alternative, usually a 
do-nothing scenario. Sufficient funds appear to be available for the projects listed above 
and extensions of the X2000 network and 200km/hr operations as  follows: 
(i) stockholm-~ski1stuna~'dsteris-0rebro kn wn as the Lake Mdar scheme (1991- 
1998). 
(ii) Stockholm-Arlanda-Uppsala-Gavle (by 1994). 
(iii) U~psala-Borlange-Falun (by 1995). 
(iv) Lax&-Karlstad (by 1996). 
(v) Gavle-Sundsvall. 
More problematic appear to be: 
(vi) The Bothnia line connection Sundsvall-Umei. 
(vii) The Gijtaland line which would involve new track between Linkoping-Jonkoping- 
Bor& to provide a second high speed link to Gothenburg. 
A more important budget constraint for BV is emerging with respect to maintenance work. 
Figure 13.3 shows that maintenance costs are increasing at a rate greater than inflation 
which is leading to budgetary control problems. 
In 1990 the SJ  Group's total investments were SEK 2040m (1989 SEK 1485m), whilst SJ's 
investments were SEK 880m (SEK 866m). This capital was mainly spent on vehicles and 
fxed assets, with a fleet of 20 X2000 units ordered. Investments are self-financed with 
a number of sources of private finance: 
(i) Capital was raised by ASG AB being given a stock exchange listing in 1990. AB 
Transportf6~altning was a major investor. 
(ii) SJ signed a so-called partnership finance deal in 1990, selling buildings in 
Stockholm and Solna to aconsortium led by Svenskt Fastighetskapital AB for SEK 
1800m. Following the sale SJ is leasing the premises back with rent and option 
price re-distributed over time so as to give an acceptable pay-back on capital. The 
re-distribution of interest also entails positive effects on SJ's income statement, 
since the annual market rental cost is less than the yield on the capital released. 
The sale resulted in a capital gain of SEK 1.755m. SJ has an option to repurchase 
these properties &r 15 years and once every five years until 2015. 
(iii) The Real-Estates division raised SEK 225m in 1990 and promotes external renting 
out of premises and leasing out of land areas. 
C. FREIGHT MARKET 
1. Services 
The main block train-load flow is iron-ore (43% of tons carried, 17% of ton-kms), with 
domestic wagon load being the other main traffic source (40% of tons carried, 49% of ton- 
kms). Foreign wagon-load traffic and a small amount of parcels traffic (Expressgods) 
make up the balance. The main traffic groups by product type are: (% of tons carried): 
Ores and Metal Waste Products: 46% 
Manufactured Products: 18% 
Agricultural Products (including timber): 13% 
Metal Products: 11% 
Chemicals: 6% 
98.7% of ton-kilometres are operated by SJ, its subsidiaries (TGOJ) and its agents (other 
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national railways). There are, though, some private operations including Nordmark 
Klarlilvens JWvB:gar (NKJ) and the recently formed Osterlenthg which has a foothold 
in the market in the Tomelilla area. 
2. Pricing 
Rates are based on direct costs plus what the market will bear, subject to a maximum. 
Over 9070 of traffic is subject to confidential specially negotiated rates. 
3. Competition 
For hauls of over 100km, rail had, in 1990, a 28% market share, compared to coastal 
shipping and roads 30% each and inland waterways 12%. Road freight transport has been 
deregulated since 1963. SJ's road based freight services have been re-organised so as to 
be complementaj. to rail services rather than competing with them, as occurred in the 
past. 
D. PASSENGER MARKET 
1. Services 
As noted above a distinction is made between national (main line) services, generally 
operated on hourly or two hourly regular interval timetables, and regional (county line) 
services, where timetables are broadly specified by the County Passenger Transport 
Boards. The inland line (Mora-GSlllivare) is treated as a special case. There have been 
few recent cases of service withdrawls; of 24 county line services recently reviewed only 
3 were discontinued for a "trial period. 
2. Pricing 
Fares maintain a relation to distance but include a taper and reductions for travel in non- 
peak periods (any day except Friday and Sunday). 40% reductions are available for 
students, pensioners and families. 
3. Competition 
Long haul trips (over 100km) accounted for over 70% of passenger k m s  on SJ's rail 
services in 1990. It was estimated that of trips over 100km, rail has a 13% share 
compared to car 74%, air 11% and bus 2%. 
Tendering has allowed competition within the rail market. Four firms other than SJ have 
registered to receive tender documents, with one company, BK Thg, being successful and 
another company, Linjetig, having a number of "near misses". The competitive pressure 
has led to SJ  reducing tender prices by 20-30%. Local services operated on the main line 
in the Stockholm, Malmo, Gothenburg and Vktergs areas have been contracted out, 
although in these cases SJ  is the only permissible bidder. These contracts tend to be of 
long duration (up to 20 years), whilst the competitive tenders are of much shorter 
duration (typically 3 years). 
Local bus services were deregulated in 1989 and SJ faces stiff competition, particularly 
from Linjebuss and Waseatraeik. Express buses remain partially regulated but competing 
services do exist. Air services were deregulated in 1992 and SASS monopoly ended. A 
number of new entrants have emerged (Malrno Aviation, TransSweden) and fares have 
fallen by up to 25%, on average. 
14. SWITZERLAND Chemins de fer fkderaux Suisses (CFF) 
a.k.a. Schweizerische Bundesbahnen (SBB) 
a.k.a. Ferrovie federali Suizzere (FSS) 
A. OBJECTIVES AND MANAGEMENT 
1. Ownership and Organisation 
CFF was created in 1902 through the merger and nationalisation of several privately 
owned railway companies. CFF is a semi-autonomous public corporation. It has 17 board 
members (Conseil d'Administration) consisting of politicians, industrialists and trade 
unionists to which the Directors report to. CFF's internal organisation is based on a 
matrix of functions, regions and products and is outlined by Figure 14.1. 
Figure 14.1: CFF Organisational Chart 
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2. Objectives and Constraints 
CFF's objectives are set by the 1987 Service Mandate which will operate until a co- 
ordinated transport policy comes into force or until 1994, whichever is the earliest date. 
A distinction (first made in 1982) is made between commercial and social sectors. The 
commercial sector covers long distance passenger traffic, wagonload and sundries traffic. 
CFF were given full commercial freedom in these sectors. The social sector covers 
regional passenger transport and, for a limited start-up period, piggyback t r d c .  Social 
services are only provided by CFF if ordered by the service mandate and corresponding 
compensation is offered. Government accepts the financial responsibility for 
infrastructure. CFF have to pay a contribution towards these expenses, earned by the 
commercial sector. This contribution is fured in advance by Government. Should CFF not 
be able to earn the contribution towards infrastructure costs, they have to show the deficit 
in their balance sheet and carry it forward to the new account, if they cannot cover it by 
reserves from previous years. The level of contributions was fixed annually in 1987 and 
1988 and for three year periods from 1990 onwards. In defining infrastructure, the main 
problem area was that of power generation. CFF maintains financial responsibility for 
power plants, frequency converters and power transmission lines to sub-stations but 
Government has responsibility for sub stations and power lines from sub-stations. 
Government also has responsibility for all administrative buildings, houses, warehouses 
and commercial facilities (station restaurants etc). 
It should be noted that the Government has assumed the financial, but not the physical, 
responsibility for CFF structure. The main change is an accountancy one with a corporate 
profit and loss account and an infrastructure profit and loss account being produced. The 
latter, for 1989 and 1990, is shown by Table 14.1. It can be seen that infrastlvcture 
charges only cover a small percentage of costs (11% in 1989,3% in 1990). 
Table 14.1: Infrastructure Profit and Loss Account (SFr Mio) 
Although Government has financial responsibility, CFF continues responsibility for 
infrastructure design. Government's influence is restricted to a review and approval of 
the investment budget for submission to parliament. The 1987 Service Mandate does 
provide for the Government to approve the long-term planning of CFF and to check, in 
particular, its agreement with the over riding objectives of the Confederation; to judge the 
medium t . - co rpo ra t e  and investment plans derived from the long term planning; and 
to review the annual budget. 
CFF is free to set fares at  commercial levels for Inter City and Direct services in order to 
cover operating costs. Fares on Regional services are determined by Local Government 
(i.e. the 25 Cantons). Rail services may be withdrawn if they are not covering operating 
costs and Government support is not forthcoming, although bus substitution will normally 
be required. There is a trend towards decentralising the transport budget from the 
Federal government to the Canton governments, whilst for regional services tendering is 
being considered. 
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B. FINANCE 
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949.9 
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949.9 
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1. Government Support 
In addition to Government support for infrastructure, Government supported regional and 
piggy-back services to the tune of SFr 550m in 1990 (SFr 523m in 1989). Given total 
expenditure of SFr 5364m in 1990 (SFr 4975111 in 1989), Government covers around 31% 
of costs (30% in 1989). 
2. Investment 
CFF's gross investments in 1990 were SFr 1932m (SFr 1631m in 1989). Net investment, 
given property sales and grants, was SFr 1775m (SFr 1509m in 1989). Investment has 
been planned in the Rail and Bus 2000 programme, which was supported by a plebisate 
held in December 1987. This programme has the following elements: 
(i) Improve passenger services by increasing frequency of Inter City and Express 
services from hourly to half hourly, reducing journey times on key O-D pairs (e.g. 
Berne-Zurich) to under an hour and co-ordinating services with Regional bus and 
train services, so as to reduce interchange. It is hoped that public journey times 
will berreduced by up to 48%. This will require 120km of new lines (equivalent to 
2.4% of existing rail tracks) in four main schemes, 26 track improvement schemes 
and modernisation of layout at nine key stations. 
(ii) Improve passenger services by introducing new rolling stock. For long distance 
services orders in 1990 included 24 Rolling Stock Locomotives, 60 EWIV coaches 
and 70 Euocity coaches, whilst for regional services this included 84 Kolibiri 
trains, 120 S-bahn locomotives and 390 double decker coaches. The piggyback 
transit corridor (see below) will require an additional 90 engines. Total orders for 
Rail 2000 are expected to be 340 engines and 1700 coaches. 
(iii) Improve freight services by developing a network for liner trains running at 
regular intervals and two Transalpine Piggyback Corridors. This will require two 
new tunnels 
(a) the Gotthard base tunnel (49km) to be completed by 2010 
(b) the Liitschberg base tunnel (28km) 
as well as a new Golthard transalpine service between Arth-Goldau and Altdorf. 
piggyback services will be capable of carrying 40 tonne lorries, semi-trailers and 
swap bodies. 
In developing piggyback services, CFF has formed a partnership with Hupac AG. They 
plan, organise and sell the piggyback services of the railways. Hupac operate the 
terminals and manage around 800 purpose-built wagons. By 1994, it is expected that 
Hupac will require 1000 additional wagons. 
1. Services 
CFF transports f ~ i g h t  as part-loads (Cargo Domicile), wagon loads and block trains 
(Cargo Rail) and containers and combined transport (Cargo Combi). These services are 
offered for inland, import, export and transit traffic. In 1990 tonnes lifted were as follows 
(million): 
Cargo Rail 41.4 80% 
of which Inland Traffic 18.1 35% 
Export 2.1 4% 
Import 11.3 22% 
Transit 9.9 19% 
Cargo Combi 8.9 17% 
of which Piggy Back 4.7 9% 
Containers 4.2 8% 
Cargo Domicile 0.9 2% 
Postal 0.6 1% 
TOTAL 51.8 
2. Competition 
In 1988 rail had a 40% market share (based on tonne km) of freight movements compared 
to 54% for road and 6% for pipelines. Despite a gross weight limit of 28 tonnes and bans 
on lorry use at night and on Sundays, road transport has grown rapidly, particularly for 
domestic trac (for example, in 1970 road had a 38% market share compared to rail's 
53%). However, rail is important for international traEc. Of Transalpine traffic through 
Switzerland, in 1987, 64% went by rail, 29% by pipeline and only 6% by road. However, 
Transalpine traffic via Switzerland has not increased at the same rate as elsewhere. In 
1987, Switzerland only accounted for 22% of land based movements, compared to Austria 
40% and France 37%. This is due to the less stringent regulations concerning road-based 
transport in these two countries. 
D. PASSENGER MARKET 
1. Services 
Passenger services are divided into three main groups; Inter City (approximately 19% of 
train kms in 19901, Direct or Express (29% of train miles) and Fkgional (52% of train 
kms). Regional services include S-bahn services in the main cities and, in Zurich, an RER 
style service. 
2. Competition 
In 1988 rail had a 12% share of passenger traffic (in passenger-km) compared to car 83% 
bus 4% and air 1%. There are around 60 so-called private railways, although in most 
cases the local Canton is the largest share-holder and they are heavily subsidised. The 
largest of these "private" companies is the Berne-Lotschberg-Simplon (BLS) railway. Both 
bus and domestic air services are regulated on a concession basis. Concessions are 
unlikely to be granted for services competing with train services. 
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